Barbara Louise Jackman

The appellants, foreign nationals and a permanent resident, were detained under security certificates issued pursuant to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

They challenged the constitutionality of the IRPA's certificate scheme, which allows for detention and deportation based on secret evidence not disclosed to the named person.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the procedure for determining the reasonableness of a certificate infringes section 7 of the Charter because it denies the named person the right to know the case to meet, and is not saved by section 1.

The Court also found that the lack of prompt review for the detention of foreign nationals infringes sections 9 and 10(c) of the Charter.

The Court struck down the offending provisions but suspended the declaration of invalidity for one year to allow Parliament to amend the law.

The appellant, a Convention refugee, was ordered deported after the Minister determined he constituted a danger to the security of Canada due to his involvement in terrorism.

After exhausting domestic remedies, the appellant petitioned the UN Human Rights Committee, which requested Canada stay the deportation.

When Canada refused, the appellant sought an injunction, arguing that his deportation violated section 7 of the Charter and his legitimate expectations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that unincorporated international treaties do not create binding domestic obligations and that the doctrine of legitimate expectations does not grant substantive rights to remain in Canada.

However, the Court granted a 30-day stay to permit the appellant to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The appellant, a Convention refugee subject to a deportation order, sought an interim stay of deportation pending his appeal of a Superior Court decision.

The Superior Court had dismissed his application for an injunction to prevent deportation until the United Nations Human Rights Committee considered his petition.

The Court of Appeal found it had jurisdiction to stay the deportation order under s. 134(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Applying the RJR Macdonald test, the court concluded there was a serious issue to be tried regarding whether the Charter protects the right to complete the international petition process before deportation.

The balance of convenience and irreparable harm also favoured the appellant, and the stay was granted pending an expedited appeal.

The appellant, a Convention refugee from Iran, was suspected of being an assassin for the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration issued an opinion under s. 53(1)(b) of the Immigration Act that the appellant constituted a danger to the security of Canada and faced only a minimal risk of harm if deported.

The appellant challenged the decision and the constitutionality of the deportation provisions.

Applying the framework from the companion case of Suresh, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant did not make out a prima facie case of a substantial risk of torture.

The Court found the Minister's decision was not patently unreasonable and that the appellant was provided with adequate procedural protections consistent with the principles of fundamental justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a Convention refugee from Sri Lanka, faced deportation on security grounds due to alleged membership in a terrorist organization.

The Minister issued an opinion declaring him a danger to the security of Canada without providing him a copy of the immigration officer's memorandum or an opportunity to respond.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that deporting a refugee to face a substantial risk of torture generally violates section 7 of the Charter.

The Court found that the appellant had established a prima facie case of a risk of torture and was denied the required procedural safeguards.

The appeal was allowed and the case remanded to the Minister for reconsideration.

The respondent's refugee claim was rejected and a deportation order was issued.

After exhausting immigration review and Federal Court appellate processes, the respondent brought a constitutional challenge in the Ontario Court (General Division).

The motions court judge stayed the application, finding the Federal Court was the appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the motions court judge properly exercised his discretion to stay the proceedings, as Parliament had created a comprehensive scheme of review in the Federal Court.

The appellant, a citizen of Iran, arrived in Canada and claimed Convention refugee status.

He was referred to a secondary examination by an immigration officer, during which he omitted important factual details about his claim.

He was not advised of his right to counsel until the conclusion of this examination.

The appellant argued that the secondary examination constituted a detention under s. 10(b) of the Charter and that his s. 7 rights were violated.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a secondary examination at a port of entry is a routine part of the screening process and does not constitute a detention within the meaning of s. 10(b).

Furthermore, the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 do not require the provision of counsel during routine information gathering at a port of entry.

The appeal was dismissed.

A public interest group sought standing to challenge the constitutionality of amendments to the Immigration Act, 1976, which altered the refugee determination process.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the group raised serious issues of invalidity and had a genuine interest, it failed the third branch of the public interest standing test.

The Court found that individual refugee claimants directly affected by the legislation could and were already challenging the provisions, meaning there was another reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the courts.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the cross-appeal to strike the claim was allowed.