Joseph Kary

The respondent mother brought a motion seeking leave to bring a contempt motion on an urgent basis, a finding that the applicant grandmother was in contempt of a consent final order dated May 30, 2018, and an order directing police to locate and apprehend the child and deliver her to the mother.

The grandmother had refused to return the child at the end of a scheduled weekend access period on September 2, 2018, contrary to the final order which granted sole custody to the mother with specified access to the grandmother.

The court granted the mother's motion, ordering the grandmother to forthwith return the child to the mother's care and no later than 5:00 p.m. that day, with a police enforcement clause.

The contempt motion was adjourned.

The tenant appealed two decisions of the Landlord and Tenant Board, including an eviction order based on the landlord's good faith intention to personally occupy the rental unit.

The appeals were dismissed by the Registrar for delay after the tenant failed to perfect them.

The tenant brought a motion to set aside the dismissal orders.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the delay was caused by the tenant's lack of diligence, the appeals lacked merit as they raised questions of fact rather than law, and the justice of the case favoured the landlord, whose life had been put on hold by the delay.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating her tenancy for rent arrears.

The tenant argued the landlord was estopped from charging market rent due to a letter suggesting she pay a lower rent-geared-to-income amount while they attempted to convert her unit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the estoppel issue was not raised before the Board, the letter was not a clear and unequivocal promise, and the Board reasonably interpreted its home statute regarding jurisdiction over rent subsidies and service of notices.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the action against them, the moving defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff did not provide costs submissions despite an extension of time.

The court noted the action had languished for years with little steps taken by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had rejected without-costs settlement offers.

Applying the Rule 57.01 factors and the principle of reasonableness, the court awarded the moving defendants $25,000 in all-inclusive costs.

The applicant sought a declaratory order that the respondents breached a prior court order requiring them to permit cleaning and insecticide treatment of their condominium unit.

A trial of an issue was ordered to clarify events surrounding the attempted compliance.

The court found confusion in the instructions provided by the applicant's agent, which likely led the respondents to believe they had adequately prepared the unit.

Consequently, the court was not prepared to find a breach of its order and dismissed the applicant's request for declaratory relief.

This decision addresses costs following a trial where the applicant was largely successful on the issue of retroactive child support but unsuccessful on a restraining order claim.

The applicant, self-represented, sought significant costs including an hourly rate for his own time and legal advice fees.

The respondent argued for no costs due to divided success and financial hardship.

The court found the applicant largely successful, noted the respondent's unreasonable conduct throughout the litigation, and disallowed the claim for the applicant's own time without evidence of lost income.

Considering the respondent's limited ability to pay, the court awarded the applicant $8,500 in costs.

The mother brought a motion to change child support retroactively, alleging the father's income had significantly increased and he failed to disclose it.

The father brought a cross-motion seeking to terminate his child support obligations and for child support from the mother, as well as a restraining order.

The court dismissed the mother's claim for retroactive child support, finding she lacked a reasonable excuse for the delay and that the father's conduct was not blameworthy, given the informal evolution of parenting responsibilities and financial contributions.

The father's request for a restraining order was also dismissed due to dated evidence.

The court continued the interim child support order payable by the mother to the father and terminated the father's prior child support obligations.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing personal guarantees she signed for corporate loans.

She argued the motion judge erred procedurally by proceeding despite allegations that she lacked mental capacity, and substantively by rejecting her defenses of non est factum, undue influence, and material change to the loan arrangement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no cogent medical evidence of incapacity and upholding the motion judge's findings that the appellant understood the continuing all accounts guarantees she signed.

The applicant, a member of a housing co-operative, alleged discrimination on the basis of disability and reprisal after receiving Notices to Appear regarding the potential termination of her membership and occupancy rights, and the subsequent removal of her housing subsidy.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the applicant provided no evidence linking the respondents' actions to her disability, nor any evidence to counter the respondents' position that the subsidy was removed for legitimate reasons (failure to provide required income verification).

The application was dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant requested an adjournment of a scheduled summary hearing for medical reasons, providing documentation that her condition had worsened and self-representation was unmanageable.

The respondent opposed the request.

The Tribunal granted the adjournment, finding that the medical documentation established extraordinary circumstances justifying the request outside the standard 14-day period.

The applicant requested an adjournment of a scheduled summary hearing because she had recently retained counsel who had a scheduling conflict.

The Tribunal denied the request, noting that the applicant had previously agreed to the hearing date and that retaining counsel after a hearing is scheduled does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance justifying an adjournment.

Appeal from a Master's costs order made in bankruptcy-related proceedings arising from an earlier judgment over lottery winnings held in trust.

The appellant creditor had moved to lift the stay of proceedings, while the bankrupt debtor obtained a costs award against her after the stay issue had effectively become moot upon discharge.

The court held that the Master proceeded on wrong principles and made palpable and overriding errors by relying on an expired offer to settle, failing to explain a departure from the principle that costs follow the event, and apparently including costs related to the trustee's unopposed motion.

The $6,000 costs award was set aside and no costs were ordered for the underlying motion.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision terminating his tenancy so the landlords' son could move into the unit.

The tenant argued the Board erred in law regarding the good faith requirement, maintenance breaches, human rights accommodation, and the landlords' corporate status.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's determinations on good faith and maintenance were unappealable questions of fact, the eviction was unrelated to the tenant's disabilities, and the individual landlords met the statutory definition of a landlord.

The applicant requested reconsideration of a decision dismissing her human rights application for delay.

The Tribunal had found that the application, alleging discrimination based on disability, was filed more than one year after the last incident of discrimination.

On reconsideration, the Tribunal upheld its finding that the application was filed out of time.

However, the Tribunal granted reconsideration on the issue of whether the delay was incurred in good faith, as the initial decision failed to address the applicant's argument that she received incorrect legal advice regarding the limitation period.

A preliminary hearing was ordered to hear evidence on the good faith issue.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $7,500 in damages for defamation.

The appellant, president of a housing co-operative, had sent an email to board members accusing the respondent of theft after she allegedly took a confidential document from a meeting.

The trial judge found the statement defamatory and concluded the appellant acted with malice, defeating his defence of qualified privilege.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's determination that the appellant lacked an honest belief in the truth of his statement and acted with malice.

The applicant, a former member of the respondent housing co-operative, alleged discrimination on the basis of race, colour, disability, family status, and association.

Following an earlier interim decision that dismissed allegations regarding subsidy calculations, the remaining issue concerned whether the applicant experienced discriminatory differential treatment regarding repair requests.

At a summary hearing, the Tribunal found that the applicant failed to provide particularized witness statements or any evidence linking the alleged repair delays to prohibited Code grounds.

The application was dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success.

In a supplemental endorsement to an appeal decision, the appellant sought to correct a calculation error regarding occupation rent.

The court agreed that the original calculation contained a conceptual error by failing to account for daily accrual, and varied the occupation rent award from $23,000 to $24,000.

The court also determined the costs of the appeal and the underlying small claims court trial, awarding partial indemnity costs to the successful parties on their respective issues based on divided success.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination based on disability (gluten allergy) against a temporary employment agency.

The respondent requested the application be dismissed as untimely, as it was filed more than a year after the last alleged incident of discrimination.

The Tribunal found that the applicant ought to have known by April 2012 that the respondent was not going to accommodate her, triggering the one-year limitation period.

The Tribunal also found that the applicant's grief over her father's death did not constitute a good faith reason for the delay.

The application was dismissed as out of time.

The appellant operated a property management business and appeared before the Landlord and Tenant Board on behalf of property owners without a paralegal license.

The Law Society obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting him from providing legal services.

On appeal, the appellant argued he was a 'landlord' under the Residential Tenancies Act and thus entitled to self-represent.

The Court of Appeal held that even if he met the definition of a landlord, he was providing legal services to third parties and had no right to self-represent under the Law Society Act.

The appeal was dismissed, but the injunction was narrowed to allow him to appear before the board only when he is the actual owner of the property.

The applicant sought a permanent injunction restraining the respondent, a property manager who regularly appeared before the Ontario Landlord and Tenant Board on behalf of landlords, from providing legal services without a licence.

The respondent argued he was entitled to appear as a landlord’s “personal representative” within the definition of “landlord” under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The court held that appearing before a tribunal as a paid representative to make submissions and examine witnesses constitutes the provision of legal services requiring a licence under the Law Society Act.

The term “personal representative” in the Residential Tenancies Act was interpreted in its traditional estates law sense and does not include a paid property manager.

A permanent injunction was issued restraining the respondent from providing legal services without a licence.