Bernard v. Fuhgeh, 2026 ONSC 3514
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Edith Marie Marielle Bernard
Kimberly Melissa Stewart
Applicants
– and –
William Ndze Fuhgeh
Respondent
Marie-Hélène Godbout and Marc Coderre
Intervenors
Applicant Bernard, Self-represented
Applicant Stewart, Not appearing
Respondent, Self-represented
S. Sack, for the Intervenors
HEARD: In writing
The Honourable Justice J. R. Henderson
COSTS DECISION
1The applicant, Edith Marie Marielle Bernard (“Bernard”), and the intervenors, Marie-Hélène Godbout and Marc Coderre, brought motions pursuant to rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules (“FLR”) for an order striking, or staying, the motions brought by the respondent, William Fuhgeh (“William”), to set aside orders made by Justice Audet on December 18, 2017 (“the Audet orders”).
2Both Bernard and the intervenors were successful in their motions for the reasons set out in my written decision dated April 30, 2026. Now, both Bernard, who was self-represented, and the intervenors, who were represented by counsel, request their costs of the motions. In his written submissions, William requests a set-off against the costs of earlier proceedings.
3The issues in this costs decision include entitlement to costs, the scope of events covered by this costs decision, the scale of costs, and the quantum of costs.
4Regarding entitlement, I find that Bernard and the intervenors were the successful parties on the rule 1(8) motions. After two previous unsuccessful attempts to set aside the Audet orders, William made a third attempt to do so by delivering two notices of motion dated
December 17, 2021, with supporting affidavits, for relief pursuant to rule 25(19). This third attempt was the subject of the rule 1(8) motions and the subject of my written decision. The net result of my decision was that William’s notices of motion and supporting affidavits were struck, and William was prohibited from bringing any further motions to set aside the Audet orders.
5William’s request for a set-off against the costs of other proceedings does not affect my decision as to entitlement to the costs of the rule 1(8) motions. William does not submit that he was successful on the rule 1(8) motions; rather, he alleges that he was successful on earlier motions that were heard in 2018 and 2019. I will deal with William’s request for costs of the earlier motions under my analysis of the scope of events covered by this decision.
6In summary, regarding entitlement, it is patently obvious that Bernard and the intervenors were the successful parties on their rule 1(8) motions. Rule 24(1) provides that a successful party is presumptively entitled to its costs of a motion. Accordingly, I find that Bernard and the intervenors are entitled to their costs against William with respect to these motions.
7Regarding the scope of events covered by this costs decision, I find that my jurisdiction to make a costs order is limited to William’s third attempt to set aside the Audet orders. William’s third attempt commenced with the two notices of motion, dated December 17, 2021, for relief pursuant to rule 25(19). Within a short time thereafter, almost all of the time and expense in this proceeding related to the rule 1(8) motions brought by Bernard and the intervenors.
8There were three relevant court attendances related to these motions. The parties appeared before me to argue the motions for approximately one full day on March 20, 2026. The only other court attendances that are within the scope of these motions are the attendances at case management conferences on February 25, 2022 and November 22, 2024, as the case management judges reserved the costs of those conferences to the judge who hears the intervenor’s motion.
9William submits that he is entitled to a costs order in his favour for certain court attendances that occurred in 2018 and 2019. Specifically, William requests his costs for three motions returnable before Justice Shelston on December 18, 2018, for William’s successful motion to stay any application for a name change decided by Justice Williams on January 8, 2019, for the case management order of Justice Shelston dated February 25, 2019, and for Bernard’s unsuccessful motion for security for costs decided by Justice Summers on July 23, 2019.
10I find that I do not have the authority to make costs orders for those earlier court attendances. The costs endorsement of Justice Shelston on December 18, 2018, simply reads, “costs are reserved” but that endorsement also included an order that the matter was to be case managed by Justice Shelston. This implies that the costs of the December 2018 motions were to be decided by Justice Shelston. This interpretation is confirmed in the endorsement of Justice Williams on January 8, 2019, who wrote that the costs of William’s motion for a stay were “reserved to Shelston J.” Further, it is obvious that Justice Shelston, as the case management judge, would be in the best position to determine any costs issue that arose out of the events of 2018 and 2019.
11Regarding the February 25, 2019, endorsement, Justice Shelston wrote that the costs were “reserved to the judge hearing the final motion.” This endorsement applied to William’s first attempt to set aside the Audet orders. In fact, a final motion has never been heard for the first or second attempt. The third attempt, which was before me, was based on fresh notices of motion and fresh affidavits.
12In addition, I find that the February 25, 2019 endorsement related to a case management conference that was focused on the inadmissible and irrelevant material that had been filed by William and the consequential remedies and directions that should be ordered by the court. Therefore, William would not be entitled to his costs of that case management conference in any event.
13As to the July 23, 2019 decision, I accept that William was the successful party, but Justice Summers ordered “costs in the cause.” That endorsement means that William may be entitled to his costs if he is the successful party at the end of the day. As discussed, at the end of the day, William was not the successful party.
14Accordingly, in this decision I will not assess the costs of any event that occurred prior to December 17, 2021. That is, I will only assess the costs of William’s third attempt to set aside the Audet orders and the resulting rule 1(8) motions. This will include the costs of attending court on February 25, 2022, November 22, 2024, and March 20, 2026, and the costs of preparing and reviewing the material that was filed for those attendances.
15I will take into account the fact that the material filed was voluminous. I find that all parties prepared a number of documents, some of which were lengthy and complex. In particular, William’s documents were extraordinarily lengthy, and therefore Bernard and the intervenors were required to spend a significant amount of time reviewing William’s material.
16I will analyze the scale and the quantum of the costs award for Bernard and the intervenors separately, as different considerations apply.
17Bernard was self-represented, and therefore she does not have out-of-pocket expenses for legal fees. However, self-represented parties may be awarded costs, in the discretion of the court, even though the party may not have spent any money on legal fees. The rationale for this view is that self-represented litigants are expected to file material, attend court, and make representations to the court, and to do so requires self-represented litigants to give up time that they would otherwise spend on other tasks or events: see Fong v. Chan (1999), 1999 CanLII 2052 (ON CA), 46 O.R. (3d) 330 (C.A.)
18In the present case, William’s attempts to set aside the Audet orders raised serious financial concerns for Bernard as the Audet orders required significant financial payments by William to Bernard. Thus, Bernard was required to spend time reviewing William’s material, responding to it, and attending court to make submissions. Bernard, in fact, prepared and filed appropriate material and made helpful submissions on the return of the motions.
19I accept Bernard’s submission that she spent a total of 14 hours of her time on the motion of March 20, 2026, and the two earlier case management conferences. I am prepared to allow compensation to Bernard at the rate of $75 per hour for that time. Rounding off those figures, I will award costs to Bernard payable by William in the total amount of $1,000, plus HST of $130, for a total of $1,130.
20Regarding the costs of the intervenors, counsel for the intervenors submits that the intervenors should be awarded costs on a full recovery basis. The presumptive scale of costs in a routine proceeding is partial indemnity costs, which usually amounts to approximately 60 percent of full recovery costs. In my view, there are several factors in this case that support a costs award on a greater scale.
21Specifically, I repeat that the motion before me was William’s third attempt to set aside the Audet orders. The first two attempts had been dismissed or adjourned by way of case management orders that clearly set out the irregularities and improprieties in the material that William had filed.
22Despite these earlier orders, William filed documents in his third attempt that were riddled with offensive, inflammatory, and inadmissible material. The fact that William filed documents that contained improper material, on its own, could give rise to a costs order on a greater scale. However, the fact that William did so after twice failing to follow the rules of court, and in the face of clear case management orders, suggests a pattern of defiance that requires costs sanctions by the court.
23Moreover, the nature of the offensive material also justifies a costs order on a greater scale. The intervenors are former counsel for the applicants who were accused by William in his material of fraud, deceit, and dishonesty. An unsubstantiated attack on opposing counsel, without a rational foundation, should be seen as a bad faith tactic designed to undermine the position of the opposing parties.
24Along the same lines, there are many unsubstantiated allegations in William’s material that various judges and court staff were also fraudulent, dishonest and deceitful. Those allegations were, in my view, attempts by William to undermine the justice system as a whole. Again, this amounts to a bad faith tactic that William employed for self-serving purposes.
25Finally, in my written decision I stated that bald allegations of fraud should not be permitted to proceed. I found that William had breached an order to produce evidence of the fraud that he alleged against the judges, court staff, and lawyers. An unproven or unsubstantiated allegation of fraud further justifies costs sanctions.
26Rule 24(8) provides that a court shall award full recovery costs if a party has acted in bad faith. In the present case, considering all of these factors, I choose to exercise my discretion and make a costs order on the equivalent of a substantial indemnity basis, or approximately 90 percent of full recovery costs.
27As to the quantum of the intervenors’ costs, I have reviewed the intervenors’ bill of costs and note that the hourly rates charged by the lawyers are very reasonable considering the seriousness of the allegations made by William. I understand that the lawyers for the intervenors were retained through the Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company and consequently acted for the intervenors at reduced rates. Therefore, the actual legal fees of the intervenors are less than the court would otherwise expect.
28I also find that the amount of time spent by each of the intervenors’ lawyers is within reasonable limits and that there has been appropriate delegation of duties as between lawyers and staff.
29I will make a modest reduction in the bill of costs submitted based on some inevitable duplication of services. I find that full recovery costs would be in the range of $18,000. I will allow substantial indemnity costs, rounded, at $16,000, plus HST of $2,080, for a total of $18,080.
30In conclusion I make the following orders:
The respondent, William, shall pay to Bernard her costs fixed at $1,130, all inclusive, payable within 90 days.
The respondent, William, shall pay to the intervenors their costs fixed at $18,080, all inclusive, payable within 180 days.
J. R. Henderson J.
Released: June 16, 2026
CITATION: Bernard v. Fuhgeh, 2026 ONSC 3514
COURT FILE NOS.: FC-17-361 / FC-12-912-5
DATE: 2026-06-16
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Edith Marie Marielle Bernard
Kimberly Melissa Stewart
Applicants
– and –
William Ndze Fuhgeh
Respondent
Marie-Hélène Godbout and Marc Coderre
Intervenors
COSTS DECISION
J. R. Henderson J.
Released: June 16, 2026