Colin Kirk Boggs

Police officers sued Crown Attorneys for negligent legal advice provided during a "Mr. Big" undercover investigation that led to the plaintiff's arrest and eventual acquittal.

The police crossclaimed against the Crown Attorneys for contribution and indemnity.

The Court of Appeal held that prosecutorial immunity barred the crossclaim and that Crown Attorneys do not owe a duty of care to police in respect of legal advice provided.

The court emphasized the separate and independent roles of police and Crown Attorneys in the administration of justice and rejected arguments that immunity should not apply to pre-charge conduct or claims by police.

The plaintiffs brought an action under s. 258(1) of the Insurance Act to recover insurance monies to satisfy a judgment arising from a settlement in a personal injury action.

The issue was which insurer—Gore Mutual (insurer of the vehicle owner) or Allstate (insurer of the injured passenger)—should satisfy the judgment.

The motion judge found Gore liable, concluding that the vehicle owner had not breached the insurance policy's cooperation clause and, alternatively, that relief from forfeiture was available.

Gore appealed, arguing the vehicle owner breached the policy by failing to cooperate and failing to provide updated contact information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the vehicle owner's conduct did not constitute substantial non-cooperation as required to breach the cooperation condition.

The plaintiffs brought a summary judgment motion seeking payment of a $300,000 judgment from either Gore Mutual Insurance Company or Allstate Insurance Company of Canada, following a motor vehicle accident.

The central issue was whether Gore's insured (the driver and owner) breached their insurance policy's cooperation clause.

The court found that the policy owner, Ms. Bass, did not breach her obligation to cooperate, despite Gore's difficulties in locating her, attributing these issues to Gore's own errors in communication and search efforts.

Consequently, the court ordered Gore Mutual Insurance Company to pay the judgment.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The appellants, The Regional Municipality of Sudbury and The City of Greater Sudbury, appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice dated November 17, 2015.

The appeal was unsuccessful.

The court awarded costs to the respondents in the amount of $95,000, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes.

A tragic motor vehicle accident occurred on November 22, 2000, when a 20-year-old driver lost control of her vehicle on a snow-covered regional road during a winter storm and collided with an oncoming school bus, sustaining catastrophic injuries.

The plaintiff and her family sued the municipality for negligence, alleging failure to maintain the road in a reasonable state of repair under the Municipal Act.

At trial, the municipality was found 100% liable for approximately $12 million in damages.

On appeal, the municipality challenged the trial judge's findings regarding statutory defences under sections 284(1.2) and 284(1.3) of the Municipal Act and the trial judge's rejection of a contributory negligence claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding that the municipality had actual or constructive knowledge of the risk of road refreezing and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the hazardous conditions that caused the accident.

A plaintiff, unsuccessfully prosecuted for murder, sued police investigators and Crown attorneys for various torts.

The motion judge dismissed the plaintiff's claim against the Crown due to prosecutorial immunity and struck a cross-claim for contribution, but allowed a cross-claim for indemnity based on negligent legal advice to proceed.

The Crown defendants sought leave to appeal this decision.

Leave to appeal was granted, as the motion judge failed to adequately consider policy reasons against recognizing a duty of care from Crown attorneys to police, which raised doubts about the correctness of the order.

Following a successful motion by the third party NGOs to strike the Crown's third party claims in a proposed class action regarding youth detention centres, the NGOs sought costs of $47,695.45 on a partial indemnity basis.

The Crown argued the amount was excessive and suggested $16,500, contending that the NGOs were only successful due to late amendments to the plaintiff's pleadings.

The court rejected the Crown's argument, finding the NGOs were entitled to costs for work both before and after the amendments, but reduced the claimed amount to $35,000 all inclusive as being within the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party.

In a proposed class action regarding youth detention centres, the plaintiff sued the Crown for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and Charter violations, explicitly limiting the claim to the Crown's several liability.

The Crown issued third party claims against the NGOs that operated some of the centres.

The plaintiff and the NGOs moved to strike the third party claims.

The court granted the motions, applying the principle that where a plaintiff limits their claim to the defendant's proportionate degree of fault, a third party claim for contribution and indemnity is legally untenable.

The infant respondent was struck by a vehicle while crossing a street on his way to school.

The trial judge found the appellant municipality liable because the accident occurred during the time a crossing guard was required to be present but was absent.

The trial judge also found the infant respondent was not contributorily negligent.

The municipality appealed, challenging the trial judge's factual findings regarding the timing of the accident and the assessment of contributory negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of the standard of care for children.

The appellants, a police officer and the police services board, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for negligent police investigation of the respondents regarding stolen auto parts.

The trial judge had determined the standard of care without relying on expert evidence and awarded substantial damages.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in departing from the general rule that expert evidence is required to establish the standard of care for a professional, as the investigation was technical and the police conduct was not egregious.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in formulating the standard of care and failing to consider the respondent's committal for trial.

The judgment was set aside except for an agreed award for damaged property.

Following the successful dismissal of the self-represented plaintiff's action against 78 defendants, six groups of defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The court considered the complexity of the claims, the plaintiff's mental health, and principles of proportionality and fairness.

The court reduced several of the costs claimed to ensure comparability and fairness, ultimately awarding a total of $71,000 in costs across the successful defendants.

The defendants appealed an order of a Master granting leave to amend a statement of claim in a solicitor’s negligence action.

The appellants argued the amendments introduced new causes of action related to defamation and republication that were statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the original pleading already contained the material facts necessary to ground the negligence claim based on the solicitor’s alleged failure to commence proceedings, including defamation claims arising from a police association news release and subsequent publications.

The amendments merely clarified and expanded on the same negligence theory rather than introducing new causes of action.

Applying the liberal amendment principles under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court dismissed the appeal.

The moving lawyer defendants sought to strike a self-represented plaintiff’s expansive civil action alleging conspiracy, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, Charter breaches, defamation, and other torts arising from criminal proceedings and child protection litigation.

The court held that the statement of claim lacked material facts linking the lawyer defendants to the alleged misconduct and improperly attempted to relitigate criminal convictions and child protection determinations.

Many claims were also barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found the pleadings vague, speculative, and abusive, failing to establish recognized causes of action or the elements of torts such as conspiracy, malicious prosecution, defamation, or abuse of public office.

The action against the four lawyer defendants was struck or dismissed without leave to amend.

The plaintiff, a 10-year-old boy, was struck by a vehicle while crossing a busy road at a school crosswalk.

The crossing guard employed by the defendant municipality had left her post early.

The driver of the vehicle was found to be speeding in poor weather conditions.

The court found both the driver and the municipality liable, apportioning fault equally at 50% each.

The court dismissed the defendants' claim of contributory negligence against the child.

The plaintiff moved for leave to amend a statement of claim in a solicitors' negligence action arising from an alleged failure to commence underlying civil proceedings within time.

The responding defendants argued the proposed amendments introduced new causes of action that were statute-barred.

The court held the original and proposed amended pleading advanced only one cause of action, namely solicitors' negligence based on failure to carry out instructions, while the amendments merely expanded the alleged losses.

Leave to amend was granted and costs were fixed in favour of the moving party.

The plaintiff, a municipal councillor, brought an action for defamation against other councillors based on statements made during a council meeting.

The defendants moved to strike the allegations, arguing their statements were protected by absolute privilege.

The motion judge held that absolute privilege does not apply to municipal councillors, who instead enjoy qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that Canadian law applies qualified privilege to municipal council speech and declining to extend absolute privilege without a full evidentiary record demonstrating its necessity.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing the action against the respondent vehicle owner.

The driver, who was impaired and caused a fatal accident, admitted he did not have the owner's consent to drive the vehicle.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by applying a purely subjective test for implied consent and by not directing a trial of the issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly considered all evidence and credibility, and correctly concluded he could resolve the dispute on summary judgment.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his civil wrongful-conviction action as an abuse of process and alternatively staying it under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The action alleged negligence, misfeasance, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, misrepresentation, and Charter breaches arising from the non-disclosure of potentially exculpatory alibi evidence in a murder prosecution.

The court held that the prior criminal reference did not determine all issues raised in the civil action and was not intended to bind future proceedings after the conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The motion judge also erred in relying on delay and changed positions by the appellant to justify a stay.

The appeal was allowed and the dismissal and stay orders were set aside.

The defendant physician brought a motion to strike a medical malpractice statement of claim for failure to plead material facts under Rules 21.01, 25.06, and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The pleading contained generalized boiler‑plate allegations of negligence relating to prenatal care and delivery but failed to specify what diagnostic steps, treatments, or decisions constituted the alleged malpractice.

Despite a demand for particulars, production of medical records, and an examination of the defendant on the motion, the plaintiffs maintained that they had no additional particulars to provide.

The court held that pleadings must contain sufficient material facts to permit a defendant to know the case to meet and cannot consist solely of unsupported conclusions.

Because the plaintiffs declined to amend and could provide no further particulars, the statement of claim was struck without leave to amend.

Following dismissal of a motion seeking removal of the plaintiffs’ solicitor of record and the litigation guardian, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs or, alternatively, higher partial indemnity costs, arguing they were successful on the motion and that serious allegations had been made against their counsel.

The court found the result reflected divided success because issues concerning the litigation guardian were addressed only after the motion was brought, and there had been significant management deficiencies by the plaintiffs’ solicitor during the litigation.

Considering the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the conduct of the litigation, the court substantially reduced the costs claimed.

Partial indemnity costs of $10,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements were awarded to the plaintiffs.