Mana Khami

The plaintiff, Stephan Wiener, brought a claim for solicitor's negligence against his former lawyer, Paul Strickland, and his firm, Siskinds LLP.

The claim arose from a mediation where a settlement document was prepared.

The plaintiff alleged that Mr. Strickland bound him to the settlement without his instructions, specifically concerning his ability to sue a third-party lawyer (Douglas Gunn) and the expiry of a limitation period for such a claim.

The court found that the settlement document, which referred to "standard releases" did not prevent the plaintiff from suing Mr. Gunn.

The court also rejected the argument that the limitation period had expired, noting that the defendant was not retained to advise on a claim against Mr. Gunn and that a limitation period is a defence, not a bar to launching an action.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claim against his former lawyer and law firm on the basis that the claim was statute barred under section 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found that the appellant discovered the material facts giving rise to his claim no later than February 3, 2014, and that the statement of claim issued on March 2, 2016 was therefore outside the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against his father, the vehicle owner, on the basis that the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident on February 5, 2012, and commenced an action on January 31, 2014, initially against the deceased occupants' estates but not against his father.

The appellant later added his father as a defendant in October 2014.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim against the father as statute-barred, finding the appellant failed to rebut the statutory presumption that he knew of the matters required for discoverability on the date of the accident.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that the appellant was presumed to know the vehicle owner's identity and that an action against the owner was an appropriate remedy as of the accident date.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the estates of the deceased drivers.

Due to the plaintiff and his father sharing the same name, the plaintiff's counsel mistakenly believed the plaintiff owned the vehicle and did not name the father as a defendant.

After the limitation period expired, the plaintiff added the father as a defendant.

The third-party insurer moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim against the father as statute-barred.

The court granted the motion, finding that the father's ownership was discoverable with reasonable diligence before the limitation period expired, and drew an adverse inference from the failure of the plaintiff, his father, and their senior counsel to provide affidavits.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's solicitor negligence claim on the basis that it was statute-barred.

The plaintiff alleged his former lawyer settled his family law matter without his consent and failed to protect his interests.

The court found that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the material facts giving rise to his claim by February 2014 at the latest, when he filed a complaint with the Law Society.

As the action was commenced in March 2016, more than two years after discovery, the court granted the motion and dismissed the action.

The defendant, Karen Pacey, brought a motion to stay a proceeding initiated by Allied Accounting & Tax Services Limited and Allied Associates LLP, arguing that the dispute fell under an arbitration clause in a Shareholders’ Agreement (SA).

The plaintiffs alleged breaches of confidentiality and non-competition provisions in both the SA and a Representative’s Contract, the latter lacking an arbitration clause.

The court found that the SA's arbitration clause was qualified by other provisions explicitly referring to "court" for equitable relief, indicating an exclusion for such disputes from arbitration.

Additionally, the court found that the defendant unduly delayed in bringing the motion for a stay, which would have been a separate ground for refusal.

The motion to stay the proceeding was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action on a summary judgment motion, the successful defendants sought costs.

The plaintiffs argued that no costs should be awarded due to financial hardship and requested that any costs order include limited monthly payments and enforcement restrictions.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and authorities addressing whether impecuniosity should influence a costs award.

The court held that economic hardship did not justify departing from the general rule that costs follow the event and found the plaintiffs’ claims to be ill‑conceived.

Costs were awarded to the defendants, including a reduced amount for one defendant who retained separate counsel shortly before the motion hearing.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' negligence action.

The plaintiffs, who were shareholders of a corporation, alleged that the defendants negligently terminated a contract with the corporation, causing the plaintiffs personal financial losses, including the loss of a U.S. work permit and a real estate deposit.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding that the claims were precluded by the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, as shareholders cannot sue for wrongs done to the corporation.

Furthermore, the court held that the defendants owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs due to a lack of proximity and foreseeability, and the claims for pure economic loss did not fall within recognized legal categories.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination in employment based on creed and sex.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant failed to provide any evidence linking the alleged adverse treatment to his creed or sex.

Furthermore, his pleadings suggested another female employee was also subjected to similar treatment, undermining his claim of sex discrimination.

The Tribunal found the allegations were pure speculation and dismissed the application for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The appellants, three physicians, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable in negligence for the delayed diagnosis and death of a patient from infective endocarditis.

The trial judge found the emergency room resident breached the standard of care by failing to review a SARS form containing critical clinical history, and held the supervising physician vicariously liable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal regarding the supervising physician, as vicarious liability was neither pleaded nor argued at trial.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal regarding the resident's breach of the standard of care and the trial judge's causation findings, concluding that the evidence supported the determination that a timely diagnosis would have prevented the patient's death.