Adam C. Pantel

The plaintiff seller brought an action against the defendant buyer for forfeiture of a $250,000 deposit and damages after a failed commercial real estate transaction.

The buyer refused to close, alleging the seller failed to rectify an illegal third-floor residential conversion and a resulting city work order.

The buyer also brought a third-party claim against its real estate lawyer for professional negligence.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the buyer intentionally orchestrated the work order for leverage and failed to properly requisition the issue within the contractual deadline.

The court held the transaction was not unconscionable, denied relief from forfeiture, awarded the seller the deposit plus $6,645 in out-of-pocket damages, and dismissed the third-party claim against the lawyer, finding he met the standard of a reasonably prudent solicitor.

The self-represented plaintiff brought an action against a supermarket for a slip and fall, and also sued his former lawyers, the Law Society of Ontario, LawPRO, and the Crown in Right of Ontario.

The non-supermarket defendants brought motions to strike the statement of claim and dismiss the actions against them.

The court granted the motions, finding the claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action, lacked material facts, and were frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The claims against the moving defendants were struck without leave to amend, and costs of $800 were awarded to each moving defendant.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the action for delay under Rule 24.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, citing the plaintiffs' two years of inaction and failure to respond to correspondence.

The plaintiffs argued the defendants were in default for not delivering affidavits of documents and offered an explanation for their delay.

The court found the defendants were not in default due to rule amendments and rejected the plaintiffs' explanation as incredible.

However, the court declined to dismiss the action, noting that "contumelious" delay typically requires serial violations of court orders, which was not present.

The motions were dismissed without prejudice, but the plaintiffs were ordered to pay $11,000 in costs to the defendants and to deliver their affidavit of documents within 30 days, with defendants to follow 30 days thereafter.

This case management endorsement addresses multiple ongoing proceedings involving a vexatious litigant, Nadire Atas.

The court made several orders and directions, including confirming the open court principle for case management conferences, dismissing numerous actions against Peoples Trust and other defendants due to the litigant's failure to comply with "Chavali requests" (orders to demonstrate intent to continue litigation), and setting deadlines for filing defence and bringing a motion for a stay of summary judgment proceedings.

The court also addressed the litigant's repeated allegations of bias and jurisdictional challenges, dismissing them as meritless and vexatious.

Directions were given regarding outstanding costs orders and the process for appealing interlocutory rulings.

This endorsement addresses multiple motions and provides case management directions for Nadire Atas, who has been declared a vexatious litigant.

The court dismissed Ms. Atas's motion for recusal of the case management judge, finding no merit in her arguments regarding functus officio or apprehended bias.

The court also dismissed Ms. Atas's claims against the Chavalis and her counterclaims in the defamation proceedings due to her persistent failure to make required "Chavali requests" to advance them.

However, the court set aside the notings in default against Ms. Atas in the defamation proceedings to allow her to defend on the merits.

Further directions were given for motions for summary judgment in the defamation proceedings, dismissal motions by Peoples Trust and LawPro Defendants, and an interlocutory injunction motion.

The court emphasized the need for Ms. Atas to comply with case management orders to move the litigation forward, despite her ongoing appeals of the vexatious litigant declaration.

The self-represented defendant requested a decision on her request to bring a stand-alone recusal motion and an emergency case management conference.

The court directed that the recusal issues be brought forward in response to the pending motion for an interlocutory injunction, dismissing the request for a stand-alone motion.

The request for an emergency case management conference was also denied as no urgent issue was raised.

This case management endorsement addresses multiple procedural issues in complex litigation involving a litigant previously declared vexatious by the HRTO.

The court denied the litigant's last-minute adjournment request, clarified requirements for fee waivers, and rejected a request to bring a stand-alone motion for recusal, directing that bias allegations be raised within an existing interlocutory injunction motion.

The endorsement also set strict deadlines for the litigant's compliance with previous orders and responding materials, emphasizing the court's role in preventing vexatious conduct and ensuring proportional and reasonable litigation.

The defendants moved to set aside a default judgment, arguing that their former counsel's negligence, including undisclosed Law Society suspensions and failure to attend to the action, led to the default.

The plaintiffs contended the defendants were aware or should have been aware of their lawyer's issues and lacked an arguable defence.

The court applied the Chitel test, finding the motion was brought without delay, the default was adequately explained by counsel's negligence, and the defendants presented an arguable defence regarding the renovation contract.

The court emphasized that clients should not be irrevocably jeopardized by counsel's neglect and that allowing the judgment to stand would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The default judgment and a prior order striking the defence were set aside, and garnished funds were ordered returned as no exceptional circumstances for a freezing order were shown.

This appeal concerns the division of a Canadian Forces pension as family property under the Family Law Act.

The appellant sought to divide her pension through monthly payment splits at source, while the respondent sought an immediate lump-sum transfer.

The trial judge ordered a lump-sum transfer to satisfy an equalization payment of $313,002.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that the Pension Benefits Division Act only permits lump-sum divisions of federal pensions and that section 10.1(5) of the Family Law Act does not preclude lump-sum transfers when a pension is in pay.

The court dismissed the appeal and awarded costs to the respondent.

The plaintiff sued her former family law lawyer for negligence, alleging the lawyer failed to present crucial evidence in a child custody jurisdiction motion and a property dispute.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding no genuine issue for trial because the lawyer did not cause the plaintiff's losses.

The court noted the plaintiff had opportunities to present the evidence herself after discharging the lawyer, and the underlying decisions were based on adverse credibility findings against the plaintiff rather than a lack of evidence.

The appellant law firm appealed an order of the motion judge that set aside a report and certificate of assessment.

The motion judge had ruled that the assessment officer erred by refusing to grant an adjournment when the respondent client failed to attend the first day of a scheduled five-day hearing due to a communication error by court staff, thereby depriving the respondent of procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the assessment officer's decision to refuse the adjournment was reasonable and that the motion judge failed to give adequate deference to that decision.

The court considered the respondent's prior conduct, including failure to provide required documentation, cancellation of mediation, and late retention of counsel, in determining that the assessment officer properly balanced the circumstances in the interests of justice.

The respondent disputed fees charged by the appellant accountants for services rendered in respect of three transactions, including the structuring of a butterfly transaction.

A fees action was settled and the parties executed a broadly worded release in 2008 referring to all claims existing up to that time arising from any and all services provided through to the end of 2007.

In 2011, the respondent learned that the butterfly transaction could be subject to an income tax liability of more than $1 million instead of being tax free as intended.

The respondent sued for damages for negligence.

The motion judge and Divisional Court dismissed the appellant's motion for summary judgment, finding the release did not bar the claim because the negligence only came to light in 2011.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the release clearly and unequivocally covered all claims arising from services provided through December 31, 2007, including unknown claims.

The appellant appealed a Master's decision refusing to set aside an administrative dismissal for delay and refusing to add further defendants.

The Divisional Court found no error of legal principle or palpable and overriding error of fact in the Master's application of the four-part Reid test.

The Master had correctly concluded that the appellant failed to adequately explain the delay, failed to prove inadvertence, and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The moving party, a former non-equity partner at the responding party law firm, brought a motion as an intervenor seeking an order under Rule 45.02 for the payment into court of a specific fund.

The fund in question was a contingency fee payable to the law firm by a client, which the moving party claimed he was entitled to a portion of based on an employment and fee-splitting agreement.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party's claim was essentially for damages for breach of contract rather than a legal right to a specific fund, and that the balance of convenience did not favour granting the order.

The moving parties (third parties in the main action) sought costs against the responding party (defendant/third party plaintiff) after the responding party discontinued the third party claim.

During the litigation, the responding party had made an assignment in bankruptcy.

The trustee in bankruptcy subsequently sold and assigned the third party claim back to the responding party, who then filed a Notice of Discontinuance.

The court held that because no judgment or costs order was made prior to the bankruptcy, the costs were not a provable debt in bankruptcy.

The court further held that the assignment of the claim by the trustee did not change the character of the matter or revive the costs liability.

The motion for costs was dismissed.

The defendants, Garry Shapiro and Kaveh Najafi, brought motions to dismiss the plaintiff's claim.

Shapiro sought to set aside a noting of default and dismiss the action as an abuse of process and statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, based on a prior dismissed action from 2011.

Najafi sought to strike the statement of claim, arguing it was statute-barred.

The court found that the 2015 action was not an abuse of process as the prior action was not decided on its merits.

Regarding the limitation period, the court applied Section 11 of the Limitations Act, 2002, finding that the family law proceedings between the plaintiff and Najafi, which resulted in a Family Order in 2014, suspended the limitation period.

The Family Order also created new rights and obligations, giving rise to fresh causes of action.

The court also noted the potential applicability of the Real Property Limitations Act, which provides a ten-year limitation period.

Consequently, the defendants failed to establish that the 2015 action was statute-barred.

The motions to dismiss were largely dismissed, with the exception of setting aside the noting in default against Shapiro by consent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action against her former co-operative housing provider, its lawyers, a court employee, and a Landlord and Tenant Board member.

The motion judge had dismissed the action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the action was an attempt to re-litigate her eviction and rent subsidy proceedings, and that the claims against the lawyers, court employee, and Board member were bound to fail due to lack of duty of care and statutory immunity.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar's order dismissing his professional negligence action for delay and sought leave to amend his statement of claim to add his former lawyers as defendants.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside the dismissal, finding the plaintiff made a deliberate decision not to pursue the litigation and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice.

The court also dismissed the motion to add the former lawyers as defendants, concluding that the proposed claims were either statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 or legally untenable.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar's order dismissing his solicitor negligence action for delay and sought leave to amend his statement of claim to add his former lawyer and law firm as defendants.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside the dismissal, finding the plaintiff failed to adequately explain the delay, failed to prove inadvertence, and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice to the defendant.

The court also dismissed the motion to add the former lawyer as a defendant, concluding that the proposed claims were either untenable or barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellants (defendants), an accounting firm, appealed the dismissal of their motion for summary judgment.

The respondents (plaintiffs) had previously settled a fee dispute with the appellants and signed a mutual release.

Years later, the respondents discovered that a 'butterfly transaction' structured by the appellants resulted in a massive tax liability, and they sued for professional negligence.

The appellants argued the mutual release barred the claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the negligence claim was unknown and not in the contemplation of the parties when the release was executed, and therefore the release did not bar the action.