Karen Shai

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a boy left in his care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal regarding credibility assessments but applied the Kienapple principle to enter a conditional stay on the sexual assault conviction, as both charges shared the same factual and legal nexus.

The sentence appeal was dismissed, with the court finding that the fresh evidence of the appellant's spouse's health issues did not justify a conditional sentence for such a serious breach of trust.

The appellant, an Aboriginal woman with a tragic history of abuse and mental health issues, abducted a newborn infant from a hospital after her own child was stillborn.

She pled guilty and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by using a prior seven-year sentence as a baseline and failing to properly apply the principle of restraint and the Gladue framework for Aboriginal offenders.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to two and a half years' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that his statements to police were involuntary because he was not re-cautioned, and that the trial judge failed to direct the jury on the issue of failure to retreat regarding self-defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the failure to re-caution did not render the spontaneous statements involuntary and that the failure to retreat was never a live issue at trial.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault involving a teenage boy whom he lured to his hotel room and drugged before assaulting.

The appellant argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, made inappropriate comments to the complainant, and improperly restricted cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework and that the trial judge's compassionate comments did not demonstrate bias.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed given the serious aggravating factors of luring and drugging a young victim.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and pointing a firearm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on identification, which relied on recognition evidence and a KGB statement.

However, the Court found the trial judge erred in law by concluding that an intent to cause harm was sufficient for attempted murder, which requires an intent to kill.

The Court substituted a conviction for discharging a firearm with intent to wound under s. 244(a) of the Criminal Code.

Additionally, the conviction for pointing a firearm was stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in her s. 11(b) Charter analysis by not giving adequate weight to the harm to his health caused by the delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to diminish the force of the prejudice claim because the appellant failed to raise health concerns before the motion.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in rejecting a conditional sentence after considering the appellant's health problems.

The appellant challenged a conviction for a historic sexual assault and a four-year penitentiary sentence arising from a judge-alone trial that turned entirely on credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that, despite a misstatement of the third branch of the W.(D.) framework, the trial judge’s reasons as a whole demonstrated proper application of the burden and standard of proof, and the conviction appeal was dismissed.

However, the court found sentencing error where the trial judge treated the accused’s fabricated trial evidence as an aggravating factor.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the sentence was reduced to three years’ imprisonment.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision declining to designate the respondent a dangerous offender and instead declaring him a long-term offender following a predicate sexual assault causing bodily harm and an extensive history of violent sexual offending.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge erred in law by failing to make the required finding of substantial risk under s. 753.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and by selectively relying on evidence of treatability while ignoring significant contrary evidence.

The court emphasized that public protection is the governing objective and that a reasonable possibility of eventual control in the community must rest on evidence amounting to more than hope or speculation.

The appeal was allowed, the long-term offender designation was set aside, and a new sentencing hearing was ordered.

The appellant, a young person, appealed his convictions for robbery, extortion, assault, and uttering threats.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework, treated the case as a credibility contest, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly instructed himself on the burden of proof, did not decide the case wholly on demeanour, and reasonably relied on corroborating evidence.

The verdict was found not to be unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and forcible confinement, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his alibi and erred in refusing to allow re-examination on a driving issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons, read as a whole, supported the rejection of the alibi and that the compelling identification evidence rendered the re-examination issue non-determinative.

The appellant appealed his nine-year sentence for sexual assault.

The trial judge had declared him a long-term offender rather than a dangerous offender and imposed the sentence to ensure he would receive sex offender treatment while in custody.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle in the disposition and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after the victim was found killed in his garage.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, eyewitness identification of a man driving the victim's car, and expert evidence matching the appellant's barefoot impressions to blood-spattered boots found at the scene.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his instructions on eyewitness identification and in admitting the barefoot impression evidence.

The Court of Appeal held the eyewitness instructions were proper but found the trial judge erred in admitting the novel expert evidence regarding barefoot impressions, as its slight probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant's hearsay statements to her mother and a videotaped statement to police under the necessity exception.

The complainant was unavailable to testify on the trial date for medical reasons.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to interfere with the trial judge's discretionary decision that the necessity requirement was met, as there was evidence that the complainant would not be available to testify within an acceptable period of time.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and related firearm offences, as well as his sentence of 16.5 years imprisonment with a parole ineligibility order.

The appellant shot the complainant, leaving her paralyzed.

On appeal, he challenged the jury instructions on the challenge for cause process, intent, reasonable doubt, and the complainant's denials, as well as the admission of similar act evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible errors in the conviction but set aside the parole ineligibility order as the trial judge provided no reasons to support it.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and trafficking after shooting a police officer during a drug takedown.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and the jury instructions on cross-racial eyewitness identification were inadequate.

The Crown appealed the 8-year sentence, arguing it failed to reflect the principle of parity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence overwhelming and the jury charge adequate.

The Court allowed the Crown's sentence appeal, increasing the sentence to 10 years (6 years net of pre-trial custody) to better reflect the gravity of the offence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for second degree murder and the increase of his parole ineligibility period from ten to fifteen years.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the defence of drunkenness, the meaning of reasonable doubt, and the distinction between inferences and speculation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's instructions were adequate and substantially complied with the principles in Lifchus.

The court also found no error in principle regarding the sentence, concluding it was not manifestly excessive.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a developmentally disabled complainant and an eight-month custodial sentence.

The majority held that the complainant’s videotaped and oral out-of-court statements were properly admitted under the principled hearsay exception because the evidence established necessity through her indefinite inability to testify and threshold reliability through timing, demeanour, absence of apparent fabrication, and corroborative admissions by the appellant.

The court further upheld findings that the complainant lacked capacity to consent to the sexual activity and that the defence of honest but mistaken belief had no air of reality, given the appellant’s knowledge of her significant cognitive limitations and failure to take reasonable steps to ascertain capacity and consent.

The s. 11(b) delay argument and sentence appeal were also rejected.

A dissent would have ordered a new trial on the basis that necessity was not established because the complainant’s unavailability may have been temporary and the inability to cross-examine her impaired full answer and defence.

The Crown appealed acquittals on theft under $5,000 and possession arising from cash found during a post-fire cleanup of hotel property.

The appellate court held the Crown had advanced and led evidence on the theory that the cash belonged to a specific individual, and the trial judge was entitled to find that ownership had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Although an alternative occupier-based property interest theory was legally available, it had not been developed in the evidence, and the Crown was not entitled to a second opportunity to prove that theory on appeal.

The court also declined to order a new trial on the possession charge, finding that the administration of justice would not be served by permitting the Crown to advance a new theory after the theft acquittal stood.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation following a jury trial.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge's charge to the jury on reasonable doubt was inadequate, as it failed to distance reasonable doubt from a balance of probabilities and referred to it as an expression used in ordinary speech.

The Crown argued that defence counsel's closing address cured any defect in the charge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the charge deficient and concluding that the jury's expressed exasperation with defence counsel made it dangerous to assume they accepted her instructions on the law.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal court order setting aside a sexual assault conviction and directing a new trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal judge erred by conducting a microscopic review of the evidence, reassessing credibility, and effectively retrying the case rather than showing proper deference to the trial judge's findings.

Applying the governing appellate principles on unreasonable verdicts and credibility-based findings, the court concluded the trial verdict was reasonably supported by the complainant's evidence and the rejection of the defence evidence.

Leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, the trial verdict was restored, and the sentence appeal was remitted for determination on its merits.