Joseph Kary

The respondent mother brought a motion seeking leave to bring a contempt motion on an urgent basis, a finding that the applicant grandmother was in contempt of a consent final order dated May 30, 2018, and an order directing police to locate and apprehend the child and deliver her to the mother.

The grandmother had refused to return the child at the end of a scheduled weekend access period on September 2, 2018, contrary to the final order which granted sole custody to the mother with specified access to the grandmother.

The court granted the mother's motion, ordering the grandmother to forthwith return the child to the mother's care and no later than 5:00 p.m. that day, with a police enforcement clause.

The contempt motion was adjourned.

The tenant appealed two decisions of the Landlord and Tenant Board, including an eviction order based on the landlord's good faith intention to personally occupy the rental unit.

The appeals were dismissed by the Registrar for delay after the tenant failed to perfect them.

The tenant brought a motion to set aside the dismissal orders.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the delay was caused by the tenant's lack of diligence, the appeals lacked merit as they raised questions of fact rather than law, and the justice of the case favoured the landlord, whose life had been put on hold by the delay.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating her tenancy for rent arrears.

The tenant argued the landlord was estopped from charging market rent due to a letter suggesting she pay a lower rent-geared-to-income amount while they attempted to convert her unit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the estoppel issue was not raised before the Board, the letter was not a clear and unequivocal promise, and the Board reasonably interpreted its home statute regarding jurisdiction over rent subsidies and service of notices.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the action against them, the moving defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff did not provide costs submissions despite an extension of time.

The court noted the action had languished for years with little steps taken by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had rejected without-costs settlement offers.

Applying the Rule 57.01 factors and the principle of reasonableness, the court awarded the moving defendants $25,000 in all-inclusive costs.

The applicant sought a declaratory order that the respondents breached a prior court order requiring them to permit cleaning and insecticide treatment of their condominium unit.

A trial of an issue was ordered to clarify events surrounding the attempted compliance.

The court found confusion in the instructions provided by the applicant's agent, which likely led the respondents to believe they had adequately prepared the unit.

Consequently, the court was not prepared to find a breach of its order and dismissed the applicant's request for declaratory relief.

This decision addresses costs following a trial where the applicant was largely successful on the issue of retroactive child support but unsuccessful on a restraining order claim.

The applicant, self-represented, sought significant costs including an hourly rate for his own time and legal advice fees.

The respondent argued for no costs due to divided success and financial hardship.

The court found the applicant largely successful, noted the respondent's unreasonable conduct throughout the litigation, and disallowed the claim for the applicant's own time without evidence of lost income.

Considering the respondent's limited ability to pay, the court awarded the applicant $8,500 in costs.

The mother brought a motion to change child support retroactively, alleging the father's income had significantly increased and he failed to disclose it.

The father brought a cross-motion seeking to terminate his child support obligations and for child support from the mother, as well as a restraining order.

The court dismissed the mother's claim for retroactive child support, finding she lacked a reasonable excuse for the delay and that the father's conduct was not blameworthy, given the informal evolution of parenting responsibilities and financial contributions.

The father's request for a restraining order was also dismissed due to dated evidence.

The court continued the interim child support order payable by the mother to the father and terminated the father's prior child support obligations.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing personal guarantees she signed for corporate loans.

She argued the motion judge erred procedurally by proceeding despite allegations that she lacked mental capacity, and substantively by rejecting her defenses of non est factum, undue influence, and material change to the loan arrangement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no cogent medical evidence of incapacity and upholding the motion judge's findings that the appellant understood the continuing all accounts guarantees she signed.

Appeal from a Master's costs order made in bankruptcy-related proceedings arising from an earlier judgment over lottery winnings held in trust.

The appellant creditor had moved to lift the stay of proceedings, while the bankrupt debtor obtained a costs award against her after the stay issue had effectively become moot upon discharge.

The court held that the Master proceeded on wrong principles and made palpable and overriding errors by relying on an expired offer to settle, failing to explain a departure from the principle that costs follow the event, and apparently including costs related to the trustee's unopposed motion.

The $6,000 costs award was set aside and no costs were ordered for the underlying motion.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $7,500 in damages for defamation.

The appellant, president of a housing co-operative, had sent an email to board members accusing the respondent of theft after she allegedly took a confidential document from a meeting.

The trial judge found the statement defamatory and concluded the appellant acted with malice, defeating his defence of qualified privilege.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's determination that the appellant lacked an honest belief in the truth of his statement and acted with malice.

In a supplemental endorsement to an appeal decision, the appellant sought to correct a calculation error regarding occupation rent.

The court agreed that the original calculation contained a conceptual error by failing to account for daily accrual, and varied the occupation rent award from $23,000 to $24,000.

The court also determined the costs of the appeal and the underlying small claims court trial, awarding partial indemnity costs to the successful parties on their respective issues based on divided success.

The appellant operated a property management business and appeared before the Landlord and Tenant Board on behalf of property owners without a paralegal license.

The Law Society obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting him from providing legal services.

On appeal, the appellant argued he was a 'landlord' under the Residential Tenancies Act and thus entitled to self-represent.

The Court of Appeal held that even if he met the definition of a landlord, he was providing legal services to third parties and had no right to self-represent under the Law Society Act.

The appeal was dismissed, but the injunction was narrowed to allow him to appear before the board only when he is the actual owner of the property.

The applicant sought a permanent injunction restraining the respondent, a property manager who regularly appeared before the Ontario Landlord and Tenant Board on behalf of landlords, from providing legal services without a licence.

The respondent argued he was entitled to appear as a landlord’s “personal representative” within the definition of “landlord” under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The court held that appearing before a tribunal as a paid representative to make submissions and examine witnesses constitutes the provision of legal services requiring a licence under the Law Society Act.

The term “personal representative” in the Residential Tenancies Act was interpreted in its traditional estates law sense and does not include a paid property manager.

A permanent injunction was issued restraining the respondent from providing legal services without a licence.

Following a summary judgment motion, the court had previously awarded substantial indemnity costs to the defendant.

After the costs endorsement was released, defence counsel disclosed that the defendant’s legal fees had been paid by his employer rather than personally.

The plaintiff argued that this new information warranted reconsideration of the costs award or reduction to partial indemnity.

The court held that the source of payment for the defendant’s legal expenses did not materially alter the reasoning underlying the substantial indemnity award, which was primarily based on the plaintiff’s litigation conduct.

The prior costs award therefore remained unchanged.

Following the granting of summary judgment dismissing the action, the successful defendant sought substantial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing that the motion judge should not fix costs due to affidavit evidence, that elevated costs were unwarranted, and that costs should be limited to the summary judgment motion rather than the entire action.

The court rejected these submissions, holding that the judge retained discretion to fix costs and that summary judgment terminating the action justifies assessing costs of the entire proceeding.

The court found the litigation was aggressively pursued without evidentiary foundation and contained serious unfounded allegations affecting the defendant’s reputation.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded.

A mother sought to transfer a child protection proceeding from Toronto to St. Lambert, Quebec, and alternatively to Cornwall or Ottawa, Ontario.

She also sought increased access to her child who was in the care of the Children's Aid Society.

The court found that it lacked jurisdiction to transfer the proceeding outside Ontario and that the mother failed to establish a preponderance of convenience for transfer within Ontario.

The court granted the mother increased access from two hours to three hours per week, with one hour potentially supervised by an approved third party, conditional on negative drug test results.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that a child was in need of protection under clause 37(2)(b) of the Child and Family Services Act based on the mother's mental health issues, substance abuse, and domestic violence.

The father supported the motion while the mother opposed it.

The court granted the motion and found the child in need of protection, determining that the mother's combination of untreated mental health conditions, ongoing drug use during pregnancy and post-birth, and inability to protect herself from domestic violence created a real and likely risk of physical harm to the child.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment under Rule 20.01(3) seeking dismissal of a negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claim arising from alleged failures by a condominium security guard to notify a resident of delivered packages and from a subsequent lobby encounter.

The court held that the evidentiary record contained no credible evidence that the defendant acted wrongfully or that the plaintiff suffered any compensable loss.

The plaintiff failed to provide particulars or documentary support for alleged financial losses, investment opportunities, loan documents, or emotional distress.

Applying the summary judgment framework and emphasizing the obligation on a responding party to put its best evidence forward, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial.

A status review application for crown wardship of a three-year-old child.

The applicant child protection agency sought crown wardship without access for purposes of adoption.

The respondent mother opposed the application and sought return of the child to her care.

The court found the child continued to be in need of protection due to the mother's paranoid personality disorder, which was pervasive and enduring, contributing to her inability to provide adequate care and stability.

The mother's parenting was significantly impaired, characterized by inability to respond appropriately to the child's cues, inconsistent attendance at access visits, and failure to accept responsibility for her circumstances.

The court made an order for crown wardship with no access.

The appellant appealed two orders from the Small Claims Court that dismissed his actions against the respondents and prohibited him from commencing further proceedings.

The orders were made by the Small Claims Court judge on her own initiative, without a motion, notice, or an opportunity for the appellant to be heard.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Small Claims Court judge acted without jurisdiction and in breach of procedural fairness and natural justice.

The orders were set aside and costs were awarded to the appellant.