Raymond Earl Boggs

Anna La Force was charged with aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and unlawful entry into a dwelling.

The charges stemmed from an attack on Allison Robinson, a friend of Luisa Botelho, with whom La Force and Botelho were both in a relationship with Cavin Banfield.

The court found La Force to be the aggressor, rejecting her self-defence claim.

She was convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.

However, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that La Force was in the dwelling without lawful excuse, leading to an acquittal on the unlawful entry charge.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for killing a 2½-year-old child in his care and assault causing bodily harm.

He was acquitted of aggravated assault.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing that the jury instructions were inadequate, that the murder conviction was unreasonable, and that the verdicts were inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the jury was properly instructed, that the evidence supported the murder conviction, and that the verdicts were reconcilable based on their different elements and temporal distinctions.

On sentencing, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence of his Aboriginal status, which was admitted but found insufficient to warrant a reduction in the 15-year period of parole ineligibility.

The appellant appealed her conviction for fraud and forgery on two grounds: (1) that the verdict was unreasonable, and (2) that the Crown had the burden to disprove the defence of complicity by the complainant once an air of reality was raised.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment and his treatment of the complainant's evidence.

The trial judge was entitled to accept only part of the witness's testimony and gave clear reasons for his conclusions.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal her sentence based on delay in proceedings, but this was dismissed as the trial judge had properly considered the delay argument and noted it would be relevant at parole eligibility review.

The offender, Sukhraj Atwal, was convicted of forgery and fraud after trial.

She was an external bookkeeper for Star Plastics Inc. and, over an 8-week period in 2006, forged 97 cheques totaling over one million dollars, resulting in an actual loss of $645,301.16 to the company.

The court considered aggravating factors such as breach of trust, planned and deliberate conduct, and the significant financial loss, and mitigating factors including her age (54), lack of prior record, and generally positive presentence report.

The court rejected the defence's arguments for a conditional sentence based on delay and the victim's alleged "unclean hands." A penitentiary sentence was deemed necessary for general deterrence.

Gregory McClurg was charged with making and possessing child pornography, sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

The complainant, a 15-year-old runaway, testified that the accused showed her pornography, sexually touched her, and took photographs of her.

The accused denied the allegations, presenting an alibi and suggesting his son's involvement, and also claimed erectile dysfunction.

The court found the complainant's testimony credible regarding sexual touching and the creation of child pornography, but had lingering doubt about the accused's direct involvement and the reliability of his alibi.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was acquitted of all charges.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and public mischief arising from a staged two-vehicle collision.

He argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and in his assessment of witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the delay was justified by the complexity of the case and caused no serious prejudice.

The Court also held that the trial judge was entitled to accept or reject parts of the evidence and was not required to give himself a Vetrovec warning in a judge-alone trial.

The accused, an accountant for Star Plastics, was charged with forgery and fraud after 97 company cheques totalling over $1 million were issued with the forged signature of the company's vice president.

The Crown alleged the accused misappropriated the funds for her personal benefit.

The defence argued the company's owner authorized the cheques as part of a tax evasion scheme.

The court found the owner's evidence credible that he did not authorize the 97 cheques, despite his involvement in a separate questionable loan arrangement with the accused.

The court concluded the accused forged the cheques and defrauded the company to alleviate her own financial pressures.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The applicant, convicted of historical sexual assault against his daughters and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment, applied for bail pending appeal.

He argued his appeal had merit based on his hearing impairment preventing a fair trial and alleged collusion between the complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the grounds of appeal arguable but weak, and concluding that the public interest favoured the continued enforcement of the sentence.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals for second degree murder and attempted murder.

The trial judge had ruled that the Crown could not call alibi evidence in reply to the defence's alternate suspect theory, forcing the Crown to call the evidence in-chief and prejudicing its case.

The trial judge also excluded the Crown's expert evidence regarding the type of instrument used to inflict the fatal wound, erroneously concluding it would not assist the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in both rulings, which had a material bearing on the acquittals, and ordered a new trial.

The defendant was charged with criminal negligence causing death and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence that the defendant removed pizza delivery items from his vehicle after the collision, arguing it showed a consciousness of guilt related to speeding to meet a delivery deadline.

The court ruled the post-offence conduct evidence was admissible, as it was relevant to whether the defendant was speeding or had a motive to speed, subject to a limiting instruction to the jury that it could not be used to elevate the level of culpability to criminal negligence or dangerous driving.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder and assault causing bodily harm in relation to the death of his common-law partner's two-year-old son.

The child suffered extensive, repeated blunt force trauma while in the offender's care, culminating in fatal abdominal injuries.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment for second-degree murder with a 15-year period of parole ineligibility, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for the brutal breach of trust against a vulnerable infant.

A concurrent sentence of five years was imposed for the assault causing bodily harm.

In a murder prosecution, the Crown sought to admit multiple statements made by the accused during police interviews and at the scene of a medical emergency involving a child.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court conducted a voir dire examining voluntariness under the confessions rule and the accused’s right to silence.

Some statements were admitted where the accused attended voluntarily and spoke without coercion, while other statements were excluded where police interrogation ignored repeated assertions of the right to remain silent or involved oppressive questioning.

The ruling provides a contextual analysis of voluntariness and the interaction between the confessions rule and Charter protections.

The youth pleaded guilty to offences arising from two armed robberies where a co-offender used a sawed-off shotgun.

The sentencing judge declined the Crown's application to designate the offences as serious violent offences (SVO) under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, finding an insufficient nexus between the youth's actions as a party and the serious psychological harm suffered by the victims.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the standard criminal law test for causation applies to the SVO definition and that the youth's conduct was a significant contributing cause of the harm.

The SVO designation was made for the second set of offences, rendering the deferred custody sentence illegal, and the matter was remitted for sentencing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to address or reconcile contradictions in the arresting officer's testimony concerning the appellant's manner of speech and movements, which formed the basis for the conviction.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for extortion, having been acquitted of related assault charges arising from the same incident.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected the jury by providing a generic instruction on extortion that included 'threats', which could have led the jury to convict based on words alone, despite the Crown's case requiring proof of physical assault.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Registrar of Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario suspending its licence.

The appellant argued that the regulatory hearing was barred by res judicata, double jeopardy, and abuse of process following a quasi-criminal acquittal, and that translation difficulties led to a denial of natural justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulatory jurisdiction is separate from the quasi-criminal prosecution, Charter s. 11(h) does not apply to regulatory proceedings, and no unfairness or translation difficulty was established.