Christine G. Carter

The Regional Municipality of Niagara issued an order under s. 100.1(1) of the Environmental Protection Act against several persons to recover costs incurred for cleaning up a spill.

Several named persons appealed the order.

The Region subsequently advised the Tribunal that it intended to revoke the order against four of the appellants, as they did not have ownership or control of the pollutants.

The Tribunal found the proposed revocation to be consistent with the purpose of the Act and in the public interest, revoked the order against those four appellants, and dismissed their appeals.

The Director of the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change issued an order regarding a spill of environmental contaminants at a site in Fort Erie.

Several parties appealed the order.

After the required remediation work was completed by some of the appellants, the Director proposed to revoke the order.

The Environmental Review Tribunal found the proposed revocation to be consistent with the purpose of the Environmental Protection Act and in the public interest.

The Tribunal revoked the order and dismissed the appeals.

The City of Kawartha Lakes brought a motion to strike portions of the appellants' Notice of Appeal, witness statements, and Notices of Allegation regarding an order to pay for the clean-up of a heating oil spill.

The City argued that the Tribunal's jurisdiction under s. 100.1(15) of the Environmental Protection Act is strictly limited to specific considerations, excluding issues of fault, fairness, and financial hardship.

The Tribunal agreed, finding that s. 100.1(15) is a 'consider only' provision that precludes a broad 'new hearing' approach.

The Tribunal also ruled that it lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate claims for contribution and indemnification, which must be pursued in civil court.

The motion was granted, and the scope of the hearing was restricted accordingly.

The Environmental Review Tribunal issued a procedural order limiting the scope of the proceeding to matters set out in s. 100.1(15) of the Environmental Protection Act.

The Tribunal struck portions of the appellants' notices of appeal, witness statements, and document briefs that did not relate to this section.

The Tribunal also accepted the withdrawal of certain notices of allegation and witness statements, and deferred costs applications to a later date.

The Environmental Review Tribunal granted party status on consent to the Technical Standards and Safety Authority, Doug C. Thompson Fuels Ltd., and Les Reservoirs D'Acier de Granby Inc. The status was granted for the limited purpose of responding to a motion brought by the City of Kawartha Lakes regarding the permissible scope of the Gendrons' appeals and Notices of Allegation.

The applicant sought a declaration that a trespass notice issued by the respondent municipality violated his freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The applicant had protested at the town hall using a megaphone and siren, exhibiting erratic and intimidating behaviour that caused staff to fear for their safety.

The court found that while the issue was moot, it warranted a decision.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the applicant's aggressive and disruptive conduct crossed the line from peaceful protest to violent expression, which is not protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Regional Municipality of Niagara issued an order under s. 100.1 of the Environmental Protection Act to recover clean-up costs related to a spill.

Several named persons appealed the order and filed a Notice of Allegation against other parties, including the Town of Fort Erie.

The Town of Fort Erie requested party status in the proceeding.

The Tribunal granted the Town party status, finding its interests may be directly and substantially affected by the outcome of the appeal.

The Tribunal also set a schedule for motions and the main hearing.

The appellants, Wayne and Liana Gendron, brought a motion to adjourn a scheduled Environmental Review Tribunal hearing regarding an order to pay clean-up costs for a furnace oil spill.

The appellants argued that the hearing should be adjourned until after the conclusion of a parallel civil action brought by the respondent municipality.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion, finding that the municipality had undertaken not to pursue its civil action if the Tribunal hearing proceeded, thereby eliminating the risk of duplicative proceedings and double recovery.

The appellants brought a motion to adjourn the hearing of their appeals regarding an order to pay for the clean-up of a spill.

The Environmental Review Tribunal dismissed the motion to adjourn, with reasons to follow, and directed that a status telephone conference call be held to address procedural issues.

Following dismissal of a motion seeking removal of the plaintiff’s counsel from the record and allegations impugning counsel’s professional integrity, the plaintiff sought costs of the motion.

The defendant argued the court was functus and that costs were disproportionate.

The court rejected those arguments, holding that the earlier endorsement expressly contemplated a later determination of costs.

Given that the motion alleged serious misconduct against opposing counsel without evidentiary foundation, the court held that substantial indemnity costs were warranted as a punitive response.

Costs were fixed on a substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $50,537.03.

The appellants appealed an order issued by the City of Kawartha Lakes under s. 100.1(1) of the Environmental Protection Act requiring them to pay for the clean-up of a furnace oil spill.

The proceedings had been adjourned due to parallel civil actions.

Following an undertaking by the City not to pursue the civil action if the Tribunal hearing proceeds, the Tribunal found a significant change in circumstances and issued an order setting procedural deadlines and hearing dates for the remaining appeals by the Gendrons.

The Tribunal held a preliminary hearing by telephone conference call regarding appeals of a Director's Order related to a spill of environmental contaminants.

Several entities requested party status.

Finding that the entities were named in a Notice of Allegation and could be directly affected by the outcome of the appeal, the Tribunal granted party status to Amercoat Canada, Rubyco Ltd., and Danroh Inc. The preliminary hearing was adjourned to allow for the completion of work required under interim amendments to the Director's Order.

At a preliminary hearing regarding an appeal of a Director's Order related to an environmental spill, several individuals and entities sought party and participant status.

The Tribunal granted party status to several potential orderees and individuals named in the order, finding their interests could be directly and substantially affected.

The Regional Municipality of Niagara was granted participant status due to its genuine interest as an adjacent property owner.

The preliminary hearing was adjourned to allow ongoing remediation work to proceed.

The appellants appealed a Director's Order relating to a spill of environmental contaminants, including toluene and acetone, at a site in Fort Erie.

Several appellants brought motions to stay the Director's Order pending the final resolution of the appeals.

At the hearing, the moving parties and the Director presented an agreement for a partial stay and interim amendments to the Order.

The Environmental Review Tribunal approved the consent agreement, finding that the stay would not result in a danger to health, safety, or the environment, and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay to allow necessary investigative work to proceed.

The moving party (defendant insurer) sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion to remove the responding party's (plaintiff's) counsel.

The removal motion was brought because the responding party's counsel retained two experts (a psychologist and an occupational therapist) who had previously been retained by the moving party to assess the responding party's disability claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's conclusion that no confidential or litigation-privileged information had been imparted to the experts by the moving party, and that there is no property in an expert witness.

On a motion for payment out of funds paid into court representing sale proceeds of a cottage interest, the court held that a transfer into joint tenancy with the movant daughter contravened the Fraudulent Conveyances Act because it hindered existing child support creditors.

Applying the badges of fraud analysis in a non-arm's length transfer for no consideration, the court found the presumption of fraudulent intent was not rebutted.

The movant was therefore not entitled to the funds as surviving joint tenant, though her funeral expense claim was recognized as an ordinary creditor claim without priority.

The funds and accrued interest, after priority payment of one creditor's full indemnity costs, were ordered distributed pro rata among the three accepted creditors.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim for payment under a critical illness insurance policy.

The trial judge interpreted a 90-day exclusion clause as applying to any sign of cancer appearing before the 91st day after the certificate of insurance came into effect.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's interpretation reasonable and held that enforcing the exclusion clause was not unconscionable.

The appeal and cross-appeal on costs were dismissed.

Following a trial involving competing defences, the court addressed costs where each side experienced partial success.

The defendants succeeded on a late‑amended secondary defence but failed on their primary defence alleging deliberate misrepresentation by the plaintiff.

Most pre‑trial costs related to the unsuccessful fraud allegation, while only a small portion of the trial addressed the successful defence.

Applying Rule 57.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and considering the timing of the amendment and the nature of the allegations, the court ordered that the plaintiff recover costs incurred prior to the amendment while each party bear its own trial costs.

The plaintiff sought payment under a critical illness insurance policy after being diagnosed with thyroid cancer.

The insurer rescinded the policy alleging the insured failed to disclose sleep apnea during the application process.

The court held the insurer was not entitled to rescind the contract because the application questions were ambiguous and the insured reasonably did not understand sleep apnea to fall within the categories asked.

However, the insurer successfully relied on a contractual 90‑day exclusion clause because signs leading to the cancer diagnosis began before the 91st day after the policy came into effect.

As a result, coverage was excluded despite the insurer’s failed rescission argument.

The appellant sought damages under a critical illness insurance policy connected to a mortgage loan after asserting that he had suffered a covered heart attack.

The appeal turned on the interpretation of policy wording requiring both ECG changes indicating myocardial infarction and an elevated level of cardiac enzymes or any other marker above acceptable levels.

The court held that the policy required something in addition to ECG changes and that 'above acceptable levels' meant higher, not merely different from normal.

The appellant failed to establish coverage, and the insurer's cross-appeal from the no-costs order was also dismissed.