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Limitation period begins when some damage is known, not when full extent of injury is diagnosed.
The respondent tripped and fell on a city sidewalk, sustaining a shoulder injury.
She commenced an action against the city six months later, beyond the three-month limitation period in the Municipal Act.
The motion judge dismissed the city's motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding when the respondent discovered the severity of her injury.
On appeal, the Divisional Court reversed the decision, holding that the limitation period begins when the plaintiff knows some damage has occurred, not when the full extent of the injury is diagnosed.
The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.
Misfeasance and negligence claims against police officers and Chief for failing to cooperate with SIU allowed to proceed.
The plaintiffs, the estate and family of a man fatally shot by police, brought actions for misfeasance in a public office and negligence against the involved officers, the Chief of Police, the Police Services Board, and the Province.
The claims arose from the officers' alleged failure to cooperate with the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) investigation.
The defendants moved to strike the claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the actions for misfeasance in a public office against the officers and the Chief, and the negligence action against the Chief, could proceed, as it was not plain and obvious they would fail.
However, the negligence actions against the Board and the Province were struck out because they did not owe a private law duty of care to the plaintiffs to ensure officers cooperated with the SIU.
Appeal dismissed as evidence supported trial judge's finding that appellant failed to prove respondent's fault.
The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to prove the respondent was at fault.
The appeal regarding damages was not considered as liability was not established.
Law firm removed as counsel for Coroner due to perceived conflict of interest.
At the opening of an application for judicial review regarding a coroner's inquest, the applicants brought a motion to remove the law firm representing the respondent Coroner.
The firm had previously done corporate legal work for a corporation that had standing at the inquest.
Although there was no actual conflict of interest, the Divisional Court granted the motion and removed the firm based on the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice and avoid any appearance of impropriety.
Respondents' calculation of prejudgment interest accepted in supplementary reasons.
The parties were unable to agree on the calculation of prejudgment interest on the damages awarded by the Court of Appeal.
The court considered the submissions and accepted the analysis and calculation provided by counsel for the respondents.
An order was directed to issue pursuant to the respondents' draft order.
Supplementary reasons awarding costs of lower court motions to the successful defendants.
Following the release of the court's reasons for judgment, the parties made written submissions regarding costs.
The Court of Appeal awarded the successful defendants, Woodhouse, Gerrits, and Ontario, their costs of the motion before the lower court and their motions for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court, in addition to their costs of the appeal.
The plaintiffs and the remaining defendants agreed that no costs would be awarded among them due to divided success.
Misfeasance requires abuse of power, not mere breach of statutory duty.
Appeals from rule 21 motions in an action arising from a fatal police shooting and the subsequent SIU investigation.
The majority held that the tort of misfeasance in public office requires abuse of statutory or administrative power, and that an alleged failure by police officers to co-operate with an SIU investigation under s. 113(9) of the Police Services Act was a breach of duty, not an abuse of power.
The majority struck the misfeasance claim against the officers and the negligent supervision claim against Ontario, but allowed the negligent supervision claim against the police chief to proceed.
The majority also held the Board could not be liable for negligent supervision because the Act confined it to policy functions and precluded operational direction.
A dissent would have permitted the misfeasance and broader negligent supervision claims to proceed.