ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
CITATION: Chaudhary v. Canada, 2015 ONSC 1503
COURT FILE NOs.: 14-90000267 to 270
DATE: 20150306
B E T W E E N:
AMINA CHAUDHARY, MICHAEL MVOGO, CARMELO BRUZZESE AND GLORY ANAWA
- and -
MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY & EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA, AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO
Barbara Jackman, Jean Marie Vecina,
and Swathi Sekhar, for the applicants
Martin Anderson, Melissa Mathieu,
Jocelyn Clarke and Amal Chaudry
for the respondents
HEARD: December 15, 2014
K.L. Campbell J.:
I
Overview
[1] The four applicants have all brought applications for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, seeking their immediate release from custody, and claiming that their continued detention is unlawful. All of the applicants have been detained in custody by various orders of the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board.
[2] Amina Chaudhary is in custody pending her deportation from Canada once she is paroled on her sentence of life imprisonment that was imposed following her conviction for first degree murder. Michael Mvogo gained entry to Canada as a visitor under a false identity, and is in custody pending his return to the Republic of Cameroon, his now alleged country of origin. Carmelo Bruzzese is in custody pending his potential return to Italy at the conclusion of his admissibility hearing. It is alleged that he is inadmissible to Canada as a danger to the public due to his association with organized crime. Glory Anawa gained entry to Canada under a false identity and with forged travel documents, and is in now custody, together with her child, pending her removal from Canada.
[3] The parties all agree that there is one paramount legal issue that must be resolved before any further consideration need be given to the factual nuances of each individual application, namely, whether this court should exercise its habeas corpus jurisdiction to determine these applications. The respondents contend that the court should decline to exercise its habeas corpus jurisdiction on the basis that (1) these are all immigration-related matters that are properly within the jurisdiction and special expertise of the Immigration Division; and (2) the Federal Court has a broad supervisory jurisdiction over the Immigration Division and can promptly judicially review the lawfulness and justification of any impugned detention order. The applicants, on the other hand, argue that the court should exercise its habeas corpus jurisdiction in these cases as (1) their continuing detention is unlawful under the orders of the Immigration Division; and (2) the Federal Court has but a narrow jurisdiction, which it seldom exercises in practice, to review the detention of individuals in immigration proceedings.
II
Analysis
A. Introduction
[4] As the Supreme Court of Canada articulated in Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, at para. 90, whether it is through the ancient writ of habeas corpus, or through more modern statutory mechanisms, foreign nationals, just like other individuals who have been detained in custody, have a right to the prompt judicial review of their detention in order to ensure that their detention complies with the law. This important principle finds constitutional expression in s. 10(c) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
[5] The important practical question raised by the present applications is whether the prerogative remedy of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid is the appropriate procedural vehicle for the applicants to employ to challenge the legality of their continuing detention, given that their respective detention orders are all clearly related to immigration matters under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA), and there are detailed statutory provisions governing the regular review of such detention orders by the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board and, with leave, by a judge of the Federal Court.
[6] In my view, for all of the following reasons, I find that the comprehensive statutory mechanism that is in place for the review of the detention of individuals in connection with pending immigration matters provides the appropriate procedural vehicle for the prompt judicial review of the lawfulness of detention orders in immigration matters. Accordingly, I decline to exercise the courts habeas corpus jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of the detention of the applicants.
B. The Jurisprudence Regarding Habeas Corpus and Available Alternative Remedies
1. Introduction
[7] The Supreme Court of Canada has consistently re-affirmed the importance of having the provincial superior courts available to hear habeas corpus applications to determine the lawfulness of detentions, even where there are alternative remedies that may be available to judicially review such detentions. In other words, habeas corpus jurisdiction should not be declined simply because of the existence of an alternative remedy. See R. v. Miller, 1985 22 (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 613, at pp. 640-641; Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, 1985 23 (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643; Morin v. National Special Handling Unit Review Committee, 1985 24 (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 662; May v. Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 809, at para. 34.
[8] At the same time, however, the Supreme Court of Canada has also held that there are two circumstances in which the provincial superior courts should decline to exercise its habeas corpus jurisdiction, namely: (1) where a statute such as the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, confers jurisdiction on a court of appeal to correct the errors of a lower court and release the applicant if need be pending the appeal; and (2) where legislation has put in place a complete, comprehensive and expert procedure for the review of an administrative decision regarding the detention of individuals. See May v. Ferndale Institution, at paras. 44, 50; Mission Institution v. Khela, 2014 SCC 24, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502, at paras. 42, 55.
2. The Peiroo Exception to Exercising Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction
[9] The second noted exception in which the provincial superior court should decline to exercise its habeas corpus jurisdiction, namely, where the legislator has put in place a complete, comprehensive and expert procedure for the judicial review of administrative decisions regarding detention, is sometimes called “the Peiroo exception” after the leading decision in Peiroo v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989), 1989 184 (ON CA), 69 O.R. (2d) 253, [1989] O.J. No. 805 (C.A.), leave denied, [1989] 2 S.C.R. x, which first clearly recognized this exception.
[10] In Peiroo the applicant arrived in Canada from Iran without any passport or travel visa and made a refugee claim. An immigration inquiry was commenced under the provisions of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, and the immigration adjudicator determined that the applicant did not have a credible claim as a refugee and ordered the applicant removed from Canada. The applicant sought to challenge this decision by way of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, but this application was unsuccessful. In dismissing the applicant’s appeal against this decision, Catzman J.A., delivering the judgment of the court, held that the court should decline to exercise its habeas corpus jurisdiction as the applicant had alternative remedies of review and appeal available in the Federal Court which, notwithstanding the requirement of “leave” to pursue such reviews or appeals, provided a process of judicial review that was at least as broad as that which might be exercised by a provincial superior court judge on an application for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid. More particularly, Catzman J.A. stated, at pp. 261-262:
The result of the foregoing analysis is this. Parliament has established in the Act … a comprehensive scheme to regulate the determination of such claims and to provide for review and appeal in the Federal Court of Canada of decisions and orders made under the Act, the ambit of which review and appeal is as broad as or broader than the traditional scope of review by way of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid. In the absence of any showing that the available review and appeal process established by Parliament is inappropriate or less advantageous than the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Ontario, it is my view that this court should, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to grant relief upon the application for habeas corpus in the present case, which clearly falls within the purview of that statutory review and appeal process.
I am fortified in this conclusion by the observation that similar considerations appear to have moved the Supreme Court of Canada to hold that where there is a legislative initiative purporting to provide a whole scheme or code for the administration and review of proceedings in a field like immigration … or human rights … such a scheme should not be by-passed, either by evolving a new cause of action … or by the use of a prerogative writ … Both jurisprudence and logic would suggest that this court should leave the review of immigration matters with the Federal Court of Canada, which has review and appeal jurisdiction with respect to many aspects of immigration law and which has geographical jurisdiction throughout Canada, and thus can deal with claims of refugee claimants wherever their point of entry.
[emphasis added – citations omitted]
[11] This approach echoed the principles articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Fraser v. Pringle, 1972 14 (SCC), [1972] S.C.R. 821, at pp.825-828. Further, subsequent authorities from the Court of Appeal for Ontario and the Supreme Court of Canada have consistently endorsed this exception. See for example Shepherd v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989), 1989 4359 (ON CA), 70 O.R. (2d) 765, [1989] O.J. No. 2056 (C.A.), leave denied, [1989] 2 S.C.R. xi; Reza v. Canada, 1994 91 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 394, at pp. 402-405; Baroud v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1995), 1995 638 (ON CA), 22 O.R. (3d) 255, [1995] O.J. No. 43 (C.A.), at paras. 8-11, leave denied, [1995] S.C.C.A. No. 111; R. v. Zundel (2004), 2004 15295 (ON CA), 241 D.L.R. (4th) 362, [2004] O.J. No. 2087, at paras. 5-7, 12, leave denied, [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 316; R. v. Graham, 2011 ONCA 138, 268 C.C.C. (3d) 517, at paras. 7-10; Chaudhary v. Canada (Correctional Services of Canada), 2012 ONCA 313, [2012] O.J. No. 2088, at paras. 4-8.
3. The Supreme Court of Canada Decision in May v. Ferndale Institution
[12] In May v. Ferndale Institution the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the overlapping jurisdiction of provincial superior courts and the Federal Court to review the legality of the detention of federal inmates. Ultimately, the court concluded that the provincial superior court had not erred in exercising its habeas corpus jurisdiction to determine the lawfulness of the transfer of the applicants from a minimum-security institution to a medium-security institution, as this case did not involve one of the two limited circumstances in which the superior court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of permitting a review by the Federal Court.
[13] In so holding, LeBel and Fish JJ., writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, at paras. 34-35, confirmed the general principle that habeas corpus jurisdiction “should not be declined merely because of the existence of an alternative remedy,” but also recognized the two limited circumstances in which it was appropriate to decline habeas corpus jurisdiction given the availability of another route of judicial review for the challenged detention that was more appropriate, and the need to properly restrict the growth of collateral methods for attacking such detentions.
[14] In this particular context, LeBel and Fish JJ., at para. 39, expressly referred to the “well-established” exception in the field of immigration law, where the courts “have a limited discretion to refuse to entertain applications for prerogative relief in immigration matters,” and cited with approval the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Peiroo, at pp. 261-262. Further, at para. 44, in summarizing the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court regarding the availability of habeas corpus, LeBel and Fish JJ. expressly stated that habeas corpus jurisdiction “should also be declined where there is in place a complete, comprehensive and expert procedure for review of an administrative decision” as in the decisions in Pringle and Peiroo. Similarly, at para. 50, LeBel and Fish JJ. indicated that provincial superior courts should decline habeas corpus jurisdiction when “the legislator has put in place [a] complete, comprehensive and expert procedure for review of an administrative decision.”
[15] As the court explained, at para. 35, the “obvious policy reason” behind this discretion to decline habeas corpus jurisdiction based upon this exception to the general rule “is the need to restrict the growth of collateral methods of attacking convictions or other deprivations of liberty.” In other words, once legislation has created a complete, comprehensive and expert procedure for the judicial review of an administrative decision impacting upon individual liberty, courts should properly restrict access to habeas corpus relief, the potential “collateral” means of challenging such decisions.
4. Mission Institution v. Khela – The Most Recent Supreme Court of Canada Decision
[16] Most recently, in Mission Institution v. Khela, the Supreme Court considered the issue of the availability of the remedy of habeas corpus in the context of a case where the inmate applicant sought to challenge the legality of his transfer from a medium-security institution to a maximum-security institution. In affirming the availability of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid to review the reasonableness of such transfer decisions and, thus, their lawfulness, the court confirmed that habeas corpus jurisdiction should not be declined simply because of the availability of some alternative remedy. However, the court also re-affirmed the “two very limited circumstances” where provincial superior courts should decline to hear habeas corpus applications.
[17] More particularly, at para. 55, LeBel J., delivering the judgment of the court, summarized the current legal position regarding habeas corpus jurisdiction as follows:
This Court has been reluctant to place limits on the avenues through which an individual may apply for the remedy. As I mentioned above, the Court confirmed in Miller that habeas corpus will remain available to federal inmates in the superior courts regardless of the existence of other avenues for redress … Similarly, Wilson J. stated in Gamble that courts have not bound themselves, nor should they do so, to limited categories or definitions of review where the review concerns the subject’s liberty … In May, the Court confirmed that there are in fact only two instances in which a provincial superior court should decline to hear a habeas corpus application: (1) where the Peiroo exception applies (that is, where the legislature has put in place a complete, comprehensive and expert procedure) (Peiroo v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) … and (2) where a statute such as the Criminal Code, … confers jurisdiction on a court of appeal to correct errors of a lower court and release the applicant if need be … Reviews of decisions of correctional authorities for reasonableness do not fall into either of these exceptions, and in accordance with May, they therefore can and should be considered by a provincial superior court.
[emphasis added – citations omitted]
5. Conclusion – Framing the Issue
[18] Accordingly, in the circumstances of the present matters, it appears that it would only be appropriate for the court to decline its habeas corpus jurisdiction if the Peiroo exception were applicable. Of course, no one suggests that the other limited exception has any potential application. Therefore, to determine if the Peiroo exception applies in the present case, it must be determined whether Parliament has, in effect, created a complete and comprehensive scheme for the expert determination of claims (such as those raised by the applicants) regarding the lawfulness of detention pending the final resolution of immigration matters. Provided that any such legislative scheme permits an ambit of judicial review that is at least as broad and advantageous as the traditional scope of review by means of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, then the court should, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to exercise its habeas corpus jurisdiction.
C. The Legislative Scheme – The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
[19] As its heading suggests, Division 6 of Part 1 of the IRPA deals with issues of “Detention and Release” under the statute. Moreover, according to s. 54 of the IRPA, the “Immigration Division” of the Immigration and Refugee Board is the “competent” Division of the Board with respect to “the review of reasons for detention” under this Division of the legislation.
[20] Section 55 of the IRPA prescribes the circumstances under which a Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) officer may arrest and detain “permanent residents” and “foreign nationals.” Section 56 of the IRPA outlines the circumstances in which the officer may order the release of such an individual “before the first detention review by the Immigration Division.”
[21] According to s. 57(1) of the IRPA, the Immigration Division of the Board, “within 48 hours” of a permanent resident or foreign national being taken into detention, or without delay thereafter, “must review the reasons for continued detention.” According to s. 57(2) of the IRPA, at least once during the seven days following the initial review under s. 57(1), and at least once during each 30-day period following each previous review, the Immigration Division must again “review the reasons for the continued detention.” The detained permanent resident or foreign national is entitled, according to s. 57(3) of the IRPA, to be present before the Immigration Division for each of these reviews.
[22] Pursuant to s. 58(1) of the IRPA, the Immigration Division of the Board “shall order the release” of the permanent resident or foreign national “unless it is satisfied,” taking into account prescribed factors, that certain preconditions are met, including such factors as whether they are a danger to the public; are unlikely to appear for examination, an admissibility hearing, removal from Canada; and whether their identity needs to be established. Where release is ordered, the Immigration Division may impose any conditions that are considered necessary. However, pursuant to s. 58(2) of the IRPA, the Immigration Division may order the detention of a permanent resident or foreign national if it is satisfied that they are the subject of an examination, admissibility hearing, or a removal order and they are a danger to the public, or unlikely to appear for the examination, admissibility hearing, or their removal from Canada.
[23] Sections 244-246 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (IRPR) outline the factors that, for purposes of Division 6 of Part 1 of the IRPA, must be taken into account when assessing whether someone: is unlikely to appear for an examination, an admissibility hearing, or removal from Canada; is a danger to the public; or is a foreign national whose identity has not been established. Further, s. 248 of the IRPR states that, if it is determined that there are grounds for detention, the following factors shall be considered before a decision is made on detention or release: (a) the reason for detention; (b) the length of time in detention; (c) the length of time the detention is likely to continue; (d) any unexplained delays or lack of diligence caused by the Department or the person concerned; and (e) the existence of alternatives to detention.
[24] Further, according to s. 173 of the IRPA, which is found in Part 4 of the legislation, which deals with the “Immigration and Refugee Board,” the Immigration Division of the Board, in any proceeding before it: (a) must, where practicable, hold a hearing; (b) must give notice of the proceeding to the Minister and to the person who is the subject of the proceeding and hear the matter without delay; (c) is not bound by any legal or technical rules of evidence; and (d) may receive and base a decision on evidence adduced in the proceedings that it considers credible or trustworthy in the circumstances.
[25] Division 8 of Part 1 of the IRPA deals with “Judicial Review” applications. According to s. 72(1) of the IRPA, “judicial review by the Federal Court with respect to any matter – a decision, determination or order made, a measure taken or a question raised – under the IRPA is commenced by making an application for leave to the Court.” Where such an application for leave is filed, a judge of the Federal Court must dispose of the application “without delay and in a summary way.” Such an application for leave may only be made, however, after any statutory right of appeal has been exhausted. According to s. 74 of the IRPA, an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal may only be pursued if, in rendering judgment, the Federal Court judge certifies that a “serious question of general importance” is involved and states the question.
D. Conclusions Regarding Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction
[26] In light of these provisions of the IRPA, I conclude that I should decline to exercise the courts habeas corpus jurisdiction in all of the circumstances of the present matters, as the Peiroo exception is applicable. It seems to me that Parliament, through the enactment of the IRPA and its accompanying regulations, has sought to create a complete and comprehensive scheme for the determination of claims, like those now raised by the applicants, concerning the lawfulness of the detention of permanent residents or foreign nationals pending the final resolution of their immigration matters. Moreover, the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board is the statutorily “competent” Division of the Board seized with the responsibility of reviewing the reasons for detention, and is possessed of the necessary expertise to properly determine whether detained individuals should continue to be detained, or be released from custody pending the resolution of their immigration matters. The Immigration Division deals with such issues on a consistent and regular basis, as does the Federal Court, the statutorily-recognized forum for the judicial review of such decisions whenever such reviews are sought.
[27] Further, in my view, this all-inclusive legislative scheme permits an ambit of review that is at least as broad and advantageous as the traditional scope of review by habeas corpus with certiorari in aid. For example:
• Automatic and Regular Reviews: The need for continued detention is determined shortly after its commencement, and is reviewed on a regular basis every 30 days. Unlike habeas corpus applications, these reviews take place automatically, with monthly regularity, and without the need for any application by the detainee. These monthly reviews provide effective and meaningful opportunities for detainees to regularly challenge their continued detention. See Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Li, 2009 FCA 85, [2010] 2 F.C.R. 433, at paras. 40-41.
• Detainee Must be Released Unless Continued Detention Justified: According to s. 58 of the legislation, at such reviews, the detainee must be released unless the Immigration Division is “satisfied” that the statutory pre-conditions justifying continued detention are met. While earlier detention decisions regarding a detainee must be considered and are entitled to deference given their fact-based nature, such prior decisions are not binding on subsequent reviews, and the onus is always upon the Minister to demonstrate that continued detention is justified. See Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Thanabalasingham, 2004 FCA 4, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 572, at paras. 9-16.
• Consideration of a Variety of Important Factors: In considering the need for any continued detention, the Immigration Division must, according to s. 248 of the IRPR, consider a variety of factors, including the reason for detention, the potential length of the detention, any unexplained or negligent delays by the parties, and the existence of any alternatives to continued detention.
• Speedy and Informal Hearing by Immigration Division: The Immigration Division must, where practicable, hold an informal hearing, without delay, where the parties may tender evidence that, while not technically or strictly admissible according to the rules of evidence, is considered to be “credible or trustworthy” in the circumstances.
• Speedy and Summary Judicial Review by the Federal Court: Decisions regarding continued detention may be reviewed by a judge of the Federal Court by means of an application for leave to the Court. Such applications must be determined “without delay and in a summary way.” According to the affidavit evidence, these applications can be quickly expedited for hearing. Significantly, in Peiroo, Catzman J.A. expressly considered and rejected the argument that the requirement of “leave” rendered such judicial review of the validity of continuing detention a “less advantageous remedy” than an application for habeas corpus. See also Anthonipilli v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 ONSC 1231, [2013] O.J. No. 811, at paras. 15-21.
• Potential Appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal: Decisions by a judge of the Federal Court may be appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal if, in rendering judgment, the Federal Court judge certifies that a stated “serious question of general importance” is involved in the case.
[28] In these circumstances, it seems to me that it is only appropriate to decline to exercise the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the court to provide the applicants with a collateral procedural mechanism to further review the legality of their continued detention. The scope of review permitted by the writ of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid provides no greater potential relief against unlawful detention than is statutorily provided under the IRPA, and the provincial superior court can claim no greater expertise in dealing with the lawfulness of continued detention in the context of ongoing immigration matters than the combined expertise of the Immigration Division and the Federal Court – the very forums statutorily assigned this responsibility under the legislation. Indeed, as Goldstein J. aptly observed in Anthonipilli, at para. 12, such immigration related issues are “right in the wheelhouse of the Federal Court” as the judges of that court “deal with immigration matters on virtually a daily basis.”
[29] Accordingly, I have concluded that, in the exercise of my discretion, I should decline to exercise the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the court in the circumstances of these cases. The applicants must be left to their statutory remedies under the IRPA, and can quite adequately raise their concerns regarding the lawfulness of their continued detention with the Immigration Division and the Federal Court. In my view, this conclusion is consistent with other decisions of this court on this issue. See, for example R. v. Aiken, [1998] O.J. No. 6680 (Gen.Div.), at para. 8; Gao v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] O.J. No. 2784, 7 Imm.L.R. (3d) 21 (S.C.J.), at paras. 23-31; Jaballah v. Canada (Attorney General) (2005), 2005 30315 (ON SC), 258 D.L.R. (4th) 161, [2005] O.J. No. 3681 (S.C.J.), at pp. 14-21; Almrei v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005] O.J. No. 5067, 50 Imm.L.R. (3d) 310 (S.C.J.), at paras. 26-35; Mohammad v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONSC 2936, [2013] O.J. No. 2308, at paras. 10-15; Kippax v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONSC 3685, [2013] O.J. No. 6324, at paras. 8-18; Babinski v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONSC 6493, [2014] O.J. No. 5348, at paras. 38-65.
[30] This is not to say that the applicants will necessarily be successful in advancing their claims in either of those forums. None of the applicants have been successful to-date. For example, Mr. Bruzzesse has already sought judicial review of some of his earlier detention reviews, but that application was dismissed: Bruzzesse v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2014 FC 230, [2014] F.C.J. No. 261. However, to paraphrase the comments of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Francis v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), 2003 64349 (ON CA), 171 O.A.C. 198, [2003] O.J. No. 691, at para, 5, leave denied, [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 185, the mere fact that the jurisprudence of the court “may not leave much hope for success does not render the court either inappropriate or ineffective,” because the Federal Court, like the provincial superior court, must apply the same legal principles in determining the legality of the applicants detention. See also Sittampalam v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 ONSC 3205, 212 C.R.R. (2d) 164, at paras. 26-32; Anthonipilli v. Canada, at paras. 11-21.
III
Conclusion
[31] In the result, the applications for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, brought by the four applicants, must all be dismissed.
[32] Incidentally, the written request that was made following the argument of this jurisdictional issue, asking to seal the entirety of the application record regarding the applicant, Michael Mvogo, is denied. In my view there is no evidentiary basis that might justify such a sealing order. Accordingly, the records in all of these four matters shall remain part of the open court files.
Kenneth L. Campbell J.
Released: March 6, 2015
CITATION: Chaudhary v. Canada, 2015 ONSC 1503
COURT FILE NOs.: 14-90000267 to 270
DATE: 20150306
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
AMINA CHAUDHARY, MICHAEL MVOGO, CARMELO BRUZZESE, GLORY ANAWA
- and -
MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY & EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA, AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
K.L. Campbell J.
Released: March 6, 2015