Greg Roberts

The applicant brought a motion under Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that the delay of approximately four years, nine months, and nine days between his charge and anticipated sentencing constituted an unconstitutional delay.

The applicant was charged with six counts of child pornography offences in November 2011 and was found guilty on two counts in February 2016.

The motion was brought in August 2016, following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Jordan, which established new presumptive ceilings for trial delay.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the total delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases, the delay was justified under the transitional exceptional circumstances framework established in Jordan, as the parties had relied on the law as it previously existed for the majority of the delay period.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for the appointment of an inspector under s. 161 of the Business Corporations Act to investigate two defendant companies.

The defendants opposed, arguing the plaintiffs lacked standing as they were no longer shareholders.

The court found the plaintiffs had standing based on original share certificates.

The court granted the motion, holding that the companies' failure to provide financial statements prior to 2012 raised an index of suspicion of oppressive conduct, meeting the low evidentiary threshold for appointing an inspector.

The inspector's mandate was limited to issues not statute-barred.

The plaintiff moved for an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendants from transferring or encumbering assets connected to a rooftop solar energy project.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald framework, the court accepted that there was a serious issue to be tried but rejected the argument that a modified property-rights injunction test applied.

The court held the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm because the responding parties had already undertaken not to assign, transfer, or encumber the project assets without a court order and any loss would be quantifiable in damages.

The balance of convenience also favoured refusing the injunction.

The motion was dismissed with fixed costs to the respondents.

A homebuilder sued a purchaser for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale after the transaction failed to close.

The purchaser had moved into the property under an interim occupancy agreement while the vendor sought a minor zoning variance required due to a setback issue.

The purchaser attempted to reinstate a “time of the essence” clause and set a final closing date, then treated the agreement as terminated when the vendor did not close on that date.

The court held that the purchaser’s notice was ineffective because it imposed new conditions, set an unreasonable closing date, and was motivated by bad faith.

The purchaser repudiated the contract, entitling the vendor to retain the deposits as liquidated damages and recover certain additional amounts under collateral and occupancy agreements.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision finding that the services it provided were real estate services under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the scope of services to be provided was a matter of factual dispute requiring a trial to determine the precise services and assess them against the legislative language.