Citation
CITATION: Maracle (Re), 2026 ONSC 2630
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO IN BANKRUPTCY and INSOLVENCY
IN THE MATTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY OF ANDREW CLIFFORD MARACLE III OF THE COUNTY OF HASTINGS IN THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
RE: Andrew Clifford Miracle, Applicant AND: Andrew Clifford Maracle III, Jasmine Johnson, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), Respondents
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
RE: Glenn Bogue, Applicant AND: Andrew Clifford Miracle, Andrew Clifford Maracle III, Smokin’ Joes and Smokin’ Speedway, Virginia Maracle, Lisa Sexsmith Maracle operating as Smokin’ Speedway and Yolanda Maracle, Respondents
BEFORE: Mew J.
COUNSEL: Ian J. Collins, for Andrew Clifford Miracle Greg Roberts, for Glenn Bogue Ken Page, for Schwartz Levitsky Feldman Inc. (as Trustee in Bankruptcy for Andrew Clifford Maracle III) Jeff Larry, for Schwartz Levitsky Feldman Inc. (as court appointed Receiver of Andrew Clifford Miracle) Natalia Paunic, for Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
HEARD: 15 April 2026 at Belleville (by video conference)
ENDORSEMENT
1Counsel have been unable to agree the terms of the order, or orders, resulting from my reasons for decision dated 23 January 2026: Maracle (Re), 2026 ONSC 449.
2Following a flurry of email communications, a case conference was convened to discuss concerns raised by counsel and settle the terms of the orders.
The Decision
3My decision arose from three motions which I heard on 3 October 2025. They are more fully described at para. 24 of my reasons. But in essence, the motions were:
a. A motion brought by Andrew Clifford Miracle (referred to in the reasons as “Senior”) in the bankruptcy proceeding (Court File No. BK-19-02561274-0033) (Ottawa) seeking, inter alia, an order that Senior’s approved claim in the bankruptcy of Andrew Clifford Maracle III (“Junior”) be paid out to his credit;
b. A motion by Glenn Bogue in the bankruptcy of Junior and the other related proceedings, declaring him to be a secured creditor of Junior; and
c. A motion by Schwartz Levitsky Feldman (as court appointed Receiver of Senior) approving the Receiver’s first report and authorising Junior’s Trustee in bankruptcy to transfer Senior’s share of the bankruptcy dividend to the Receiver for distribution.
Conditional Settlement
4On 1 October 2025, two days before the motions were heard, counsel for Mr. Bogue wrote to the court advising of a conditional settlement between Mr. Bogue, the Trustee and the Receiver. The settlement was conditional upon Senior’s motion being dismissed and on the court granting orders discharging the Trustee and the Receiver.
5Although in my reasons for decision, Senior’s motion was dismissed, I did not order the discharge of the Trustee or the Receiver.
6Shortly after my reasons had been released, Mr. Bogue’s lawyer wrote to the court advising that the 1 October 2025 letter had resolved all of the issues except Senior’s motion and costs. The letter concluded:
I anticipate that this settlement will be incorporated in draft orders for your review.
7On my instructions, the court advised counsel that because the terms of the settlement had been predicated on the court granting an order discharging the Trustee and Receiver, which had not, in fact, occurred, the terms of the settlement had not been incorporated into the court’s reasons. The communication to counsel continued:
While the terms of the settlement did not inform Justice Mew’s reasons for decision, it may well be, as [counsel for Mr. Bogue] suggests, possible to incorporate some, if not all, of the elements addressed in the settlement in the order.
8What is clear from this exchange of correspondence is that Mr. Bogue, the Trustee and the Receiver wished to have the terms of their settlement incorporated into the order resulting from my reasons for decision dated 23 January 2026, notwithstanding that one of the conditions of their agreement (the formal discharge of the Trustee and the Receiver) had not occurred (specifically, at para. 106 of my reasons I had stated that an order would go authorising and directing the Trustee to seek such further directions from the court that may be necessary for the Trustee to discharge its remaining responsibilities, if any, and adjourned, sine die, Mr. Bogue’s motion for discharge of the Receiver).
9I would add that none of the additional details that they propose to include in the order involve matters of substance. Nor do they address any matters that affect Senior’s interests.
The Draft Orders
10Two draft orders have been prepared following the release of my reasons:
a. An order addressing the relief sought by the Receiver and Mr. Bogue in their respective motions; and
b. An order dealing with the dismissal of the relief sought by Senior.
11Senior objects to the contents of both of these draft orders.
12Senior’s principal objection to both draft orders is that they should not bear the date of 23 January 2026, i.e. the date that my reasons were released, but, rather, should bear the date that I sign the orders.
13Senior argues that in my reasons, at para. 106, I wrote that: “[f]or the foregoing reasons, orders will go…” – before itemising the various items that I had determined – and continued, at para. 107, that: “Counsel should confer on the form and content of a formal order that gives effect to the foregoing”. Senior argues that this contemplates orders to be made in the future.
14Counsel for Senior initially took the position that a draft of the Receiver order prepared by counsel for the Receiver was satisfactory as to form and content with the exception of the date that the order should bear. However, he subsequently withdrew his approval of the content of the order, taking the position that he had never been given notice of the motion brought by the Receiver and, hence, that I should not have ruled on the relief sought by the Receiver and instead, I should re-hear the Receiver’s motion.
15All of the parties other than Senior take the position that the orders should bear the date that my reasons were released and that the real reason for Senior’s objection is that he has missed the time within which an appeal can be taken (other than with leave of the Court of Appeal to commence an appeal out of time). The other parties also reject the suggestion that Senior was unaware of the Receiver’s motion. Even if he was, the Receiver’s motion did not deal with any substantive issues affecting Senior’s interests.
Date of the Order
16I will deal first with the date that the orders should bear.
17An order is effective from the date on which it is made, unless the order provides otherwise: Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 59.01.
18Morden & Perell, The Law of Civil Procedure in Ontario, 5th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2024), at §11.11, comment:
This means the order operates notwithstanding that the formalities of issuing and entering the order…have not been completed.
19In Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 ONCA 206, at para. 57, Watt J.A. reiterated that, as a general rule, the time period within which a notice of appeal is to be delivered begins to run on the date the order under appeal is pronounced by oral or written reasons, adding “[i]n other words, the time begins to run from the date a judgment is pronounced, and not from the date that it is signed and entered”. An exception to this general principle would be where a substantial matter remains to be determined from the day of pronouncement of the decision, in which case time would run from entry of the order, not pronouncement.
20Counsel for the Receiver argues – and I accept – that there are very few provisions in the draft orders that are not addressed in my reasons for decision. And nothing in the draft orders is inconsistent with my reasons. To the extent that there are matters of detail that my reasons did not address, they reflect the agreement between the affected parties. The details of that agreement were disclosed to all parties, including Senior, and have no impact on Senior’s position or interests.
21In short, no substantial matters have been included in the draft orders that were not addressed in the oral submissions made, or written materials filed, on the motions.
22Furthermore, as previously indicated, Senior’s lawyer initially agreed to the content of the draft Receiver order (other than its date). Counsel for Mr. Bogue and the Receiver make the reasonable suggestion that Senior’s subsequent resiling from that position is purely tactical.
23I therefore conclude that the effective date of the orders should be 23 January 2026.
The Receiver’s Motion
24I do not accept that Senior and his lawyer were unaware of the Receiver’s motion.
25It is conceded on behalf of Senior that on 15 September 2025 at 4:36:15 p.m., the Receiver’s lawyer sent Senior’s lawyer an email, the contents of which were as follows:
Please refer to the link below which contains our motion record and factum, and confirm receipt. Thank you. [link provided.]
26Senior argues that, notwithstanding that service by email on a lawyer of record is valid service under the Rules (r. 16.01(4)(b)(iv)), the use of a link, rather than attaching the served documents to the email message, is not valid service.
27That position belies modern reality. Use of document sharing services and other links embedded in email messages, particularly where multiple documents or large documents are being served, is now routine.
28Counsel for Senior raises the additional argument that no confirmation of motion was sent to the court by the Receiver’s lawyers. Assuming that to be correct, it might have been a valid basis for an objection to be raised to the motion proceeding on 3 October 2025. But no such objection was raised. It is far too late to do so now.
29Despite counsel for Senior’s protestations to the contrary, it is inconceivable that Senior and his counsel were not aware that the Receiver had brought a motion. As I pointed out to Mr. Collins during the course of his submissions, my own notes of the submissions made by Mr. Larry at the hearing of the motion indicate that he made frequent references to his factum. That factum addressed not only the Receiver’s motion, but also, Senior’s motion in the bankruptcy action for payment of his share of the dividend.
Reconsideration – And Another Motion
30In a written memorandum submitted by Senior’s lawyer prior to the case conference, he asked that I reconsider my decision. His reasons for this request included not only the issue of whether the Receiver’s motion was properly before the court but, also, what he characterised as numerous other errors or omissions arising from my reasons.
31Surprisingly, on 28 April 2026, Senior purported to serve a motion seeking orders that:
a. I reconsider and review my reasons for decision dated 23 January 2026;
b. I reverse my ruling that the Trustee pay bankruptcy funds to the Receiver;
c. I order payment of the bankruptcy funds to Senior as an approved unsecured creditor; and
d. I order that payment of the bankruptcy levy not be deducted from the funds received by Senior by reasons of s. 89 of the Indian Act.
32Put differently, Senior is asking me to hear an appeal from my own decision.
33I should add that this latest motion purports to be returnable in Belleville on 9 June 2026, a date that appears to have been unilaterally selected by Senior’s lawyer without consulting the court or counsel.
34The motion is an abuse of process. It will not be heard.
Disposition
35Orders will be signed in accordance with the drafts prepared by the lawyers for Mr. Bogue (the bankruptcy motions) and the Receiver. I will incorporate into the draft orders presented by the Receiver and Mr. Bogue the disposition of costs, which I have dealt with in a concurrent endorsement.
36Mr. Bogue requested costs of the attendance at the 15 April 2026 case conference which, he submitted, was completely unnecessary, and no more than a device to try and buttress some sort of appeal or leave to extend time to appeal.
37The Receiver also seeks costs. It argues that the case conference was predicated on the fiction that a notice of motion was not delivered.
38Senior argues that there should be no costs of the case conference. He says that he “provided very substantial authorities” to the court and believed that I should reconsider my judgment.
39No objection was taken to the quantum of costs submitted by Mr. Bogue and the Receiver, namely, $5,000 each.
40In my view, the issues raised on behalf of Senior are entirely without merit. The Receiver and Mr. Bogue are each entitled to costs, which I fix in the amount of $5,000 to each of those parties. The Trustee did not ask for costs.
Mew J.
Date: 4 May 2026