Colin Kirk Boggs

The appellant municipality appealed the dismissal of its motion for summary judgment.

The municipality argued the plaintiffs' action was statute-barred under s. 44(8)(b) of the Municipal Act, 2001, claiming the vehicle collided with a pole on an 'untravelled portion of a highway' (a median).

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that determining whether the median was an untravelled portion of the highway required a trial to fully appreciate the evidence regarding reasonably foreseeable vehicular and pedestrian use.

The appellant physician appealed the dismissal of his summary judgment motion in a defamation action brought by the respondent physician.

The action arose from an email sent by the appellant to the Minister of Health and the College of Physicians and Surgeons criticizing the respondent's medical practices regarding multiple sclerosis treatments.

The appellant argued the email was protected by absolute or qualified privilege.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the application of absolute and qualified privilege, as well as the presence of malice, raised genuine issues requiring a full factual record at trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The vehicle owner brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing multiple civil actions arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident caused by her 17‑year‑old son while impaired.

The central issue was whether the son had the owner's implied consent to possess and operate the vehicle, engaging owner liability principles.

The court held that the issue of implied consent could properly be determined on summary judgment where the evidentiary record was complete and no responding party adduced evidence.

Accepting the son's consistent discovery evidence that he did not believe he had permission and had taken the vehicle without consent, the court found no implied consent on a balance of probabilities.

The actions against the vehicle owner were dismissed.

Following the dismissal of a civil action alleging negligence and wrongdoing by police and the Crown arising from a historic murder conviction later quashed, certain police defendants sought substantial indemnity costs against the plaintiff.

The court considered the extraordinary circumstances of the case, including the miscarriage of justice that resulted in the plaintiff serving decades in prison and the role of state actors in the events leading to that outcome.

Although the action had been dismissed as an abuse of process due to the inability to re-litigate factual findings already determined by the Court of Appeal and the prejudice caused by the passage of time, the court held that ordering costs would be unfair and contrary to the interests of justice.

Exercising its discretion, the court declined to award costs to the successful defendants.

The moving party sought an order removing the plaintiffs’ solicitors of record and removing the mother as litigation guardian in a personal injury action arising from a snowmobile accident involving a minor.

The motion alleged a conflict of interest between the minor plaintiff and her mother, who was also a plaintiff and alleged to have contributed to the accident by failing to ensure the child wore a helmet.

The court acknowledged that a potential conflict had existed and that counsel had been inattentive in aspects of the litigation, including allowing counterclaims against the mother to proceed to default.

However, the now-adult plaintiff had received independent legal advice and confirmed that she wished to continue with the same counsel and did not intend to pursue any claim against her mother.

Applying the objective test of whether a reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that removal was required for the proper administration of justice, the court held that disqualification was not warranted.

The plaintiff, whose murder conviction was quashed by the Court of Appeal after a reference, brought a civil action against the Crown and police alleging negligence and wrongdoing related to an undisclosed alibi.

The defendants moved to dismiss or stay the action.

The court dismissed the action as an abuse of process, finding that it sought to relitigate factual findings already made by the Court of Appeal regarding the absence of wrongdoing by the Crown and police.

The court also held that, alternatively, a permanent stay under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act was warranted due to the impossibility of a fair trial given the passage of over 40 years, faded memories, and lost evidence.

The defendant sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing his motion for summary judgment in a defamation action.

The underlying dispute arose from an email sent by the defendant, a neurologist, to the Minister of Health and the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario requesting investigation into the plaintiff’s involvement in diagnosing and treating a controversial medical condition.

The motion judge had refused summary judgment largely on the basis that the plaintiff had delivered a jury notice and should have the opportunity to have issues such as malice determined by a jury.

The court held that the existence of a jury notice does not alter the test for summary judgment and that the motion judge erred by declining to determine the asserted defences of absolute privilege, qualified privilege, justification, and fair comment where the material facts were not in dispute.

Finding conflicting authority and good reason to doubt the correctness of the order, and that the issue was of broader importance regarding the availability of summary judgment in defamation actions, the court granted leave to appeal.

The appellant, a former police officer, sued for malicious prosecution and negligent investigation after criminal charges against him were withdrawn pursuant to a negotiated resolution agreement requiring his resignation.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding the criminal proceedings did not terminate in the appellant's favour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the withdrawal of charges was a bona fide quid pro quo for the appellant's resignation, not an abandonment of prosecution or an abuse of power.

The municipality brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of claims arising from a catastrophic motor vehicle collision at a rural stop‑controlled intersection.

The plaintiffs alleged that the municipality failed to maintain proper sight lines and failed to reinstall a stop bar after resurfacing, contrary to guidance in the Ontario Traffic Manual.

Competing expert reports addressed whether vegetation and the absence of pavement markings contributed to inadequate sight distance and whether the roadway was in a reasonable state of repair under s. 44 of the Municipal Act, 2001.

Applying the full appreciation test from Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch, the court held that the conflicting expert evidence prevented a proper determination on a summary judgment record.

The issues of roadway maintenance, sight lines, and causal contribution required a full trial.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a defamation action arising from an email sent to the provincial Minister of Health and the president of a professional regulatory body concerning a physician’s clinic offering diagnostic imaging related to a controversial multiple sclerosis theory.

The plaintiff alleged that the email implied unethical conduct, fraud, and exploitation of vulnerable patients.

The defendant argued the communication was protected by absolute or qualified privilege and that the action could be dismissed without trial.

Applying the “full appreciation” test articulated in Combined Air Mechanical Service Inc. v. Flesch, the court held that the issues of privilege, truth, and malice required credibility assessments and a full evidentiary record.

Given the low threshold for defamatory meaning and the plaintiff’s right to a jury trial, the court concluded the matter should proceed to trial.

Following the dismissal of an action for malicious prosecution and negligent investigation on summary judgment, the successful defendants sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $85,000.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs were not warranted because the dismissal of the action turned on the plaintiff’s inability to establish a required element of the torts—namely that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favour—rather than any judicial determination that the allegations of malice were baseless.

Although the plaintiff’s counsel failed to comply with a court‑ordered timetable for motion materials, the delay caused no prejudice and did not justify elevated costs.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed partial indemnity costs for the motion and action together.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay $62,240.49 inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The plaintiff, a former police officer, brought an action for malicious prosecution and negligent investigation after criminal charges against him were withdrawn following his resignation from the police service pursuant to a negotiated resolution with the Crown.

The defendants, including several police officers and the police services board, moved for summary judgment.

The court held that one essential element of both torts is that the criminal proceedings must have terminated in favour of the plaintiff.

Because the charges were withdrawn as part of a bona fide resolution agreement requiring the plaintiff’s resignation, the termination was not legally considered to be in his favour.

As a result, the plaintiff could not establish a necessary element of either tort and the action had no reasonable prospect of success.

The City of Hamilton appealed a trial judgment finding it liable in negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct standard of care and that her findings were supported by the evidence.

The Court also found that the trial judge correctly applied the 'but for' test for causation, noting that causation is a practical question of fact best answered by ordinary common sense.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, stating they agreed with the reasons of the motion judge.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario agreed with the reasons of the motion judge and dismissed the appeal.

Costs of the appeal and a related appeal were awarded to the respondents in the amount of $15,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant slipped and fell on ice in a parking lot, suffering a broken ankle.

She commenced actions against the property owner and the winter maintenance contractor more than six years after the fall.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing both actions, finding the discoverability rule did not apply to extend the limitation period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against the property owner, as its identity could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

However, the Court allowed the appeal against the maintenance contractor, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding when the appellant could have reasonably discovered its identity.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their 1991 motor vehicle accident action for delay.

The motion judge found inordinate delay, triggering a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, which the appellants failed to rebut.

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge should have considered the respondents' materials to rebut the presumption.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the respondents' materials were considered, they were inadequate to rebut the presumption of prejudice, particularly regarding the injured appellant's medical condition and income loss.

The appellant appealed a jury trial judgment where the jury awarded zero for general damages.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge's instructions on causation did not prejudice the appellant, the jury's answers to specific questions were inconsistent, rendering the zero damages award perverse.

Exercising its power under section 119 of the Courts of Justice Act, the Court fixed general damages at $35,000, less a $15,000 deductible, and awarded the appellant $25,000 in appeal costs.

The respondent was accidentally shot and injured by a youth who subsequently pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing bodily harm.

The respondent obtained a civil judgment against the youth and then sought to recover from the homeowner insurance policies of the youth's mother and his aunt and uncle.

The motion judge found the youth was covered under the aunt and uncle's policy and that the 'criminal act' exclusion did not apply because there was no intent to injure.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that the 'criminal act' exclusion is unambiguous and applies to any breach of the Criminal Code, regardless of whether the insured intended to cause injury.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their action for damages for personal injuries sustained on an amusement park ride.

At trial, the judge refused to instruct the jury that the respondent was a common carrier subject to a higher standard of care and a reverse onus, instead charging them on ordinary negligence and occupiers' liability.

The jury found no liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that an amusement park ride does not fall within the definition of a common carrier and the policy rationale for the higher standard of care does not apply.