REASONS FOR DECISION

COURT FILE NO.: 114/14 & 45/15 DATE: 20160629 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

JAMIL OSAI OGIAMIEN Applicant – and – HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO as represented by the MINISTRY OF COMMUNITY SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, and MAPLEHURST CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX and the ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondents

Counsel: Self-Represented Ms. Barbara Jackman, Amicus Curiae

Mr. Whitehead and Ms. Evans, for the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services and Maplehurst Correctional Complex Ms. Guthrie and Mr. Dodokin, for the Attorney General of Canada

JAMIL OSAI OGIAMIEN Applicant – and – HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO as represented by the MINISTRY OF COMMUNITY SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, and the CENTRAL NORTH CORRECTIONAL CENTRE Respondents

Counsel: Self-Represented Ms. Barbara Jackman, Amicus Curiae Mr. Whitehead and Ms. Evans, for the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services and Central North Correctional Complex

Heard: Sept 12, 26, Oct 8, 10, Nov 14, 21, Dec 12, 2014 – Jan 8, Feb 27, Mar 18, Apr 29 -30, May 1, 12, Jun 1, 2, 3, 4, 16, 23, Aug 17, Sept 11, 14, Oct 5, 9, 22, 30, Nov 16, 30, Dec 1, 2, 4, 11, 17, 2015; Jan 14, 15, 20, 25, 26, 28, Feb 10, 11, 12, 26, Mar 3, 9, 18, Apr 5 , 6, 12, 21, 29, May 9, 17, 26, 27, June 1, 2016

Coats J.

Background Regarding Issues

[1] On June 1, 2016, I made an endorsement in this habeas corpus application commenced by Mr. Ogiamien. I indicated that I had considered the decision of Chaudhary v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 ONCA 700, 127 O.R. (3d) 401. I found that Mr. Ogiamien had established reasonable and probable grounds for his complaint – that his detention was lengthy and of uncertain continued duration. The Respondent, the Attorney General of Canada, did not meet the onus in establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. Ogiamien’s continued detention at Maplehurst Correctional Complex (“Maplehurst”) or in any other correctional facility is reasonably necessary to further the machinery of immigration control. For these reasons, I found that Mr. Ogiamien’s detention had become illegal and I ordered him released from detention on terms of judicial interim release pending his removal from Canada. I indicated that written reasons would follow. These are the reasons.

[2] On March 25, 2014, Mr. Ogiamien was arrested by the Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA”) pursuant to an outstanding immigration warrant for his arrest. Mr. Ogiamien was ordered detained on immigration grounds on that same day. He was in custody on criminal hold at the time of his immigration arrest.

[3] On May 2, 2014, while detained at Maplehurst on criminal hold, bail was posted with regard to Mr. Ogiamien’s outstanding criminal charges in Ontario. He remained detained, however, as a result of the order for his detention on immigration grounds. His outstanding criminal charges were withdrawn on July 16, 2014. Mr. Ogiamien has remained detained for removal on immigration hold since that time.

Procedural History of this Application

[4] On or about August 22, 2014, Mr. Ogiamien filed this habeas corpus application based on a complaint that he was being denied access to legal resources and writing materials, that he claimed he required to challenge his detention in the Federal Court. The application evolved in the fall of 2014 and my December 12, 2014 endorsement reflects that Mr. Ogiamien was challenging the legality of his detention as well as his restricted access to legal materials for the purpose of challenging his detention.

[5] In my endorsement of December 12, 2014, I concluded that the evidentiary record before me was insufficient to determine whether this Court had jurisdiction to entertain this application. I reserved my decision for two months during which time Mr. Ogiamien would have the opportunity to avail himself of recourses that would assist him in pursuing a remedy in Federal Court. On the basis of his efforts and the outcome, I would be able to determine whether Mr. Ogiamien did, in fact, have a remedy available in the Federal Court, and accordingly, whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the application.

[6] I resumed hearing witnesses in this application. The focus of the evidence was on the issue of whether Mr. Ogiamien did have in fact available to him a claim in the Federal Court, which is at least as broad as that available by way of habeas corpus and no less advantageous: see May v. Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 809; Peiroo v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 253 (C.A.). The evidence focussed on two issues: (1) Evidence of the effectiveness of the statutory remedies available to him to challenge his immigration detention in the Federal Court; and (2) The merits of his claims against the correctional facilities. This is best explained in my endorsement of June 26, 2015.

[7] The Applicant also raised other issues in this period of the proceeding. He sought to quash a criminal conviction. He sought an order that I direct the Attorney General of Canada to show cause as to why they are seeking to deport him when his deportation order was already executed. He also brought an “Emergency Application for a Writ of Mandamus and an order for Immediate Release” in the Ontario Court of Appeal, which was dismissed: R. v. Ogiamien, 2015 ONCA 680.

[8] On October 22, 2015, the Court appointed amicus curiae.

[9] On October 30, 2015, in light of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Chaudhary, Mr. Ogiamien amended his application with the assistance of amicus. The handwritten amended application is attached as Schedule “A” to these Reasons. Mr. Ogiamien confirmed that the amended application represented the entirety of his argument going forward with respect to immigration matters. On October 30, 2015, he also set to the side his claims against Maplehurst and Central North Corrections Centre as they related to the conditions of his detention for later determination. I note that some of these issues were addressed in Ogiamien v. Ontario, 2016 ONSC 3080.

[10] My endorsement of October 30, 2015 states that the question before the Court on Mr. Ogiamien’s amended habeas corpus application is whether his detention is unlawful or illegal because of its length and uncertain duration. This is based on Chaudhary. The endorsement provides that Mr. Ogiamien will give evidence, subject to cross-examination, to show that reasonable and probable grounds exist for his complaint (see Chaudhary, at para. 81) and to prove deprivation of liberty and a legitimate ground upon which to question the legality of this deprivation: see Chaudhary, at paras. 94 and 96. I refer to this as the threshold issue. If the evidence establishes that Mr. Ogiamien has met his burden on the threshold issue, the onus will shift to the Attorney General of Canada to satisfy the Court that despite its length and uncertain duration, the continued detention is still justified. I will refer to this as the merits issue.

[11] I proceeded to hear evidence with respect to both the threshold issue and the merits issue. After the evidence was completed on both issues I received written submissions and heard oral argument. On June 1, 2016, I ordered Mr. Ogiamien be released on terms of judicial interim release with specific terms set out in my endorsement of that date.

[12] During the period in which I was hearing evidence on the amended application, Mr. Ogiamien raised other issues. He brought a “show cause” motion with respect to the seizure of a vehicle, which I determined fell outside the scope of these proceedings. He brought a motion in January 2016 asking that I recuse myself, which he later withdrew. He brought a motion for interim release, which was heard over several days and was denied by me on May 17, 2016.

Brief Background with Regard to Mr. Ogiamien

[13] Before his entry to Canada, Mr. Ogiamien was convicted of numerous felonies in California and New York including credit card fraud, grand theft, appropriate lost property, possess driver’s license or identification to commit forgery, making a false financial statement, second degree burglary, forgery of access card, and obstructing a public service officer. Mr. Ogiamien was scheduled to be sentenced in the United States (“U.S.”), but he did not appear, which resulted in a warrant for his arrest.

[14] Mr. Ogiamien entered Canada in November 2001 from the U.S. under an assumed name, and carrying fraudulent U.S. identification documents in the name of Alain Lapierre. He did not have permission to enter or remain in Canada.

[15] On January 31, 2002, Mr. Ogiamien was convicted in Canada of uttering a forged document and obstructing a police officer. He was discovered at a provincial driver’s licensing office attempting to obtain identification under the name of Alain Lapierre. He pleaded guilty to these charges and was sentenced to six months in jail.

[16] A conditional deportation order was issued against Mr. Ogiamien on February 6, 2002 for serious criminality arising from his Canadian convictions, and for entering Canada with fraudulent documents. Mr. Ogiamien signed the deportation order that same day.

[17] Following a fingerprint match which resulted in the discovery of another alias, Mr. Ogiamien was extradited from Canada to California on July 11, 2002 to face criminal charges for fraud-related offences including personation, forgery and theft, and to be sentenced for convictions for attempted fraud and personation. A certificate of departure was completed that same day.

[18] Mr. Ogiamien was granted a 90-day humanitarian parole to the U.S. which allowed him to enter the United States to receive a disposition on charges of theft, fraud and burglary in Beverly Hills, California. He was also sentenced to 24 months arising from a conviction in Beverly Hills, California.

[19] In 2003, two separate warrants were issued against Mr. Ogiamien for being a fugitive from justice and violating parole. In 2007, a warrant for arrest was later issued for failing to appear at a community supervision hearing.

[20] On March 25, 2004, Mr. Ogiamien was also convicted in Washington state of forgery and second degree identity theft. He was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment and was required to pay a $500 victim’s compensation fee.

[21] On February 2, 2005, Mr. Ogiamien was referred to the United States Department of Homeland Security while in detention because he was determined to be a possible criminal alien who was the focus of an investigation for identity theft and forgery.

[22] On March 9, 2005, Mr. Ogiamien’s asylum claim was received by the U.S. Immigration Court. His claim for asylum was denied on April 19, 2005.

[23] Following receipt of Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s consent to allow Mr. Ogiamien to be returned to Canada, Mr. Ogiamien was ordered deported from the U.S. to Canada. Mr. Ogiamien remained in detention until he was deported to Canada on August 24, 2005.

[24] Upon arriving in Canada, Mr. Ogiamien was advised that the deportation order against him would be enforced. He was detained upon arrival by the CBSA in Vancouver as his identity had not been established. He was later released by the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the “ID”) in Vancouver on January 20, 2006 on a cash bond that carried numerous terms and conditions of release, including in-person reporting, and reporting of criminal charges and changes of address.

[25] At the time of Mr. Ogiamien’s release, the ID Member held that the length of time until Mr. Ogiamien’s removal was indeterminate. This was because Mr. Ogiamien said that he was from Zimbabwe and there was a suspension on removals to Zimbabwe in place at the time. The ID also noted that Mr. Ogiamien had “no history with Immigration officials” and that the tribunal did not “have a pattern of behaviour” it could use to assess the likelihood that Mr. Ogiamien would comply with the terms of the order for release.

[26] The record of Mr. Ogiamien’s reporting indicates that he did not always report as required between the time of his release in 2006 and January 2009. However, in January 2009, the frequency of Mr. Ogiamien’s in-person reporting was nevertheless reduced from monthly to bi-monthly.

[27] Mr. Ogiamien was arrested on criminal charges in Montreal on August 28, 2009. He was arrested by CBSA that same day and released on an Acknowledgement of Conditions which indicated that he must “abide by all conditions imposed by an officer of the Immigration Division.”

[28] Mr. Ogiamien is currently facing outstanding criminal charges in Montreal for use, trafficking or possession of forged document, two counts of fraud and theft, forgery, etc. of a credit card.

[29] During this period, Mr. Ogiamien did not always report as required. However, it appears that a CBSA clerk exercised his or her discretion not to escalate the non-compliance. Mr. Ogiamien also faced multiple criminal charges from 2010 to 2012.

[30] Mr. Ogiamien was taken into custody at Maplehurst Correctional Complex on April 26, 2013. At the time, he faced two sets of criminal charges resulting from arrests in Ontario in March and April 2013. He remained in custody for criminal remand purposes from April 2013 to May 2014.

[31] On February 10, 2014, a CBSA officer issued a Warrant for Arrest for Mr. Ogiamien’s removal from Canada because the officer had found reasonable grounds to believe Mr. Ogiamien was unlikely to appear for his removal from Canada. The officer who issued the warrant noted that Mr. Ogiamien had failed to report on five occasions since May 2013.

[32] On March 25, 2014, the CBSA arrested Mr. Ogiamien pursuant to the outstanding immigration warrant for his arrest. Following an interview, a CBSA officer formed the opinion that he was unlikely to appear for removal based on Mr. Ogiamien’s known history of using aliases, evading removal, and involvement in criminal activity. In the arresting officer’s opinion, Mr. Ogiamien would go to great lengths and use any identity necessary to avoid removal to Africa. Mr. Ogiamien was ordered detained on immigration grounds on that same day.

[33] As set out above, on May 2, 2014, while detained at Maplehurst Correctional Complex on criminal hold, bail was posted with regard to Mr. Ogiamien’s outstanding criminal charges in Ontario. He remained detained, however, as a result of the order for his detention on immigration grounds. His outstanding criminal charges were withdrawn on July 16, 2014. He has remained detained for removal on immigration hold since that time.

Law

[34] The test to be applied on an application for habeas corpus was reiterated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mission Institution v. Khela, 2014 SCC 24, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502, at para. 30. To be successful, an application for habeas corpus must satisfy the following criteria:

1. First, the applicant must establish that he or she has been deprived of liberty.
2. Once a deprivation of liberty is proven, the applicant must raise a legitimate ground upon which to question its legality.
3. If the applicant has raised such a ground, the onus shifts to the respondent authorities to show that the deprivation of liberty was lawful.

[35] In Chaudhary, Rouleau J.A., summarized the law on habeas corpus in immigration matters to that point at para 3:

Habeas corpus is an essential remedy in Canadian law and access to it is enshrined in s. 10 (c) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, it is well established that in immigration matters, where a complete, comprehensive and expert statutory scheme provides for a review that is at least as broad as and no less advantageous than habeas corpus, habeas corpus is precluded. This is commonly known as the “Peiroo exception”, so named for this court’s decision in Peiroo v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 253 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1989] S.C.C.A. No. 322.

[36] Rouleau J.A. concluded that the appellants in Chaudhary should have been entitled to proceed with their habeas corpus applications, in spite of being on immigration holds. The position of each side in Chaudhary and Rouleau J.A.’s conclusions are summarized at paras. 4-7:

[4] On the agreement of the parties, the sole issue addressed by the applications judge was the court’s jurisdiction to consider the habeas corpus applications. The applications judge concluded that the court should decline to exercise its habeas corpus jurisdiction. In his view, the IRPA put into place a comprehensive statutory review mechanism as broad and advantageous as habeas corpus.

[5] The appellants maintain that where, as here, a detainee argues that the detention has become illegal because of its length and the uncertainty of its continued duration, the Peiroo exception does not apply. This is because the challenge is not to the immigration matters themselves, but rather to the continued detention beyond what can be justified for immigration-related purposes under the IRPA. In such circumstances, the appellants argue that continued detention contravenes the detainee’s ss. 7 and 9 Charter rights and habeas corpus should be available as its ambit of review is broader and more advantageous to the detainee than the scheme established by the IRPA.

[6] The respondents submit that the Peiroo exception applies and that it removes all immigration matters from the ambit of the courts’ habeas corpus jurisdiction. They argue that the applications judge’s decision should stand.

[7] Upon a careful review of Peiroo and the cases that followed, I reject the respondents’ submission that the Peiroo exception is as broad as they submit. I conclude that Peiroo does not create a blanket exclusion for all immigration matters, and further, that the exception does not apply in the circumstances of the cases under appeal. For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that the appeals should be allowed.

[37] Justice Rouleau’s conclusion as to the court’s habeas corpus jurisdiction is set out at para. 54:

[54] For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that the Peiroo exception is not a blanket exclusion of habeas corpus in immigration-related matters. Further, after reviewing the legislative scheme for review of immigration detention, I consider that where, as in the current appeals, the issue is the legality of a continuing lengthy detention of uncertain duration, the review process created by the IRPA is not as broad and is less advantageous than habeas corpus.

[38] Justice Rouleau determined that the appellants in the habeas corpus applications in the appeals before him did not seek a determination of ongoing immigration matters. Rather, they sought a determination of the legality of their continued detentions. This is summarized at para. 72 of Chaudhary as follows:

[72] The appellants’ challenge in the present case is to the legality of the continued lengthy detentions. Where, as here, the issue raised is not, strictly speaking, an immigration law matter as in Peiroo, the court needs to consider whether the issue raised falls within the category of exceptions as defined in May. The question a habeas corpus application would answer is whether the detentions, because of their length and their uncertain duration, have become illegal and in violation of the appellants’ ss. 7 and 9 Charter rights. As such, the immigration status of the appellants will not be affected. They will still be subject to removal. All that will be decided is whether there continues to be a constitutionally valid basis for their detentions pending those immigration decisions and dispositions.

[39] After comparing the statutory scheme for detention review under the Immigration Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 [IRPA] and habeas corpus – the question the court is to answer, the onus and the review process – Justice Rouleau concluded at paras. 111–113 of Chaudhary:

[111] In conclusion, I do not consider Peiroo and the other cases confirming the Peiroo exception to stand for the principle that habeas corpus is always precluded in immigration-related matters. Nor do I view the IRPA as having put in place “a complete, comprehensive and expert statutory scheme which provides for a review at least as broad as that available by way of habeas corpus and no less advantageous” (May, at para. 40) where, as here, the decision sought to be reviewed is the continuation of a lengthy detention of uncertain duration.

[112] In R. v. Gamble, at p. 641, the Supreme Court emphasized that in matters of liberty:

[a] purposive approach should … be applied to the administration of Charter remedies as well as to the interpretation of Charter rights, and in particular should be adopted when habeas corpus is the requested remedy, since that remedy has traditionally been used for, and is admirably suited to, the protection of the citizens' fundamental right to liberty and the right not to be deprived of it except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. The superior courts in Canada have, I believe, with the advent of the Charter and in accordance with the sentiments expressed in the habeas corpus trilogy of Miller, Cardinal and Morin displayed both creativity and flexibility in adapting the traditional remedy of habeas corpus to its new role.

[113] The applicants, who have been in immigration detentions for lengthy periods and whose detentions are to continue for an uncertain duration, should not be deprived of their Charter right to habeas corpus. They have the right to choose whether to have their detention-related issues heard in the Federal Court through judicial review of the ID decisions, or in the Superior Court through habeas corpus applications.

[40] This is precisely Mr. Ogiamien’s primary claim. He claims his detention has become unlawful as it is lengthy and because it is indefinite. He claims his continued detention is in breach of ss. 7 and 9 of the Charter and maintains that under s. 10 his detention is unlawful and he is entitled to be released. He framed his amended application within Chaudhary.

[41] Chaudhary provides that this Court has jurisdiction to hear this type of habeas corpus application. I turn now to the questions the Court is to answer and the onus as determined in Chaudhary.

[42] On a habeas corpus application in this context an applicant has to show that reasonable and probable grounds exist for the applicant’s complaints. The ground will be the exceptional length of his or her detention and his or her uncertain continued detention. “The question the Court will then have to address is whether, because of their length and the uncertainty as to their continued duration, the detentions have become illegal, in violation of the detainees’ ss. 7 and 9 Charter rights and international instruments to which Canada is a signatory”: Chaudhary, at para. 81. In responding to the habeas corpus application, the Minister must satisfy the Court that although the detention is lengthy and of uncertain duration, it is still justified. In terms of justification, Justice Rouleau said at para. 81:

[81] A detention cannot be justified if it is no longer reasonably necessary to further the machinery of immigration control. Where there is no reasonable prospect that the detention’s immigration-related purposes will be achieved within a reasonable time (with what is reasonable depending on the circumstances), a continued detention will violate the detainee’s ss. 7 and 9 Charter rights and no longer be legal.

[43] Unlike the ID context, in a habeas corpus application such as this, once the applicant establishes the threshold issue, the matter will be heard afresh with the Minister bearing the onus: Chaudhary, at para. 91. The Court on the habeas corpus takes a step back and considers the evidence without the burden or previous ID decisions. The applicant is not required to demonstrate that there has been a change from prior ID determinations. “Further, the onus on the Minister will be to show that the detention, despite its length and uncertain duration, is nonetheless legal”: Chaudhary, at para. 91. The Minister will not satisfy the onus simply by establishing that one of the grounds listed in s. 58 of the IRPA is present.

[44] Sections 7, 9 and 10 (c) of the Charter provide as follows:

7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
8. Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned.
9. Everyone has the right on arrest or detention (c) to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas corpus and to be released if the detention is not lawful.

[45] Mr. Ogiamien and amicus raised at least two other legal arguments which are not necessary for me to address. I will outline each before returning to an analysis of this case by applying the Chaudhary framework.

[46] First, amicus argued that the reasons the Court of Appeal in Chaudhary found for accepting the Superior Court’s jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus applications brought by detainees held under immigration legislation should apply whether or not the applicant has been detained for a short time or long time. She argues that the advantages identified by the Court of Appeal with regard to habeas corpus applications as opposed to the statutory scheme for detention review under IRPA exist whether the detention is short or long. She refers to the superior courts’ expertise in determining the lawfulness of detention, the timelines of a remedy in the superior courts, the onus, there being no requirement for leave as is required in judicial review, and the non-discretionary nature of habeas corpus. In my view, this argument goes beyond what the Court of Appeal determined in Chaudhary, where it referenced immigration detentions for lengthy and long periods of an indeterminate, no end in sight, nature.

[47] Second, amicus argued that the right to bring habeas corpus applications in immigration detention matters should not be limited to instances of lengthy and indeterminate detentions. This is based on her submission that habeas corpus and release are constitutional remedies enshrined in s. 10(c) of the Charter and that they can only be eliminated if this is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society pursuant to s. 1 of the Charter. The only courts with jurisdiction to grant the habeas corpus and release are the provincial superior courts. Amicus states that the federal detention review process only provides for a review by one immigration official of the decision of another immigration officer to detain, and then review on a discretionary basis with leave before a court which cannot release. She argues it is not justified in a free and democratic society to eliminate both rights under s.10(c) of the Charter in favor of this process. She submits the Court of Appeal in Chaudhary was addressing the issues in the cases brought before it and those appellants had maintained that their detentions were lengthy and of uncertain duration.

[48] It is not necessary for me to decide either of these issues. I have found for the reasons set out below that Mr. Ogiamien’s detention is lengthy and of an indeterminate duration and that the Minister has not met the onus of establishing that his continued detention is reasonably necessary to further the machinery of immigration control. This case, therefore, fits within the framework established in Chaudhary and I need not rule on the alternative arguments put forward by amicus.

Analysis

[49] The Court of Appeal in Chaudhary established a threshold question to be considered before this Court decides whether to exercise or declare jurisdiction to hear this habeas corpus application. Before the merits of the application can be considered, Mr. Ogiamien has the onus to show reasonable and probable grounds that his detention has become very lengthy and of uncertain continued duration. Meeting the reasonable and probable grounds standard of proof means that Mr. Ogiamien must establish an objectively identifiable factual basis, on a balance of probabilities, for his subjective belief that his detention has become very lengthy and of uncertain duration: see Li v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 1, [2005] 3 F.C.R. 239, at para. 9; Estrin v. Law Society of Alberta (1995), 1995 ABCA 429, 174 A.R. 379, [1995] A.J. No. 1021, at paras. 6-7 [Cited to QL]. Mr. Ogiamien’s objective basis must be based on the law as well as compelling and credible facts, while taking into consideration all of the circumstances of the case: see R. v. Rhyason, 2007 SCC 39, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 108, at para. 19; R. v. Storrey, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241, at pp. 250-51; Baron v. Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416, at pp. 446-47; Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, at para. 114; Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170, at p. 193.

[50] I find as a fact on the basis of the evidence before me that Mr. Ogiamien’s detention was lengthy. He was on an immigration hold from May 2, 2014 to the date of his release on June 1, 2016. This is virtually 25 months. In coming to this conclusion that Mr. Ogiamien’s detention was very lengthy, I have considered that throughout his detention he has been held in a maximum security part of a corrections facility (the remand area). This has for the most part been at Maplehurst and for a short period at Central North Corrections Centre. The length of detention must be considered in this context. He has been held on immigration detention in a maximum security part of a facility for 25 months.

[51] Amicus and Mr. Ogiamien urged me to consider in my determination the conditions in the facility, the frequency of lock-downs, Mr. Ogiamien’s allegations of mistreatment and abuse by corrections staff and Mr. Ogiamien’s allegations of racism and unfair targeting by corrections staff. In my view, it is not necessary for me to do so.

[52] Mr. Ogiamien was placed at Maplehurst Correctional Complex. The CBSA also maintains an Immigration Holding Centre for the detention of individuals on immigration holds. However, the CBSA, through its own administrative rules and insurance coverage, made it inaccessible as a place of detention for Mr. Ogiamien. It must be noted that it has never been alleged that Mr. Ogiamien is a danger to the public.

[53] In Chaudhary, at the time of the hearing of the appeal, one of the appellants, Carmelo Bruzzese, had been detained for one year and eight months. The Court of Appeal described that detention as lengthy. This provides some indication of what the Court of Appeal considered very lengthy.

[54] The Attorney General of Canada argued that simply counting days spent in detention oversimplifies the issue. The Attorney General of Canada submits that where immigration detention for removal is concerned, many of the steps required to remove a non-citizen from Canada are greatly aided by, if not contingent upon, an individual’s co-operation with Canadian authorities and those of their country of origin. Specific reference is made to IRPA, ss. 58 (1)(b) and (d) and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, ss. 244(a), 247(1) and 248 (d) [IRPR].

[55] The Attorney General of Canada submits that because individuals can exercise a significant measure of control over the length of their detention, when assessing the lengthy detention, it is necessary to remove from consideration any time when the detainee’s conduct has delayed or interfered with the steps that might reduce the time spent in detention In their written submissions, the Attorney General of Canada analogizes this to a section 11(b) Charter application with specific reference to R. v. MacDougall, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 45, at para. 48 and R. v. Conway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659, at pp. 1690-91.

[56] In the immigration context, conduct that lengthens the time in detention is considered as a factor. Section 248 of the IRPR requires that, if there are grounds for detention, “any unexplained delay or unexplained lack of diligence caused by the Department or the person concerned” be considered in addition to the length of detention. The Supreme Court of Canada in Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, at para. 114, applied a similar approach in the security certificate context.

[57] The Attorney General of Canada submits that Mr. Ogiamien did not discharge his duty to establish his identity. It is argued that he engaged in a sustained campaign of obfuscation and obstruction designed to frustrate CBSA’s ability to identify his name and his country of origin. The Attorney General of Canada’s position is that this is virtually the sole cause of the length of his detention and should count against him in assessing how long he has been in detention for the purposes of the threshold question.

[58] I do not disagree with the principle put forward by the Attorney General of Canada in this regard but I disagree with Attorney General of Canada’s suggestion that, in the facts of this case, time in detention should count against Mr. Ogiamien. This is based on several factors which I will address below.

[59] First, it is vital to this case and is uncontroverted that Mr. Ogiamien was arrested on an immigration warrant in March of 2014 because of his failure to report in Montreal, Quebec as he was required to do under his immigration release terms. He was alleged to be a flight risk. It is also uncontroverted that all of the alleged failures to report which formed the basis of the warrant occurred times he was in custody in Ontario. He was in custody for pending criminal charges which were all ultimately withdrawn. He was not in detention for any identity reasons. He had been out of immigration detention from 2006 to 2014 and only arrested because of these specific failures to report. No other reason. He had a reason for not reporting. He was in jail.

[60] Mr. Francis Bard, the officer who issued the arrest warrant on February 14, 2014, testified. He was aware that Mr. Ogiamien had not reported and he was aware that Mr. Ogiamien was facing charges in Brampton, Ontario at that time. He called the courthouse in Brampton and was told that Mr. Ogiamien was not detained. There was no indication on the National Case Management System (“NCMS”) that Mr. Ogiamien was detained. He therefore issued a warrant. Officer Bard stated that if he had known that Mr. Ogiamien was being detained on a criminal hold he would not have issued the warrant in the first place. He said, “If I had seen it, I wouldn’t have issued a warrant. ‘Cause the subject is ... on court hold. He had a valid reason not to be present.”

[61] Mr. Ogiamien was arrested and detained because he as perceived to be a flight risk. His detention had nothing to do with establishing his identity or country of origin. It is therefore not reasonable to count against him any lack of cooperation in establishing his identity.

[62] Second, I have reviewed Mr. Peter Donaldson’s affidavit, sworn November 25, 2015, in detail (Exhibit 94). Mr. Donaldson is an inland enforcement officer for the CBSA. Since 2014, he has been the lead investigator engaged in the investigation of Mr. Ogiamien with respect to his claimed identity and nationality. In his affidavit, he reviewed the CBSA’s investigation into Mr. Ogiamien’s identity prior to June 2014. The CBSA did virtually nothing in the period between Mr. Ogiamien’s release at a detention review on January 20, 2006 and Mr. Donaldson’s investigation which commenced in June of 2014. This was over eight years. There doesn’t appear to have been an investigation on the case. CBSA appears to have conducted on interview with Mr. Ogiamien in August of 2006. Mr. Ogiamien completed travel document applications for Nigeria and South Africa. He used the surname Mahachi, the surname he says is his father’s but also used Ojoir-Ogiamien as an alternative name. No other investigation or investigative steps are set out.

[63] It is unreasonable to ignore or discount the 25 months Mr. Ogiamien spent in a maximum security part of a facility because he is alleged to have failed to cooperate with establishing his identity and nationality when CBSA did virtually nothing for many years (January 2006 to June 2014).

[64] Moreover, the unreasonableness is highlighted when I consider that Mr. Ogiamien did, in fact, provide the CBSA with some information in 2005 and 2006. The travel document form he signed in 2006 listed his birth place as Nigeria, which is where CBSA now accepts he is from (more on this below). His wife in 2005 sent CBSA a marriage certificate, some court documents and a rental agreement for a house in Los Angeles, California. The CBSA received a package containing a California Driver’s License and a Certificate of Title from California with respect to car ownership. He advised the CBSA on October 7, 2005, that he believed his father had children in Canada. He told CBSA he had had an aunt in the U.S., Rita Ogiamien, who left the U.S. in 1988. Photographs and prints from Mr. Ogiamien were sent in 2005 to South Africa and Nigeria. There is correspondence from CBSA dated April 19, 2005, sent care of Kerisha Williams. There was a handwritten note in the CBSA file with the names Kerisha Williams, Keisha Williamson and Atasha Henryhand on it. There is also reference to an A. Ogiamien with a Toronto, Ontario address. None of this information seems to have been pursued or investigated in depth by CBSA.

[65] In Mr. Donaldson’s report of June 11, 2014 (Exhibit D to his Affidavit of November 24, 2015), he reports that Mr. Ogiamien had not been investigated in more than eight full years and that the investigation in 2005 was only for five months. Mr. Donaldson referred to implementing “a very thorough investigation on the global scale” which had not yet been done. He spoke of investigative techniques in this report, his further reports and his affidavit - not all of which required Mr. Ogiamien’s cooperation or his involvement at all. For example, the Global Diffusion process was initiated. They located and interviewed Dr. Steve Slack through their own methods, presumably available to them over the eight years. It is not reasonable for CBSA to have waited more than eight years and now claim that Mr. Ogiamien’s lack of cooperation should count against him in calculating the time he has been in Maplehurst. There were things they could have done in the more than eight year period. There were not even investigative interviews with Mr. Ogiamien.

[66] Third, it is not reasonable to say that Mr. Ogiamien did not cooperate at all with establishing his identity and nationality in the period he has been in Maplehurst. A summary of some of the events in this regard is as follows:

1. Mr. Ogiamien was interviewed by CBSA officers on September 5, 2014. He agreed to be interviewed by the Zimbabwean government if his safety could be guaranteed. He provided names of schools he had attended in the U.S. He provided his mother’s name and birth place. He said he didn’t have siblings, but maybe half-siblings.
2. Mr. Ogiamien was interviewed at the Enforcement and Intelligence Operations Directorate by CBSA officers on September 10, 2014.
3. He underwent a Linguistics Analysis on September 10, 2014.
4. He was interviewed by CBSA officials on October 27, 2014.
5. He agreed to be escorted to and attended with CBSA officials at the Embassy of Zimbabwe in Ottawa on November 10, 2014. Mr. Ogiamien was ultimately interviewed by Embassy officials.
6. He agreed to be escorted to and attended with CBSA officers to meet with representatives of the Nigerian High Commission. This meeting took place on December 1, 2015.

[67] Fourth, Mr. Donaldson ultimately conducted most of his investigation without requiring any information from Mr. Ogiamien. He pursued old information. He used investigative techniques. Some of this is detailed above. He conducted a Global Diffusion Search. An Interpol Notice was disseminated extensively abroad. He located a person in California who provided information about Mr. Ogiamien. He sent a “chaser” to Interpol. He located the step-father of Mr. Ogiamien’s former partner and contacted him. He found Mr. Ogiamien’s sister Adesuwa Joy Ndulne (also known as Adesuwa Ogiamien) living in Brampton, Ontario and interviewed her. Mr. Donaldson located and interviewed Kerisha Williams in Mississauga, Ontario. She identified herself as Mr. Ogiamien’s ex-sister-in-law. Her name is very similar to a name Mr. Ogiamien indicates he provided to the CBSA in the past, well before his detention. I reference Exhibits 61 and 120. Mr. Donaldson obtained information from police reports. He says he did all this with no direct information from Mr. Ogiamien. Why was this not done between 2006 and June of 2014? Why did Mr. Ogiamien have to be in a maximum security facility for Mr. Donaldson to do this work? The investigation could have been done in the many years Mr. Ogiamien was on CBSA release. My review of Mr. Donaldson’s affidavit suggests he has not met with Mr. Ogiamien for investigative purposes since 2014. Since Mr. Ogiamien’s cooperation was not required for Mr. Donaldson to conduct his investigation, it is not reasonable to claim that Mr. Ogiamien’s lack of cooperation should count against him.

[68] Before moving on, I must comment on Mr. Ogiamien’s lack of cooperation with the CBSA. He has provided information that is incomplete or inaccurate. For example, he repeatedly said his mother was dead, but she is alive and well living in England. He said he had no siblings in Canada, yet he does have at least one sister, Adesuwa Ogiamien, and one brother, Osaze Ogiamien, who live in the Toronto area. He claims he came to the U.S. as a young person. This seems to have met been confirmed by his sister Adesuwa. Mr. Ogiamien has suggested the incompleteness or inaccuracy of the information he provided is, in part, a result of leaving his family as a young person. His various statements are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile. He told the CBSA he had no siblings in Canada, yet clearly visited with his sister prior to his detention. The information obtained by the CBSA from his family members references siblings rather than step-siblings. Mr. Ogiamien provided bits and pieces of accurate information over the years woven together with misinformation. He signed requests for travel documents in 2006. He claims he did so again in 2009, although no copies of forms were produced by the CBSA or Mr. Ogiamien. He cooperated somewhat during his detention as I have detailed above; however, he maintained that he was from Zimbabwe even after Zimbabwean authorities confirmed in 2005 and 2014 that he was not a citizen of that country. Some of his misstatements could be explained by his separation from his family at a young age and travel to the U.S., but not all of his statements and claims. The bottom line is that Mr. Ogiamien was evasive with the CBSA from 2005 onward. He wasn’t detained because of this. With effort, CBSA was able to identify his nationality and Mr. Ogiamien appears to have consistently used his real name for years. The CBSA knew his name and used it as well. I accept that Mr. Ogiamien did not completely fulfill his responsibility to establish his identity: see Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2004 FC 1634, 263 F.T.R. 106, at para. 38.

[69] Overall, in all of the circumstances I have described above, I do not find that the absence of complete cooperation (he was cooperative in some regards as I have set out) by Mr. Ogiamien with the CBSA supports the claim by the Attorney General of Canada that the time he has spent in detention is not lengthy. Any “fault” for the length of the detention cannot be laid solely on Mr. Ogiamien.

[70] A final argument the Attorney General of Canada made regarding my consideration of the length of Mr. Ogiamien’s detention was that for part of the time he has been in detention, Mr. Ogiamien has intentionally chosen not to participate in reviews by the statutory body (ID reviews) that could release him from detention. Mr. Ogiamien did stop meaningfully participating in the reviews since October 2015. However, he did participate in regular monthly reviews for about 18 months.

[71] The Attorney General of Canada also points out that Mr. Ogiamien has not applied to the Federal Court for judicial review of his detention since October of 2014. The Attorney General of Canada submits that Mr. Ogiamien knew what is required for judicial review, for a period had counsel and had access to materials needed to pursue leave. The Attorney General of Canada references the basis for these submissions in their Factum.

[72] These submissions are inconsistent with the Court of Appeal’s decision in Chaudhary. The fact that Mr. Ogiamien stopped participating in ID reviews after 18 months and did not seek judicial review after October 2014 is not relevant to the availability of habeas corpus. The remedies are available concurrently. It is the lawfulness of the detention that is at issue here. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the ID or Federal Court would have released Mr. Ogiamien if he continued to seek recourse in those venues. The fact that Mr. Ogiamien stopped participating in hearings that continued to affirm his detention cannot count against him in this application.

[73] Moreover, I do not consider this against Mr. Ogiamien in my assessment of his lengthy detention. For the most part Mr. Ogiamien has been self-represented. I accept that it has been very difficult to do the necessary legal work while at Maplehurst. Throughout the many months this matter has been before me, I have had to do many things to ensure Mr. Ogiamien can participate in this proceeding including:

a. order him to be brought to the courthouse on a daily basis to be able to work on his submissions in the cells in the courthouse; b. order that he has access to his various boxes and files at Maplehurst for certain hours on a number of days to ensure he can do his preparation for court; c. order that amicus counsel’s law student be able to meet with Mr. Ogiamien on certain days and for certain hours to assist him; d. request counsel of the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services provide him for a period prior to amicus with caselaw he required to make his submissions; e. request the same counsel to assist in ensuring Mr. Ogiamien had appropriate access to his files to prepare and requested and received not irregularly from said counsel submission in this regard to facilitate Mr. Ogiamien’s preparation.

With all that I have done to ensure he could properly and fairly participate in this process, it is inconceivable to me that Mr. Ogiamien as a self-represented individual incarcerated at Maplehurst could have filed and fully participated in a leave and judicial review process.

[74] The Attorney General of Canada contends that since April 1, 2016, Mr. Ogiamien has known that the Nigerian government requires identity documents in order to issue a travel document (see Exhibit 170). The responsibility to provide such identity documents resides with Mr. Ogiamien and there is no evidence that he has taken steps to do so, and therefore, he is solely responsible for the length of his detention since April, 2016. I disagree. Mr. Ogiamien has always maintained he has no identity documents from his country of origin. He cannot provide what he doesn’t have. The CBSA has been involved with Mr. Ogiamien continuously since his return to Canada in 2005. There is no suggestion by anyone from the CBSA that Mr. Ogiamien possesses a Nigerian identity document. Exhibit 184 is dated May 5, 2016. It sets out an alternative to identity documents. On June 1, 2016, Mr. Ogiamien’s sister signed an Attestation as requested by the Attorney General of Canada and undertook to provide the relevant page from her passport. There was no undue delay that should mitigate against the duration Mr. Ogiamien was in custody.

[75] For the reasons set out above, the entire period of his detention counts in the calculation of length for the purposes of the Chaudhary threshold issue and it was very lengthy.

[76] In terms of the length of Mr. Ogiamien’s detention, in Chaudhary the Court of Appeal noted at para. 113 that applicants who have been detained for lengthy periods and of where their detention are to continue for an uncertain duration have a choice of pursuing judicial review of the ID decisions in the Federal Court or through habeas corpus in the Superior Court. Mr. Ogiamien made his choice in October of 2005 after Chaudhary was released and by that time he had already been in detention approximately 18 months.

[77] I turn now to the second threshold issue, whether Mr. Ogiamien’s detention was of uncertain duration. I find that Mr. Ogiamien has established that his detention was of uncertain duration.

[78] In Chaudhary, at para 75 the Court of Appeal characterized uncertain duration as a situation which there is “... no end to the detention in sight...” I find that Mr. Ogiamien has met this requirement and has established that there is no way to reasonably estimate, with any degree of specificity, an end date to his immigration detention. This is for several reasons.

[79] First, Mr. Ogiamien first filled out a request for travel documents from Nigeria in 2005 to no avail. A CBSA memo dated January 10, 2016, contains the following insert written by a CBSA officer on page 5:

05 December 2005, I sent an email with photos and prints to both, Pretoria, South Africa and Lagos Nigeria, requesting assistance. On 06 December 2005, Lagos responded by saying a request for assistance from the police or immigration in Nigeria would enter a “black hole”

[80] I have no evidence before me that the situation in Nigeria has changed.

[81] Second, in the course of the hearing before me, it emerged that Nigerian officials might have determined that Mr. Ogiamien is, in fact, a Nigerian citizen. However, I have no sworn evidence before me from Nigerian authorities to validate the information provided by counsel that Nigerian officials have determined Mr. Ogiamien is a Nigerian citizen. I have Exhibit 170 which is an email from the CBSA to counsel for the Attorney General of Canada reporting on a phone call. I also have Exhibit 184 which is an email from the Nigerian High Commission to CBSA staff. The information is not in a sworn format. The email does not contain any timelines or timeframes as to when Mr. Ogiamien might be removed from Canada, if and when documents are provided.

[82] Third, there are genuine issues Mr. Ogiamien has raised that must be determined before he can be deported. The most pressing issue is that he has vigorously maintained in this amended application that the deportation order he was arrested under has already been spent. He has requested as far back as June 2015 that I make this finding. He will have to go to the Federal Court in this regard. There is a genuine issue to be determined as to whether Mr. Ogiamien is or is not under a valid deportation order. Mr. Ogiamien and amicus submit that the Minister executed this order when Mr. Ogiamien was removed to the U.S. in 2002. A Certificate of Departure was completed. The Attorney General of Canada submitted that I should only consider actual facts and pending proceeding: see Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Li. Mr. Ogiamien did initiate a proceeding to determine whether the deportation order has been spent – his “show cause” from July of 2015 and his amended application. Only by this decision I determined I will not be deciding this immigration issue. It was a pending proceeding which I can consider.

[83] Fourth, his Pre-Removal Risk Assessment has not been completed.

[84] Fifth, Mr. Ogiamien has outstanding criminal charges in Montreal, Quebec. He cannot be removed from Canada until those charges have been dealt with. The Attorney General submits that the Crown has undertaken to stay those charges when a removal date is set. I have no evidence of this other than a transcript from the November 27, 2015 ID hearing when the member made reference to having been advised of this. This is insufficient evidence.

[85] I turn now to the question of whether Mr. Ogiamien’s continued detention at Maplehurst is reasonably necessary to further the machinery of immigration control. As the Court of Appeal noted in Chaudhary, “Where there is no reasonable prospect that the detention’s immigration-related purposes will be achieved within a reasonable time (with what is reasonable depending on the circumstances), a continued detention will violate the detainee’s ss. 7 and 9 Charter rights and no longer be legal. The Attorney General of Canada bears the onus of establishing this and I find they have not.

[86] I consider once again at this stage of the analysis that Mr. Ogiamien was detained for 25 months in a maximum security part of an institution for what ultimate amounts to an administrative, rather than penal, detention. The officer who issued the warrant which placed him in custody testified that he would not have done so if he had known Mr. Ogiamien’s failures to report were a result of being in custody on criminal charges.

[87] The Attorney General of Canada has maintained the primary immigration purpose for his continued detention is that Mr. Ogiamien is a flight risk. To the extent that a secondary immigration purpose was to establish his identity and country of origin, this has now been done and can no longer justify, if it ever did, his continued detention.

[88] The Attorney General of Canada has not established that Mr. Ogiamien is a flight risk. I have considered the following:

1. He was on immigration release from 2006 to 2014 and never tried to leave Canada.
2. He has a child here in Canada.
3. I have carefully looked at the evidence of Mr. Ogiamien’s reporting record. He sometimes reported early. He sometimes reported late. I am in no way suggesting that he was right to report as he did. He was obligated to report on time and not at his own determination. There is no excuse for this. However, he never disappeared. He never went underground. The CBSA only ever took action once in 2009. Mr. Ogiamien explained what occurred. I accept his explanation. It makes sense as he was released the same day. The Attorney General of Canada argued that the CBSA did not waive these past non-compliance incidents because they did not take action. It is not a matter of waiver. CBSA simply took no action. From this I draw an inference CBSA did not consider the incidents serious.
4. Mr. Ogiamien did avoid court process in the U.S. in 2001 by coming to Canada. There is, however nothing in his record since which would indicate he is a flight risk.
5. His actual reporting frequency was reduced in 2009 by CBSA.
6. His criminal convictions are now dated.

[89] Reasonable provisions were included in the terms of release to appropriately mitigate any flight risk. Mr. Ogiamien has put forth a plan to live with his sister, who came forward as a surety.

[90] Detention in a maximum security part of an institution is not required. Mr. Ogiamien’s detention became offensive to his ss. 7 and 9 Charter rights when it was no longer necessary to achieve an immigration purpose. His identification and country of origin are now known. While I am not satisfied the Attorney General of Canada has established Mr. Ogiamien is a flight risk, any risk that might exist has been mitigated by the plan of release and his detention is therefore no longer necessary to ensure he presents himself for removal. His detention in a maximum security facility is no longer rationally connected to his removal (an immigration purpose).

[91] The Attorney General of Canada argues Mr. Ogiamien is now at a heightened risk of flight because it has now been confirmed that he is Nigerian. This is speculation. Again, there was no reliable evidence before the court on this issue.

[92] I am unable to resolve whether Mr. Ogiamien reported to CBSA his criminal charges or his changes of addresses or if he didn’t. He claimed he did report some of these events. I didn’t have the entirety of the CBSA file to know if he did or didn’t. Somehow, Mr. Bard knew to call Brampton Court to see if Mr. Ogiamien was on criminal hold. It is not clear to me that Mr. Ogiamien moved to Toronto in 2013 and failed to report this. He seems to have been going between Toronto and Montreal. In any event, he has not fled. He has not gone underground and he didn’t for more than eight years. He now has very strict reporting terms and this mitigates any risks related to non-reporting in the future.

[93] The Attorney General of Canada argued a detention can be reasonably continued by the ID on a ground that is different from the ground that existed at the time of the initial detention. I do not disagree. This does not change the fact that at present there is the detention is no longer necessary to further of the machinery of immigration control.

[94] The final issue is Mr. Ogiamien’s request that I determine whether the deportation order was spent and that I determine whether his arrest and initial detention was carried out in an unlawful manner. I decline to determine these issues. Paragraph 101 of Chaudhary is a complete answer to this request. These Reasons do not and will not affect the disposition of immigration matters. My determination not to decide these matters is entirely consistent with my October 30, 2015 endorsement and stated by me once again in Court on February 26, 2016. These matters can and should be dealt with in the Federal Court.

Conclusion

[95] Mr. Ogiamien has established that his detention has become very lengthy and is of uncertain continued duration. The Attorney General of Canada has not met its burden to justify the continued detention. A writ of habeas corpus must issue as of right.

[96] Mr. Ogiamien is ordered released from custody on the terms provided in my June 1, 2016 endorsement.

Coats J.

Released: June 29, 2016

SCHEDULE A

COURT FILE NO.: 114/14 & 45/15 DATE: 20160629 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE JAMIL OSAI OGIAMIEN Applicant – and – HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO as represented by the MINISTRY OF COMMUNITY SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, and MAPLEHURST CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX and the ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondents JAMIL OSAI OGIAMIEN Applicant – and – HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO as represented by the MINISTRY OF COMMUNITY SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, and the CENTRAL NORTH CORRECTIONAL CENTRE Respondents REASONS FOR DECISION Coats J.

Released: June 29, 2016