Éliane Marie Johanne Lachaîne

The applicant sought attendant care benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer agreed to pay the benefits subject to proof that the expenses were incurred, but the applicant failed to provide any expense claim forms or invoices.

The applicant argued the expenses should be deemed incurred due to the insurer's delayed response to a Form 1.

The Tribunal found that the delayed response did not automatically entitle the applicant to benefits and declined to deem the expenses incurred.

The application for benefits, along with claims for an award and interest, was dismissed.

Following a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident claim, the plaintiffs were awarded $5,000, a fraction of the $1.5 million claimed.

The defendant had made a Rule 49 offer of $350,000 prior to trial.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01 and the impact of the Rule 49 offer.

The court fixed the plaintiffs' costs at $100,000 and the defendant's costs at $200,000, ordering the plaintiffs to pay the net costs of $100,000 to the defendant, less the amount of their judgment.

The defendant brought a threshold motion seeking a declaration that the plaintiff, Catherine McNamee's, claims for non-pecuniary general loss and health care expenses were barred under the Insurance Act, as her injuries did not meet the "permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function" threshold.

The court, after hearing evidence at trial, focused on the issue of causation.

The plaintiff had a significant pre-accident history of alcohol use disorder, depression, and chronic pain.

The court found Ms. McNamee's evidence regarding the severity of the accident and the resolution of her prior injuries to be unreliable.

Preferring the defendant's expert opinion, the court concluded that Ms. McNamee's injuries from the motor vehicle accident had resolved by Fall 2014 and that her subsequent decline in functioning and mental health issues were primarily due to unrelated life stressors and her pre-existing conditions, not the accident.

Therefore, the plaintiff failed to establish causation, and her claims did not meet the statutory threshold.

The defendant's motion was granted.

The defendant brought a threshold motion during a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident, seeking a declaration that the plaintiff's claims for non-pecuniary general damages and health care expenses were barred under the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff had a significant history of pre-existing neck and back pain.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that his current ailments were caused by the subject accident.

Furthermore, even if causation was established, the plaintiff failed to prove that his impairments substantially interfered with most of his usual activities of daily living.

The threshold motion was granted, barring the claims.

This endorsement rules on which questions regarding damages claims (future treatment costs, medication, income loss) for Catherine and John McNamee will be put to the jury.

The court found insufficient evidence to support several of the plaintiffs' claims for future care costs and income loss, declining to put those specific questions to the jury.

The ruling emphasizes the need for precise evidence and medical justification for future care costs and a clear evidentiary foundation for income loss claims to avoid speculation.

The Plaintiffs sought leave under s. 12 of the Evidence Act to call more than three expert witnesses at trial and an order to abridge time for service of their expert reports.

The Defendant opposed, citing late service and duplication of expert evidence.

The court applied factors for granting leave, emphasizing the "gatekeeper" role of the trial judge and the policy behind s. 12 of the Evidence Act, which applies to all experts offering opinion evidence, including participant experts.

The court found significant duplication among the proposed psychiatric, psychological, and occupational therapy experts and that several reports were served late without adequate justification.

The motion was largely denied, limiting the Plaintiffs to one expert per specialty for opinion evidence and restricting the scope of a physiotherapist's testimony to observations rather than future recommendations for litigation purposes.

This is a supplementary decision addressing outstanding issues following the Court of Appeal's partial allowance of both the defendant's and plaintiff's appeals in a personal injury case.

The respondent, a minor, suffered serious injuries when pushed onto a roadway by the appellant, also a minor.

The case involved complex issues regarding statutory accident benefits deductions, prejudgment interest rates, and costs awards.

The court addressed whether the defendant should pay costs of the plaintiff's statutory accident benefits recovery, the appropriate prejudgment interest rate, costs of the trial, costs of the appeal, and the deductibility of management fees and out-of-pocket expenses.

The plaintiff was pushed by the defendant Saywell, causing him to stumble into the path of a truck driven by Cloutier.

He suffered brain damage and became incapable of managing his own affairs.

He settled his statutory accident benefits (SABs) claim and his tort claim against Cloutier (a Pierringer settlement) prior to trial.

At trial, the jury apportioned liability equally among the plaintiff (contributory negligence), Saywell, and Cloutier.

The trial judge adopted the "silo" approach to deducting SABs from tort damages, rather than the strict "apples to apples" matching approach.

The trial judge also held that the non-settling defendant was only entitled to deduct 50 per cent of the SABs from his share of damages.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the silo approach and the proportionate deduction of SABs, overruling prior precedent requiring strict matching.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for back injuries sustained during a job demonstration.

Following a four-day liability trial, the action was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs.

The successful defendants sought partial indemnity costs of $156,015.04.

The plaintiffs argued for minimal costs due to their impecuniosity and criticized the defendants' conduct regarding adjournments and witness calling.

The court fixed the defendants' costs at $135,000, inclusive of disbursements and H.S.T., finding the plaintiffs' impecuniosity unsupported by sufficient evidence to warrant a reduction.

The plaintiffs brought an action for damages after Ms. Armstrong, a prospective employee, suffered an L4 vertebrae burst fracture while demonstrating her ability to hitch a U-Haul trailer during a job interview at the defendants' garage.

The trial proceeded on the issue of liability only.

The court found that the defendants owed a duty of care to Ms. Armstrong, both as occupiers of the premises under the Occupiers’ Liability Act and as a quasi-employer.

However, the court concluded that the defendants did not breach the standard of care, as the injury was not reasonably foreseeable given the circumstances, including Ms. Armstrong's assurances of her lifting capabilities and the lack of evidence of industry standards or obvious negligence.

The action was dismissed.

Following a seven-week personal injury jury trial, the court determined post-trial adjustments to the $2.3 million verdict.

The court ruled that recent Insurance Act amendments increasing statutory deductibles applied retrospectively, but changes to pre-judgment interest did not.

Applying the 'silos of deductibility' approach, the court deducted the plaintiff's $900,000 Statutory Accident Benefits (SABs) settlement from the tort award, but apportioned the deduction 50-50 between the defendant and a non-party driver who had previously settled, matching the jury's liability finding.

The plaintiff's final judgment of $500,827 slightly exceeded the defendant's Rule 49 offer, entitling the plaintiff to costs, which the court fixed at $100,000 plus disbursements.

The applicant, a party under disability following a severe motor vehicle accident, brought an application to approve a $900,000 settlement for statutory accident benefits.

The court approved the global settlement amount and the inclusion of a 30-year guarantee period for the structured settlement portion, finding it in the applicant's best interests.

However, the court declined to approve the proposed solicitor-client account of $154,439.77, reducing the approved fees and disbursements to $90,826.86 due to concerns over the retainer agreements and the lack of risk assumed by counsel.

The court ordered further materials to address the allocation of the additional funds resulting from the fee reduction.

Les demandeurs ont poursuivi l’exploitant et le propriétaire d’un parc aquatique après une chute ayant causé une fracture du coude.

Le procès portait uniquement sur la responsabilité des occupantes au regard de la Loi sur la responsabilité des occupants.

Le tribunal a conclu que la preuve n’établissait pas, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, l’existence d’une condition dangereuse ayant causé la chute, notamment en raison d’incohérences importantes entre les témoignages au procès et les interrogatoires préalables.

La preuve des défenderesses sur l’entretien continu et l’état impeccable des lieux a été retenue.

L’action a donc été rejetée sur la question de la responsabilité.

In a bifurcated slip-and-fall trial arising from an incident at a recreational waterpark, the plaintiffs sought to call a mechanical engineer to opine on whether the water filtration system was designed to operate underwater and on contaminants allegedly affecting the surface condition.

After a voir dire, the court applied the Mohan criteria for admissibility of expert evidence and held that the proposed witness lacked specific expertise in commercial pool filtration systems, waterpark operations, and water contamination analysis.

The court further found the opinion evidence did not satisfy the necessity requirement because it was not shown how it would materially assist in proving the alleged hazard at the location of the fall.

The plaintiffs' expert was therefore disqualified.

The applicant, a resident of a housing co-operative, alleged discrimination on the basis of disability (mental illness) after the co-op implemented a 'no cash' policy for housing charges.

The applicant claimed her disability required her to pay debts in cash to manage stress and excessive spending.

The Tribunal found that while the policy had an adverse impact, the co-op provided reasonable accommodation by allowing cash payments directly at the co-op's bank, which was close to the applicant's home and did not cause significant additional inconvenience.

The application was dismissed.