Kevin Michael Rawluk

The appellant was convicted after a 70-day trial of two counts of fraud over $5000, two counts of fraud under $5000, one count of attempting to obstruct justice, one count of forgery, and one count of causing someone to use a forged document.

She was sentenced to 14 months in jail.

The appellant appealed her convictions on multiple grounds, including claims that the trial judge erred in refusing an adjournment, that certain counts were void for vagueness, that the convictions were unreasonable, and that the burden of proof was reversed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The applicant sought judicial interim release pending conviction appeal after being convicted of multiple counts of assault, assault with a weapon, choking, sexual assault, and assault causing bodily harm.

He was sentenced to nine years imprisonment.

The court applied the three-part test under section 679(3) of the Criminal Code: whether the appeal is not frivolous, whether the applicant will surrender into custody, and whether detention is necessary in the public interest.

While the appeal was found to be not frivolous and the applicant demonstrated he would comply with release conditions, the court dismissed the bail application based on the public interest component, finding that the enforceability interest substantially outweighed the reviewability interest given the gravity and circumstances of the offences.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of sexual offences against a single complainant.

The appeal addresses multiple errors arising from jury management during deliberations and the trial judge's charge to the jury.

The jury reported deliberation impasses, requested materials and evidence playbacks, and one juror indicated unavailability beyond the third day.

The trial judge provided transcripts of portions of the appellant's police interview used in cross-examination rather than replaying the cross-examination itself, failed to replay the appellant's testimony after the jury withdrew their request, exhorted the jury twice without clarifying that no time limit existed on deliberations, and failed to adequately relate the evidence to the defence position in the charge.

The cumulative effect of these errors resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed a disposition order of the Ontario Review Board requiring his continued detention at the Southwest Centre for Forensic Mental Health Care with permission to live in approved accommodation.

The appellant sought to quash the order and substitute a Conditional Discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's disposition, finding no error in the Board's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk to public safety and that the detention disposition was the least onerous and restrictive option available.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a male dancer at a strip club, was convicted of sexual assault of a female customer.

The trial judge found that the complainant did not consent to fellatio and vaginal intercourse that occurred in the VIP room.

The appellant appealed on the basis that the trial judge relied on behavioural assumptions and stereotypes about how a young woman would act in a strip club setting to determine that the complainant did not consent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's credibility analysis was tainted by impermissible reliance on stereotypes and assumptions about female behaviour in a sexualized environment.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code for acts committed over five months and sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

He appealed on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

Trial counsel had presented telephone records purporting to show over 900 calls between the appellant and the complainant to support a defence of consensual contact, but failed to authenticate the records as required by law.

The trial judge disregarded the unauthenticated records, found the complainant credible, and convicted the appellant.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel's failure to address authentication fell below the standard of reasonable competence and prejudiced the appellant in a manner that might have impacted the verdict.

The court admitted fresh evidence, allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction on one count of counseling to kidnap and one count of counseling to rob, as well as his sentence of nine months imprisonment.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's evidence and accepted the Crown's evidence, including testimony from an undercover officer supported by intercepted communications.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and concluded that the evidence established either intent or recklessness as to the risk inherent in counselling, meeting the test established in R. v. Hamilton.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

However, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to address defence counsel's submissions regarding pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions.

The sentence was reduced from nine months to eight months to account for a 14-day credit for nine days of pre-trial custody and an additional two-week credit for over a year of restrictive bail conditions.

The appellants were convicted of three counts of robbery with a firearm, three counts of forcible confinement, and one count of breaking and entering with intent to commit robbery.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence including text messages discussing obtaining a firearm, cell phone tower evidence placing the "Flyd" phone near the robbery location, fingerprint evidence linking Miles to the scene, and Miles' prior employment at the store.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sought leave to appeal sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals and the sentence appeals, finding that despite a hearsay error regarding the post-it note evidence linking Miles to the phone, the curative proviso applied as the evidence against Miles was overwhelming.

The accused appealed convictions arising from an armed bank robbery, arguing the circumstantial evidence did not reasonably establish identity.

The Court held that, applying Villaroman, the evidence as a whole reasonably excluded alternatives to guilt, including in light of DNA found on two key items connected to the robbery and getaway car.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a member of the Batchewana First Nation, appealed his sentence for sexual assault.

The sentencing judge imposed six months' imprisonment followed by three years of probation.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in proceeding with sentencing based on an inadequate Gladue report without ordering a supplementary report.

The court directed the Crown to obtain a supplementary Gladue report to determine whether non-custodial alternatives were available.

After receiving the supplementary report, which confirmed that the Batchewana First Nation has no formal restorative justice programs and that meaningful community-based alternatives were not available, the court concluded that denunciation must be the primary sentencing objective.

The court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding the original sentence fit and proportionate.

The appellant appealed his convictions on 11 counts of weapons offences and his sentence of eight years.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty of firing a handgun at a third party and then chasing the shooter, ultimately disposing of the weapon in a recycling bin.

The sole issue at trial was whether the pursuer was the appellant or his friend.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the burden of proof and noting that the appellant's blood was found on the recovered handgun, his clothing matched witness descriptions, and he was the only injured party.

The court also upheld the eight-year sentence, noting it was a second firearms offence committed while subject to weapons prohibition orders, and that the mandatory minimum penalty of seven years applied under s. 244(3) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

He contended that the arresting officer violated his Charter rights by failing to consider whether residual mouth alcohol could have distorted the accuracy of the approved screening device (ASD) test result.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while officers should consider residual mouth alcohol as a matter of good practice, the failure to do so does not constitute a Charter violation.

The court found that the officer had reasonable grounds to arrest and make an evidential breath demand based on the information available to her at the time.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault with a sentence of four years imprisonment.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the complainant's evidence, pointing to two alleged inconsistencies in statements made to a sexual assault nurse.

The Court of Appeal found these were not material inconsistencies and that the trial judge adequately addressed them.

The appellant also argued the trial judge failed to give proper consideration to the defence theory, but the Court of Appeal disagreed, finding the trial judge specifically addressed the defence theory and based his decision on the evidence as a whole.

The appeal was dismissed.

Appeal from conviction for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, and from sentence of six months imprisonment.

The appellant, an Aboriginal offender, challenged the trial judge's credibility findings and the sentencing judge's failure to properly apply Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sexual assault conviction appeal, stayed the unlawful confinement conviction pursuant to the Kienapple principle, and found the sentencing judge erred by proceeding without adequate Gladue and pre-sentence reports addressing community-based sentencing alternatives.

The sentence appeal was reserved pending a supplementary pre-sentence report.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated May 1, 2017, which ordered her detained at the General Forensic Service of Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences, though with discretion for the person in charge to permit community living.

The appellant challenged the Board's constitution, arguing the Chairperson did not meet statutory qualification requirements, and contested the Board's use of victim impact statements and its finding that the appellant posed a significant threat to the community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no improper constitution of the Board, no improper use of victim impact statements, and that the Board's findings were supported by evidence and joint counsel recommendation.

The appellant was convicted of bank robbery and related offences following a trial by judge alone.

The main issue at trial was the identity of the robber, with evidence being circumstantial.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on DNA evidence linking him to a pocket knife left at the crime scene and a t-shirt found in the getaway vehicle.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the reasonableness of the verdict.

The majority upheld the conviction, finding that the cumulative circumstantial evidence excluded any reasonable alternative to guilt.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal, finding that the DNA evidence lacked a temporal connection to the robbery and that alternative explanations remained reasonable.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and unlawful confinement against his daughter when she was under 16 years of age.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons for meaningful appellate review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's reasons were brief, they were sufficiently clear to demonstrate why the conviction was reached.

The trial judge properly assessed credibility and reliability of witnesses, accepted the complainant's evidence regarding the April 16, 2013 offences, and correctly applied the W.(D.) analysis to reject the appellant's denial and defence evidence.

The appellant was convicted of five carjackings, with direct evidence linking him to one incident and similar fact evidence linking him to four others.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two grounds relating to the trial judge's jury charge on similar fact evidence, arguing the judge erred in instructing the jury on how to assess such evidence and group membership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the charge faithfully followed the two-step process established in R. v. Perrier and was sufficient to ensure the jury did not improperly use group activity to identify the appellant without specific linkage to the individual acts.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment.

The sole issue at trial was consent.

The complainant testified she did not consent to sexual intercourse that occurred in her dormitory room.

The appellant did not testify but provided a police statement claiming the sexual activity was consensual.

The trial judge found the complainant credible and the appellant's statements unbelievable, convicting him based on the circumstances of the incident and the appellant's pattern of dishonesty.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on multiple grounds, all of which were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old complainant, claiming he believed she was 16.

The trial judge found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant did not take all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age.

The sole ground of appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging trial counsel should have forensically examined a MicroSD card containing a purported message indicating the complainant was 16.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice from counsel's alleged incompetence.

The Court also struck the s. 161(1)(c) order on sentencing appeal as the relevant provisions came into effect after the offences were committed.