E. Persichilli

The defendant insurer brought a motion to have the plaintiff's long-term disability action and a separate tort action arising from a motor vehicle accident heard together or consecutively.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing prejudice due to the actions being at different stages of litigation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the actions shared some common facts, the issues were discrete, and delaying the advanced long-term disability action would prejudice the plaintiff.

The plaintiff successfully moved to set aside a registrar's dismissal order.

The parties could not agree on costs, and the defendants sought partial indemnity costs of $5,949.49, arguing that the plaintiff was granted an indulgence.

The court found that while the plaintiff received an indulgence, the defendants' counsel contributed to the delay and prejudice by refusing to make a defendant available for discovery and failing to preserve evidence.

The court concluded that no costs should be payable on the motion.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar's dismissal order for delay in a personal injury action.

The court applied the four-factor test from Habib v. Mucaj and Reid v. Dow Corning Corp., finding that while there were periods of unexplained delay attributable to counsel, the plaintiff himself was not at fault.

Crucially, the prejudice to the defendants due to a defendant's terminal illness was not solely attributable to the plaintiff's counsel's delay, as defendants' counsel also contributed to the delay and failed to mitigate prejudice by preserving evidence under Rule 36.01.

The motion was granted, and the dismissal order was set aside, with the action to be set down for trial by a specified date.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a registrar’s dismissal order after failing to meet a court‑ordered deadline to set the action down for trial.

The underlying action involved a claim for adverse possession of a strip of land and a counterclaim for injunctive relief.

Applying the Reid factors, the court considered the explanation for the delay, the conduct of the parties, the role of former counsel’s errors, and potential prejudice to the defendants.

The court found the delay was not deliberate or contumelious and that the plaintiffs had made ongoing efforts to advance the action.

As the defendants demonstrated little actual prejudice and had themselves taken no steps to advance the litigation, the dismissal order was set aside and a new trial set‑down deadline imposed.