Susan M. Sack

The self-represented plaintiff, a disbarred lawyer, commenced an action against 16 defendants, including the Law Society of Ontario, the Law Society Tribunal, Legal Aid Ontario, Hamilton Police Services, and various individuals involved in his disciplinary and criminal proceedings.

Several defendants brought requests under Rule 2.1.01(1) to dismiss the action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the claims against the Law Society Tribunal defendants as an improper collateral attack, against the Legal Aid Ontario defendants as duplicative of an existing action, against the Colleton defendants as barred by absolute privilege, and against the Hamilton Police defendants as frivolous and an abuse of process.

The action was allowed to continue against the remaining defendants who had not filed Rule 2.1 requests.

This decision addresses motions for leave to intervene on an appeal from a summary judgment in a child protection case.

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) and Renatta Austin, a lawyer who previously represented the appellant E.K.B. when she was a special party, sought leave to intervene.

The appeal raised significant issues regarding the role of special parties, their representatives, counsel's duties, procedural fairness, and Charter values.

The court found that these issues had a significant public interest element and that both proposed intervenors had an interest in the subject matter and could be adversely affected by the judgment.

Leave to intervene was granted to both the PGT and Ms. Austin, with terms restricting their intervention to specific issues related to their roles and conduct.

The Plaintiffs moved to appoint Janina Gal as litigation guardian for Andrzej Gal, who was mentally incapable.

The Defendants opposed, arguing Janina had an adverse interest and was not indifferent to the outcome.

The court found Janina had a conflict of interest, as the litigation's success would result in properties forming part of Andrew's estate, which would then be transferred solely to Janina under Andrew's will, conflicting with Andrew's stated intention to divide properties equally among his daughters.

Furthermore, Janina was not indifferent to the outcome, as she stood to gain financially and had an acrimonious relationship with another daughter involved in the dispute.

The motion to appoint Janina as litigation guardian was dismissed, and the Plaintiffs were ordered to appoint a new, unconflicted litigation guardian or move to appoint the Public Trustee and Guardian.

The appellant sought review of a motion judge's order denying an extension of time to appeal from a summary judgment decision.

The motion judge applied the correct legal test, considering delay, reasons for delay, potential merit of the appeal, and the interests of justice.

Finding no apparent merit to the appeal on the limitation period issue and no basis to impugn the lower court's decision, the motion judge denied the extension.

The appellate panel upheld this decision.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his professional negligence claim against a tax lawyer.

The appellant had retained the tax lawyer to advise on tax implications of a matrimonial settlement involving the purchase of his ex-spouse's shares in a family corporation.

The tax lawyer provided advice on two approaches: a direct purchase (which would trigger significant personal tax liability) and a redemption approach (which would avoid the tax hit).

The appellant ultimately settled using the direct purchase approach with a negotiated "tax discount" rather than the recommended redemption approach.

The appellant subsequently incurred approximately $1.3 million in tax liability and sued for negligence.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding the tax advice was correct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that partial summary judgment was inappropriate in these circumstances and that serious issues remained regarding the lawyer's professional obligations to ensure advice was communicated to and understood by the client.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing the action for delay.

The defendants Frank Naccarato and Radeon Technologies Ltd. opposed the motion, while Radiant Hospitality Systems Ltd. took no position.

The court applied a contextual approach, considering the explanation for the litigation delay, the inadvertence in missing the deadline, the promptness of the motion, and the absence of actual prejudice to the defendants.

The court found the delay adequately explained, the deadline missed due to inadvertence, the motion brought promptly, and no actual prejudice affecting the defendants' ability to defend.

Consequently, the motion was granted, setting aside the dismissal order and extending the time to set the action down for trial, with no costs awarded.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment, the defendants sought costs on a full indemnity basis, citing the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct and late withdrawal of serious allegations.

The plaintiff argued that full indemnity costs were not justified and challenged the time spent by the defendants.

The court found that the defendants' offer to settle, which proposed dismissing the action without costs, was a valid compromise.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a partial indemnity basis up to the date of the offer and on a substantial indemnity basis thereafter.

The moving party Estate sought leave to appeal two final discretionary cost orders that dismissed its motion for costs against the impecunious respondent and her former lawyer personally.

The motions judge had found the respondent was unable to pay and that the lawyer, who acted pro bono for a limited time, did not act frivolously or vexatiously.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding no error in principle and that the motions judge's decision was not plainly wrong.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for negligence, breach of Charter rights, and defamation arising from his suspension from practice.

The plaintiff argued that the defendants exceeded their statutory authority by demanding client files without reasonable suspicion on a file-by-file basis.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff's claims constituted an impermissible collateral attack on unappealed Law Society Tribunal proceedings, and that the defendants were protected by statutory immunity under s. 9 of the Law Society Act as there was no evidence of bad faith.

This is a second appeal in a child protection matter involving a 10-year-old child made a Crown ward with no access for adoption purposes.

The biological parents appealed the no access order.

The first appeal judge, while finding no error with the trial judge's determination, nonetheless ordered access followed by an openness hearing, made findings of ineffective assistance of counsel against trial counsel, and ordered personal costs against her.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Society's appeal, restored the trial judge's no access order, dismissed the parents' cross-appeal seeking declarations of Charter violations and miscarriage of justice, and allowed trial counsel's cross-appeal on the ineffective assistance findings and costs order.

In a high-conflict family law proceeding, the applicant wife brought a motion to compel further production of documents and answers to undertakings from the respondent husband and his father, alleging they conspired to conceal the husband's income and assets.

The court dismissed the request for pre-2012 documents as irrelevant to the conspiracy claim.

However, the court ordered the mass production of post-2012 emails, finding the respondents' search terms too limited, and ordered the production of certain solicitor-client files, finding the father had waived privilege by relying on a specific privileged communication to defend against the conspiracy claim.

In a child protection proceeding, the mother's former lawyer brought a motion to set aside the court's previous findings of incompetence and ineffective counsel.

The mother brought a cross-motion for costs against the former lawyer personally under Rule 24(9) of the Family Law Rules.

The court set aside the finding of incompetence, deferring that issue to the Law Society, but upheld the finding that the lawyer provided inadequate and ineffective counsel by failing to order trial transcripts and failing to bring a motion for access pending appeal.

The court found the lawyer's inaction caused a miscarriage of justice and wasted significant costs.

The lawyer was ordered to personally pay $50,000 to Legal Aid and $50,000 to the mother's new counsel.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment by the defendants, the court determined the issue of costs based on written submissions.

The court found the defendants' submissions reasonable and ordered the self-represented plaintiff to pay costs on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $30,073.01, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The appellant brought a motion to set aside an order of a single judge of the Divisional Court refusing leave to appeal two costs orders.

The appellant argued the leave motion should have been heard orally rather than in writing.

The court held that a single judge of the Divisional Court does not have inherent or statutory jurisdiction to set aside an order of another single judge of the same court.

The motion was adjourned to a panel of the Divisional Court, which has the statutory authority to set aside a motion order of a single judge.

The self-represented plaintiff brought an action for solicitor negligence against her former lawyer and his firm, alleging negligence in their handling of her various claims arising from a 2006 motor vehicle accident.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff's claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act because she knew of the alleged negligence when she terminated the retainer in 2009, well beyond the two-year limitation period.

The court also found no genuine issue requiring a trial on the merits, concluding the defendants acted with due diligence.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff's motor vehicle accident claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act.

The plaintiff sustained injuries, including blurred vision, but returned to work and did not seek further treatment until his condition worsened over a year later.

The court applied the discoverability principle, noting that an expert ophthalmologist could not have determined the permanence of the eye injury within the first year.

The court found the plaintiff's claim was issued within the two-year limitation period and dismissed the defendants' motion.

The respondent mother brought a motion seeking interim joint custody and an access schedule in accordance with a s. 30 assessment report by Dr. Butkowsky.

The applicant father opposed, arguing the report's recommendations should not be implemented before trial and that the 14-year-old son wished to reside primarily with him.

The court found no 'exceptional circumstances' requiring immediate implementation of the report's recommendations, but considered the assessor's observational evidence.

The court ordered that the son reside primarily with the father but have regular weekend access with the mother, overriding the son's stated preference based on his observed comfort with her.

The father was also ordered to pay child support, spousal support, and his proportionate share of the assessment report costs.

The respondent sought leave to appeal two costs decisions.

The motion judge had declined to award costs against the applicant, who withdrew her spousal support application, due to her inability to pay.

The motion judge also declined to order costs personally against the applicant's former counsel, finding the application was not frivolous or vexatious.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding the issues did not meet the high threshold for leave under Rule 62.02 and the motion judge's discretionary decisions were entitled to deference.

This was a motion for leave to appeal two costs decisions.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the motion judge's decision not to award costs against the applicant personally, citing her financial inability to pay, and not to award costs against her former counsel for allegedly initiating a frivolous application or being in a conflict of interest.

The court denied leave, finding that while there might be doubt about the correctness of denying costs based solely on inability to pay, the matter was not of sufficient importance given the applicant's circumstances.

The court also deferred to the motion judge's findings that the application was not frivolous or vexatious and that counsel was not in a conflict of interest warranting personal costs.

The plaintiff brought two motions in an ongoing estate dispute against his sisters.

The first motion sought leave to amend his Statement of Claim to further particularize allegations of conversion of estate assets, which was granted on consent.

The second motion sought to lift a stay of proceedings on a related Application to Pass Accounts to allow for an amendment to a Notice of Objection and to have common issues tried together.

The court dismissed the second motion, finding it unnecessary to lift the stay as the trial judge in the main action would decide the common issues, which would be binding on the Application by issue estoppel, and the stay would automatically lift upon the final disposition of the action.