Susan M. Sack

Following the withdrawal of a spousal support application, the estate trustees of the deceased respondent sought a costs order jointly and severally against the applicant and her former lawyer.

The trustees alleged the proceeding was frivolous and vexatious and argued the lawyer had acted in conflict of interest and improperly initiated litigation despite knowing the claim had no chance of success.

The court considered Rules 12(3) and 24(9) of the Family Law Rules and the principles governing personal costs orders against counsel.

The court held the support claim was not clearly devoid of merit because statutory provisions permit setting aside domestic contracts in cases of unconscionability or lack of disclosure.

As the lawyer had acted on instructions and did not run up costs or abuse the court’s process, no personal costs order was warranted.

In an estate dispute between siblings, the estate trustee moved to dismiss an application requiring an accounting of estate assets on the basis of delay.

The delay resulted largely from the applicant’s former lawyer, who had misled the client and failed to advance the proceeding while suffering from severe personal and mental health issues.

The court held that the delay was adequately explained, the applicant intended to pursue the claim, and the moving party had also failed to take steps to advance the matter or his own related motion regarding a purported will.

The court further found no non-compensable prejudice resulting from the delay.

Exercising its discretion, the court declined to dismiss the application.

Following a motion in a civil proceeding, the defendants sought costs against the self‑represented plaintiff.

The plaintiff did not provide submissions on the issue of costs.

The court considered the defendants’ submissions and concluded that an award of costs was fair and reasonable.

Each defendant was awarded $5,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The court also dispensed with the requirement that the defendants obtain the plaintiff’s approval of the form and content of the dismissal and costs order.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a motor vehicle accident claim on the basis that it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The central issue was when the claim became discoverable under s. 5 of the Act, given the statutory threshold requirement for serious and permanent impairment under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act.

The court held that discoverability required a sufficient body of medical evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff’s injuries met the statutory threshold.

Because the first medical opinion diagnosing serious and permanent impairment arose in June 2010, the claim issued in May 2012 was within the limitation period.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed and partial summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff dismissing the limitation defence.

The self-represented appellant appealed an order dismissing his action against multiple defendants under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous and vexatious.

The Court of Appeal issued a notice under Rule 2.1 indicating the appeal itself may be dismissed on similar grounds.

The Court found the appellant's pleading contained no intelligible claims against the respondents and sought non-justiciable relief regarding the redesign of Ontario's social welfare and legal services systems.

The appeal was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The defendants brought motions arising from a self-represented plaintiff's failed purchase of a condominium unit and the subsequent release of deposit monies to the vendor.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim against the vendor's solicitors, holding they owed no duty of care to the plaintiff in an arm's-length transaction where she had her own counsel, were not parties to the agreement, and had lawfully dealt with the deposit funds.

The court also struck the claim against the regulator under Rule 21, holding it owed no private law duty of care and that the pleading failed to allege bad faith sufficient to overcome statutory immunity under s. 9 of the Law Society Act.

The pleading was additionally described as a rambling narrative contrary to proper pleading principles and one that would also have been struck under Rule 25.11 without leave to amend.

The moving party sought an adjournment of his motion to set aside consent orders previously made in complex estate litigation.

The respondents opposed the adjournment, arguing prejudice and delay in the sale of an estate property.

The court refused to adjourn the portions of the motion relating to the dismissal of claims against former counsel and the removal of the Estate Trustee During Litigation, finding no merit to those claims and emphasizing the need to enforce court orders.

The court granted an adjournment for the remaining issues regarding the consent orders but ordered the moving party to personally pay the ongoing expenses of the estate property and awarded costs of $54,490 to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis.

At a contested status hearing, the self-represented plaintiff was required to show cause why her professional negligence action against her former lawyers should not be dismissed for delay under Rule 48.14(13).

The court applied the conjunctive test from Khan, finding the plaintiff provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay due to ongoing matrimonial appeals, financial constraints, and medical issues.

The court also found the defendants would not suffer actual prejudice, rejecting the argument that potential harm to professional reputation constitutes prejudice in this context.

The action was allowed to proceed subject to a timetable order.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision enforcing a settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge reasonably interpreted correspondence from the appellant's counsel as confirming instructions to settle.

The appellant provided no evidence that her counsel acted without instructions and demonstrated no prejudice from the enforcement of the release.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claims against multiple respondents, which arose from prior matrimonial proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the claims were an impermissible collateral attack and an attempt to relitigate issues already determined.

The court also refused to admit proposed fresh evidence and awarded costs to each respondent.