Stephen Robert Dyment

This appeal arose from the appellants' default under several mortgages and guarantees.

The appellants challenged the motion judge's decision to grant interest despite the respondent's concession of charging a criminal interest rate and failing to provide timely discharge statements, and disputed the calculation of amounts owing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, affirming the motion judge's discretionary application of notional severance for the criminal interest rate and upholding the factual findings regarding the amounts advanced.

The court found no reversible error or basis for claims of Charter violations or judicial bias.

The applicant corporation sought leave for its principal to represent it in a construction lien action, despite having legal counsel.

The respondents opposed, raising concerns about the principal's advocacy ability and seeking security for costs.

The court granted leave on the condition that the applicant post $56,000 as security for costs by a specified date.

The court found that while the principal's advocacy ability was a concern, it did not meet the "too high a threshold" for denial, but imposed the security for costs to "level the playing field" and ensure procedural fairness, given the existing security posted by the defendants in the construction lien context.

Failure to post the security would result in the claim and defence to counterclaim being stayed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that rejected her claim of a partnership for a residential property and found her not credible.

The trial judge had also awarded punitive damages against the appellant in favour of one respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the partnership, upholding the trial judge's factual findings and credibility assessments, which were entitled to deference.

However, the Court of Appeal set aside the punitive damages award, reiterating that such damages require an independent actionable wrong, which was absent in this case.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their claim for a mandatory order requiring the respondents to relocate the venting of a furnace and hot water heater from the side to the top of the respondents' house.

The appellants had claimed that emissions from the side venting were obnoxious, caused fumes and vapours that made one appellant ill, caused ice buildup on their walkway, and posed potential future danger to their siding.

The trial judge found that the appellants' complaints did not constitute a substantial interference with their enjoyment of property under the law of nuisance, as the expert evidence was insufficient, health claims were unsupported by medical evidence, ice buildup was insignificant, and future damage claims were speculative.

The appellants did not appeal the dismissal of their damages claim but only the dismissal of the mandatory order claim.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the appeal.