Éliane Marie Johanne Lachaîne

The defendant brought a threshold motion seeking a declaration that the plaintiff, Catherine McNamee's, claims for non-pecuniary general loss and health care expenses were barred under the Insurance Act, as her injuries did not meet the "permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function" threshold.

The court, after hearing evidence at trial, focused on the issue of causation.

The plaintiff had a significant pre-accident history of alcohol use disorder, depression, and chronic pain.

The court found Ms. McNamee's evidence regarding the severity of the accident and the resolution of her prior injuries to be unreliable.

Preferring the defendant's expert opinion, the court concluded that Ms. McNamee's injuries from the motor vehicle accident had resolved by Fall 2014 and that her subsequent decline in functioning and mental health issues were primarily due to unrelated life stressors and her pre-existing conditions, not the accident.

Therefore, the plaintiff failed to establish causation, and her claims did not meet the statutory threshold.

The defendant's motion was granted.

This endorsement rules on which questions regarding damages claims (future treatment costs, medication, income loss) for Catherine and John McNamee will be put to the jury.

The court found insufficient evidence to support several of the plaintiffs' claims for future care costs and income loss, declining to put those specific questions to the jury.

The ruling emphasizes the need for precise evidence and medical justification for future care costs and a clear evidentiary foundation for income loss claims to avoid speculation.

The Plaintiffs sought leave under s. 12 of the Evidence Act to call more than three expert witnesses at trial and an order to abridge time for service of their expert reports.

The Defendant opposed, citing late service and duplication of expert evidence.

The court applied factors for granting leave, emphasizing the "gatekeeper" role of the trial judge and the policy behind s. 12 of the Evidence Act, which applies to all experts offering opinion evidence, including participant experts.

The court found significant duplication among the proposed psychiatric, psychological, and occupational therapy experts and that several reports were served late without adequate justification.

The motion was largely denied, limiting the Plaintiffs to one expert per specialty for opinion evidence and restricting the scope of a physiotherapist's testimony to observations rather than future recommendations for litigation purposes.

This is a supplementary decision addressing outstanding issues following the Court of Appeal's partial allowance of both the defendant's and plaintiff's appeals in a personal injury case.

The respondent, a minor, suffered serious injuries when pushed onto a roadway by the appellant, also a minor.

The case involved complex issues regarding statutory accident benefits deductions, prejudgment interest rates, and costs awards.

The court addressed whether the defendant should pay costs of the plaintiff's statutory accident benefits recovery, the appropriate prejudgment interest rate, costs of the trial, costs of the appeal, and the deductibility of management fees and out-of-pocket expenses.

The plaintiff was pushed by the defendant Saywell, causing him to stumble into the path of a truck driven by Cloutier.

He suffered brain damage and became incapable of managing his own affairs.

He settled his statutory accident benefits (SABs) claim and his tort claim against Cloutier (a Pierringer settlement) prior to trial.

At trial, the jury apportioned liability equally among the plaintiff (contributory negligence), Saywell, and Cloutier.

The trial judge adopted the "silo" approach to deducting SABs from tort damages, rather than the strict "apples to apples" matching approach.

The trial judge also held that the non-settling defendant was only entitled to deduct 50 per cent of the SABs from his share of damages.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the silo approach and the proportionate deduction of SABs, overruling prior precedent requiring strict matching.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for back injuries sustained during a job demonstration.

Following a four-day liability trial, the action was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs.

The successful defendants sought partial indemnity costs of $156,015.04.

The plaintiffs argued for minimal costs due to their impecuniosity and criticized the defendants' conduct regarding adjournments and witness calling.

The court fixed the defendants' costs at $135,000, inclusive of disbursements and H.S.T., finding the plaintiffs' impecuniosity unsupported by sufficient evidence to warrant a reduction.

The plaintiffs brought an action for damages after Ms. Armstrong, a prospective employee, suffered an L4 vertebrae burst fracture while demonstrating her ability to hitch a U-Haul trailer during a job interview at the defendants' garage.

The trial proceeded on the issue of liability only.

The court found that the defendants owed a duty of care to Ms. Armstrong, both as occupiers of the premises under the Occupiers’ Liability Act and as a quasi-employer.

However, the court concluded that the defendants did not breach the standard of care, as the injury was not reasonably foreseeable given the circumstances, including Ms. Armstrong's assurances of her lifting capabilities and the lack of evidence of industry standards or obvious negligence.

The action was dismissed.