Howard Crosner

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking to exclude documents disclosed late by the defendants or, alternatively, to examine the defendants on them, citing non-compliance with disclosure rules.

The defendants also sought to examine the plaintiff on newly disclosed handwritten notes.

The court granted leave for the defendants to use their late-disclosed documents, but on terms that included an adjournment of the trial, an examination of the defendants on the documents, and payment of the plaintiff's costs thrown away.

The court also ordered the plaintiff to attend an examination regarding her late-disclosed notes, a request which was unopposed.

The accused was charged with two counts of possession of heroin and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The accused initially pleaded not guilty to the trafficking charges but guilty to simple possession.

The Crown rejected the pleas and the trial proceeded.

The accused testified that the drugs were for personal use, funded by online poker winnings.

The court found the accused's evidence incredible due to numerous inconsistencies with statements made to an addiction medicine specialist and the mathematical impossibility of affording such quantities on welfare income alone.

The court concluded the accused was an "addict trafficker" who possessed the drugs to sell them to fund his own addiction.

Both charges were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant, Ying Tsuen Tiao, brought an application to declare a fraudulent discharge of her first mortgage void and to rectify the land register by restoring her mortgage to its original first priority position.

The respondents, Dino Leone and Jeanette Leone, had fraudulently discharged the applicant's mortgage and subsequently registered new mortgages.

While the Director of Titles agreed to delete the fraudulent discharge, they argued the applicant's mortgage should be reinstated in a lower priority.

The court applied the theory of deferred indefeasibility, finding the Leones were fraudulent persons and the subsequent mortgagees were intermediate owners.

The court ordered the fraudulent discharge void and the applicant's mortgage restored to first priority, ahead of the subsequent mortgages.

Following a judgment allowing the appeal in part, the Court of Appeal received written submissions on costs.

The court awarded the appellants their costs of the appeal and related motions, fixed at $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellants defaulted on a loan secured by both a promissory note and a mortgage.

The promissory note contained a provision escalating the interest rate from 0.75% to 10% upon default, while the mortgage contained late payment and default fees.

The motion judge granted summary judgment enforcing the 10% interest rate and the fees.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that because the promissory note and mortgage secured the same debt, section 8 of the Interest Act applied to both instruments.

The interest escalation provision and the late fees were found to violate section 8's prohibition against penalties on arrears secured by a mortgage and were set aside.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for defamation.

The defendants counterclaimed for abuse of process and added John Magno, the plaintiffs' brother, as a defendant by counterclaim.

John Magno brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike the counterclaim against him.

The court found that the counterclaim disclosed no reasonable cause of action against John Magno because he was not a plaintiff in the main action and had not initiated any legal process against the defendants.

The counterclaim against John Magno was struck without leave to amend.

The plaintiff corporation brought a motion for partial summary judgment arising from an alleged fraudulent investment scheme involving a purported $900 million bond‑trading program.

The plaintiff had transferred $2 million to a company account controlled by the principal defendant, believing the funds would be used in a short‑term bond transaction, but the funds were diverted through various accounts and ultimately used to purchase personal assets including a luxury residence.

The defendants asserted the transaction was legitimate and that the funds had been used for the bond program, but produced no reliable documentation supporting the existence of the bonds or the investment structure.

The court found overwhelming evidence that the scheme was fraudulent and that the principal defendant had knowingly misappropriated the funds.

Partial summary judgment was granted for $2 million against the principal defendant and related companies, while claims against other parties were left for trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking a stay of an order that had discharged a certificate of pending litigation obtained ex parte, pending determination of their motion for leave to appeal.

The prior order discharged the certificate on the basis that the plaintiffs failed to provide full, fair, and frank disclosure, including failing to disclose earlier related proceedings.

Applying the test analogous to an interlocutory injunction—serious issue, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience—the court considered the procedural history and an existing consent order preserving the status quo.

The court concluded that maintaining the status quo pending the leave to appeal motion was appropriate to avoid prejudice to either side.

The order discharging the certificate was stayed, subject to limited exceptions allowing the defendants to deal with specified properties, and a scheduled summary judgment motion was adjourned pending the leave motion.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a registrar’s dismissal order after failing to meet a court‑ordered deadline to set the action down for trial.

The underlying action involved a claim for adverse possession of a strip of land and a counterclaim for injunctive relief.

Applying the Reid factors, the court considered the explanation for the delay, the conduct of the parties, the role of former counsel’s errors, and potential prejudice to the defendants.

The court found the delay was not deliberate or contumelious and that the plaintiffs had made ongoing efforts to advance the action.

As the defendants demonstrated little actual prejudice and had themselves taken no steps to advance the litigation, the dismissal order was set aside and a new trial set‑down deadline imposed.

The plaintiffs moved to dismiss the defendants' appeal for delay, and the defendants brought a cross-motion to extend the time to perfect their appeal of a Master's order striking their pleadings.

The Master had previously struck the defendants' pleadings due to repeated failures to comply with timetables and court orders.

The Divisional Court found that the defendants failed to demonstrate a bona fide intention to appeal within the prescribed time, that the delay was excusable, or that the appeal had merit.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the appeal for delay and dismissed the defendants' cross-motion for an extension of time.