Kevin Michael Rawluk

The appellant, a member of the Batchewana First Nation, appealed his sentence for sexual assault.

The sentencing judge imposed six months' imprisonment followed by three years of probation.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in proceeding with sentencing based on an inadequate Gladue report without ordering a supplementary report.

The court directed the Crown to obtain a supplementary Gladue report to determine whether non-custodial alternatives were available.

After receiving the supplementary report, which confirmed that the Batchewana First Nation has no formal restorative justice programs and that meaningful community-based alternatives were not available, the court concluded that denunciation must be the primary sentencing objective.

The court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding the original sentence fit and proportionate.

The appellant appealed his convictions on 11 counts of weapons offences and his sentence of eight years.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty of firing a handgun at a third party and then chasing the shooter, ultimately disposing of the weapon in a recycling bin.

The sole issue at trial was whether the pursuer was the appellant or his friend.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the burden of proof and noting that the appellant's blood was found on the recovered handgun, his clothing matched witness descriptions, and he was the only injured party.

The court also upheld the eight-year sentence, noting it was a second firearms offence committed while subject to weapons prohibition orders, and that the mandatory minimum penalty of seven years applied under s. 244(3) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

He contended that the arresting officer violated his Charter rights by failing to consider whether residual mouth alcohol could have distorted the accuracy of the approved screening device (ASD) test result.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while officers should consider residual mouth alcohol as a matter of good practice, the failure to do so does not constitute a Charter violation.

The court found that the officer had reasonable grounds to arrest and make an evidential breath demand based on the information available to her at the time.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault with a sentence of four years imprisonment.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the complainant's evidence, pointing to two alleged inconsistencies in statements made to a sexual assault nurse.

The Court of Appeal found these were not material inconsistencies and that the trial judge adequately addressed them.

The appellant also argued the trial judge failed to give proper consideration to the defence theory, but the Court of Appeal disagreed, finding the trial judge specifically addressed the defence theory and based his decision on the evidence as a whole.

The appeal was dismissed.

Appeal from conviction for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, and from sentence of six months imprisonment.

The appellant, an Aboriginal offender, challenged the trial judge's credibility findings and the sentencing judge's failure to properly apply Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sexual assault conviction appeal, stayed the unlawful confinement conviction pursuant to the Kienapple principle, and found the sentencing judge erred by proceeding without adequate Gladue and pre-sentence reports addressing community-based sentencing alternatives.

The sentence appeal was reserved pending a supplementary pre-sentence report.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated May 1, 2017, which ordered her detained at the General Forensic Service of Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences, though with discretion for the person in charge to permit community living.

The appellant challenged the Board's constitution, arguing the Chairperson did not meet statutory qualification requirements, and contested the Board's use of victim impact statements and its finding that the appellant posed a significant threat to the community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no improper constitution of the Board, no improper use of victim impact statements, and that the Board's findings were supported by evidence and joint counsel recommendation.

The appellant was convicted of bank robbery and related offences following a trial by judge alone.

The main issue at trial was the identity of the robber, with evidence being circumstantial.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on DNA evidence linking him to a pocket knife left at the crime scene and a t-shirt found in the getaway vehicle.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the reasonableness of the verdict.

The majority upheld the conviction, finding that the cumulative circumstantial evidence excluded any reasonable alternative to guilt.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal, finding that the DNA evidence lacked a temporal connection to the robbery and that alternative explanations remained reasonable.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and unlawful confinement against his daughter when she was under 16 years of age.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons for meaningful appellate review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's reasons were brief, they were sufficiently clear to demonstrate why the conviction was reached.

The trial judge properly assessed credibility and reliability of witnesses, accepted the complainant's evidence regarding the April 16, 2013 offences, and correctly applied the W.(D.) analysis to reject the appellant's denial and defence evidence.

The appellant was convicted of five carjackings, with direct evidence linking him to one incident and similar fact evidence linking him to four others.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two grounds relating to the trial judge's jury charge on similar fact evidence, arguing the judge erred in instructing the jury on how to assess such evidence and group membership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the charge faithfully followed the two-step process established in R. v. Perrier and was sufficient to ensure the jury did not improperly use group activity to identify the appellant without specific linkage to the individual acts.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment.

The sole issue at trial was consent.

The complainant testified she did not consent to sexual intercourse that occurred in her dormitory room.

The appellant did not testify but provided a police statement claiming the sexual activity was consensual.

The trial judge found the complainant credible and the appellant's statements unbelievable, convicting him based on the circumstances of the incident and the appellant's pattern of dishonesty.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on multiple grounds, all of which were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old complainant, claiming he believed she was 16.

The trial judge found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant did not take all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age.

The sole ground of appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging trial counsel should have forensically examined a MicroSD card containing a purported message indicating the complainant was 16.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice from counsel's alleged incompetence.

The Court also struck the s. 161(1)(c) order on sentencing appeal as the relevant provisions came into effect after the offences were committed.

The appellant appealed his convictions on multiple firearm and drug offences.

The central issue was whether evidence seized during a warrantless search on March 6, 2012 should have been admitted despite a prior illegal warrantless search on February 29, 2012.

The trial judge had excluded evidence from the first search but admitted evidence from the second search, which was conducted pursuant to a warrant.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in his section 24(2) analysis by impermissibly diminishing the seriousness of the Charter breach and considering irrelevant factors.

The court held that the deliberate and ongoing nature of the police misconduct required exclusion of the evidence to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault with a weapon, raising three grounds of appeal.

First, he argued the trial judge misused a hospital report by relying on it for its truth; the court found the trial judge's reasons did not support this submission as the complainant testified to inconsistencies in her own evidence and confirmed the appellant gave her a false story.

Second, he argued the trial judge was required to make a specific factual finding on whether he threw or stabbed the complainant; the court disagreed, finding the real issue was whether the injury was intentionally or accidentally inflicted, and the trial judge's finding of intentional infliction was sufficient.

Third, he argued the trial judge failed to properly caution himself about the complainant's admissions of public mischief and perjury; the court found the trial judge appropriately cautioned himself on the complainant's previous false accusations.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence regarding the appellant's full criminal record.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle collision in Mississauga.

He appealed on two grounds: first, that the 31-month delay from charge to trial violated his Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time under the new framework established in R. v. Jordan; and second, that the trial judge erred in finding the actus reus of dangerous driving by impermissibly inferring excessive speed from the consequences of the driving rather than the manner of driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the delay was reasonable for a transitional case and that the trial judge properly focused on the manner of driving in establishing the actus reus.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to two years' imprisonment following a trial in which the trial judge found that the complainant fell asleep and awoke to find the appellant engaged in non-consensual intercourse with her.

The appellant appealed his conviction on three grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in assessing evidence of prior sexual activity; (2) the trial judge erred in applying the rule in Browne v. Dunn; and (3) the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal allowed the conviction appeal on the ground that the trial judge erred in finding violations of the rule in Browne v. Dunn and in drawing negative inferences about the appellant's credibility as a result.

The Court found that these errors adversely impacted the appellant's credibility and that there was a real risk the erroneous findings influenced the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and tipped the scale toward a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence on the basis that the trial judge failed to give credit for restrictive bail terms as required by R. v. Downes.

The trial judge had misapprehended the duration of the bail period, referring to 42 days of pre-bail custody rather than the actual 18 months the appellant spent on restrictive bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal found that had the trial judge understood the true duration and restrictive nature of the bail conditions, he would have granted the five months' credit requested by defence counsel.

Leave to appeal was granted and the sentence was reduced by five months.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the victim's identification evidence—based on his knowledge of the appellant, recognition of his voice, identification of a can of bear mace previously in the appellant's possession, and recognition of the appellant when his mask was pulled off—provided a reasonable basis for conviction.

The court also found the trial judge's reasons adequate, demonstrating a proper understanding of the evidentiary record and the dangers of identification evidence.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that continued his conditional discharge from the North Bay Regional Health Center.

The appellant argued that the Board failed to focus on whether he posed a significant risk of serious harm to the public as required by s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code, and that the Board erred in failing to consider whether a community treatment order under the Mental Health Act could mitigate residual risk.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonable given the appellant's schizoaffective disorder, his history of violence, and the evidence that he would discontinue medication if absolutely discharged.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated July 12, 2016.

The appeal was dismissed as moot by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The accused was charged with Operation Impaired and Refuse Breath Sample following an incident in September 2014.

He brought a motion under s. 11(b) of the Charter to stay the charges due to unreasonable delay.

The Information was not sworn until February 2015, approximately five months after arrest.

Full disclosure was not provided until August 2015, approximately ten months after the accused's first court appearance.

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan, which sets an 18-month ceiling for provincial court cases.

The court found that while there was significant Crown and institutional delay, particularly in the disclosure process, the total delay of approximately 8.5 months fell within acceptable parameters and did not markedly exceed the reasonable time requirements for a routine impaired driving case.

The motion was dismissed.