Kevin Michael Rawluk

The appellant, Johnathan Impey, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's response to a jury question regarding the definition of reasonable doubt, and the alleged failure to instruct the jury on how to deal with the complainant's motivation to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's response to the jury's question was appropriate, especially given counsel's joint submission, and that the general instructions on witness credibility were sufficient to address the issue of motive to fabricate.

The respondent was acquitted of child luring, with the trial judge finding him reckless as to the complainants' ages but concluding recklessness was insufficient mens rea based on a misinterpretation of R. v. Morrison.

The Court of Appeal clarified that recklessness as to age is sufficient mens rea for child luring under s. 172.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code where the Crown proves an actual child complainant, distinguishing this from police sting operations.

However, as the trial judge did not make findings on the respondent's subjective intent to facilitate a secondary offence, the appeal was allowed, acquittals set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, convicted of theft over $5,000 and sentenced to six months imprisonment followed by two years probation, appealed both her conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge properly grappled with the evidence and that the grounds of appeal constituted an attempt to reargue the trial.

The court also denied a fresh evidence application regarding alleged gaps in the trial transcript, concluding that the appellant failed to establish irreparable prejudice or that material evidence was missing.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was not demonstrably unfit and the trial judge's discretion in declining a conditional sentence for a breach of trust involving theft from an employer was upheld.

The appellant, Awale Hussein, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and sought leave to appeal the parole ineligibility component of his sentence.

The conviction appeal was based on alleged errors in dismissing a Corbett application (allowing cross-examination on his criminal record) and in the jury charge regarding police investigation inadequacies.

The sentence appeal argued errors in disregarding juror recommendations for parole ineligibility and treating absence of motive as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in principle or unreasonable exercises of discretion by the trial judge.

The appellant, B.S., appealed his conviction for indecent assault and the imposed sentence of 18 months' imprisonment.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's reliability and credibility, and the rejection of the appellant's evidence.

The sentence appeal argued the trial judge erred by not imposing a conditional sentence, particularly in light of the appellant's Indigenous status and the absence of a Gladue report at sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's findings on credibility and reliability, and upholding the custodial sentence as appropriate given the nature of the offence against a vulnerable child.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient and that she misapprehended evidence regarding the opportunity to commit the offence.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons sufficient, noting that credibility assessments are complex and that the judge clearly rejected the defence's evidence after a full review of the complainant's testimony.

The court reiterated that incomplete transcripts do not automatically lead to a new trial unless there is a serious possibility of error or deprivation of appeal grounds.

The appeal was dismissed.

Stuart Murray, convicted of fraud, sought an extension of time to appeal his conviction, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary and uninformed due to his mental state and unexpected collateral consequences from Law Society proceedings.

The Crown opposed, citing delay and lack of merit.

The motion judge granted the extension, finding that psychiatric evidence raised sufficient doubt about Murray's cognitive functionality at the time of the plea and adequately explained the delay, thus warranting an appeal on the validity of the guilty plea.

The appellant, William James Epp, appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion of penetration was reasonable given the overwhelming evidence and the appellant's failure to testify.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in the seven-year imprisonment sentence, considering aggravating factors such as the victim's age, the appellant's age and prior record, and the harm caused.

The appellant, Mikail Moolla, appealed his conviction, arguing that his trial, conducted remotely via Zoom from a correctional institution due to COVID-19 concerns, was fundamentally unfair.

He contended that distractions and inadequate facilities impaired his ability to participate and present his defence, or at least compromised the appearance of fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the less than ideal arrangements, the appellant failed to demonstrate that his ability to present a defence was impaired or that the trial was unfair.

The court noted that counsel had agreed to the remote format and did not raise objections during the trial, and the trial judge had actively worked to mitigate any issues.

The appellant, Michael Laforme, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and sought leave to appeal his sentence of life imprisonment with a 16-year period of parole ineligibility.

The conviction appeal alleged errors in the trial judge's jury charge, specifically regarding the understanding of legal principles, fairness, balance, and warnings about post-offence conduct evidence.

The sentence appeal argued that the trial judge failed to give meaningful effect to Gladue principles, resulting in an unduly harsh sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and affirming that the sentencing judge properly considered Gladue principles while balancing other relevant factors, including the brutality of the offence and the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The accused was convicted at trial of second degree murder after stabbing the deceased six times during a bar altercation.

The majority of the Court of Appeal overturned the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding an air of reality to the defence of provocation.

The Crown appealed as of right.

The Supreme Court of Canada, applying a correctness standard of review, found no error in the trial judge's determination that there was no air of reality to the provocation defence.

On the evidence, the accused did not act 'on the sudden' before passion could cool — his reaction was the culmination of an altercation he both instigated and anticipated, and he had time and opportunity to reflect before stabbing the deceased.

The appellant, Ahmed Farah, appealed his convictions for multiple firearms offences, including trafficking for the benefit of a criminal organization, and his 12-year custodial sentence.

The main issue at trial was identification, as the Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence linking the appellant to the alias "Hurdaye" from wiretap investigations.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in admitting Leaney identification evidence from police officers and that the jury's verdict was unreasonable.

He also challenged the sentence, arguing for more credit for harsh remand conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the admission of identification evidence, that the verdict was reasonable given the circumstantial evidence, and no error in the sentencing judge's discretion regarding pre-trial credit.

The moving party, Mr. Murray, sought a ten-month extension of time to appeal his criminal conviction and sentence for fraud over $5,000, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary due to his mental state and uninformed about collateral consequences, specifically the Law Society's use of the plea.

The court reviewed the principles for extending time to appeal and for withdrawing guilty pleas based on limited cognitive capacity and lack of informed consent regarding legally relevant collateral consequences.

While sympathetic to Mr. Murray's depression, the court found insufficient expert evidence to support his claim of an involuntary plea.

The motion was adjourned for three months to allow Mr. Murray to gather the necessary evidence on the merits of his proposed appeal.

The appellant, Ali Amiri, brought two appeals from Superior Court decisions concerning certiorari applications related to his criminal trial for threatening his wife.

The first appeal (C70004) challenged the dismissal of his certiorari application to quash a procedural order, which was deemed moot as the trial judge had since decided the underlying issues.

The second appeal (C70051) challenged the granting of certiorari applications by two subpoenaed witnesses (a lawyer and a Legal Aid Ontario employee) to quash their subpoenas, based on solicitor-client privilege and statutory privilege, respectively.

The Court of Appeal summarily dismissed both appeals under s. 685(1) of the Criminal Code, finding them frivolous or vexatious, emphasizing the limited scope of certiorari in criminal proceedings and the lack of merit in the appellant's arguments regarding privilege exceptions.

The appellant, Cindy Ali, appealed her conviction for first-degree murder in the death of her profoundly disabled daughter.

The Crown alleged the appellant suffocated her daughter and fabricated a home invasion story to cover it up.

The defence argued the death was seizure-related or caused by a home invader, and that the home invasion was real.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in narrowing the jury's consideration of the cause of death to only suffocation and in unduly restricting the jury's consideration of alternative explanations for the fabricated home invasion narrative.

The trial judge's instructions effectively invited the jury to convict of murder if they found the home invasion story fabricated, without adequately considering other culpable acts (like failure to provide necessaries) or innocent explanations for the fabrication.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, S.P., appealed convictions for sexual offences against his daughters, which occurred approximately 40 years prior.

The appeal was based on alleged errors in the trial judge's credibility analysis and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, but this was later abandoned.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material inconsistencies in the complainants' evidence, upholding the trial judge's credibility findings, and rejecting the ineffective assistance claim and the admission of fresh evidence.

The appellant, convicted of second degree murder and aggravated assault, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed the application on the public interest criterion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the grounds of appeal were weak and did not clearly surpass the not frivolous criterion.

Balancing the weak grounds, serious convictions, and lengthy sentence against the lack of flight risk and public safety concerns, the court concluded that the enforceability interest outweighed the reviewability interest, making detention necessary in the public interest.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal judge's decision upholding his conviction for uttering a threat.

The moving party had attempted to enter the wrong apartment while confused and suffering from a broken jaw, and told the complainant 'I'm going to kill you' in broken English.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding no issues of general importance and no merit to the arguments, as the trial judge's factual findings regarding the threat and mens rea were entitled to deference.

The appellant, Tola Paul, was convicted of aggravated assault and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred in refusing to put the defences of self-defence and defence of others to the jury, finding no air of reality to these defences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by making factual conclusions and credibility assessments that usurped the jury's role in determining the air of reality of the defences.

The Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to reasonably find that the defences of self-defence and defence of others had an air of reality.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

K.V. sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against a Superior Court judge's decision to quash a subpoena issued to the prosecuting Crown counsel in his ongoing sexual offence trial.

The Crown opposed, arguing lack of merit and delay.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding the appeal not frivolous and that K.V. had a right to appeal, despite concerns about trial delay, as the complainant's evidence was complete.