Grace M. McKeown

The applicant sought to register a British Columbia default judgment against the Antiguan Government in Ontario under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act.

The British Columbia judgment was itself a derivative judgment enforcing a Privy Council order regarding expropriation compensation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Antiguan Government did not carry on business in British Columbia through its Citizenship by Investment Program representatives.

Furthermore, the court held that the 'original judgment' under s. 3(g) of the Act was the Privy Council judgment, not the British Columbia judgment, meaning the respondent would have a valid limitation period defence in Ontario.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order striking his pleading and dismissing his action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The appellant had previously brought an action in contract against the respondents claiming they had guaranteed a $30,000 short-term loan.

That action was dismissed on summary judgment and the appeal was dismissed.

One month later, the appellant brought a new action arising from the same facts but framed in tort, alleging misrepresentation, fraud, and deceit.

The respondents moved to strike the second action as an abuse of process on the basis of res judicata.

The motion judge found the tort action was based on the same facts as the dismissed contract action and that the appellant should have included all causes of action in the original pleading.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 21.01(3)(d), and sought to prevent further actions without leave under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found the current action to be an attempt to relitigate issues previously decided by Perrell J. and upheld on appeal, applying the doctrine of res judicata.

The plaintiff's argument of new facts and legal theories was rejected, as the underlying factual basis was the same and could have been raised with reasonable diligence in the prior action.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's action, finding it frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and declined to exercise discretion to allow relitigation.

The plaintiff moved to add its founder back into the action as a plaintiff nunc pro tunc, arguing misnomer.

The founder had originally commenced the action in his own name but subsequently obtained an ex parte order substituting the corporate plaintiff for himself.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the deliberate decision to substitute the parties meant the founder was not always the intended plaintiff, and thus the test for misnomer was not met.

However, the court granted leave to amend the statement of claim to add the founder as a plaintiff without prejudice to any limitation period defence, as agreed by the defendants.

The appellant brought a motion for summary judgment against the respondents on an alleged guarantee of a $30,000 loan.

The motions judge dismissed the motion and granted the respondents' cross-motion for summary judgment, dismissing the action against them.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's findings that there was no agreement to guarantee the loan and that, in any event, an oral guarantee would be unenforceable under section 4 of the Statute of Frauds.

The appeal was dismissed.