Bruce A. Simpson

The court considered whether to stay or dismiss a proposed contempt motion and a civil fraud action brought by a self-represented litigant under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The responding parties asserted that both proceedings were frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the court's process, as they targeted steps taken in the normal course of bankruptcy proceedings.

The litigant failed to provide a substantive response to the court's Form 2.1B notices, instead sending emails containing unsubstantiated allegations of criminal activity against various judicial and legal actors.

Kimmel J. found that both the fraud action and the contempt motion were entirely devoid of particulars and failed to disclose any reasonable cause of action.

Consequently, the court dismissed the fraud action in its entirety and prohibited the litigant from filing further motions in the bankruptcy proceeding without leave.

The Administrator of a consumer proposal brought a motion to approve legal fees incurred for registering a restrictive covenant against the debtor's property as security for the proposal.

The Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy opposed the fees, arguing they were not prescribed by Rule 129 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the fees prescribed in Rule 129 are exhaustive for Division II consumer proposals, and any administration requiring additional fees must be pursued as a Division I proposal.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that a lease amending agreement was a duly constituted and executed standalone agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, rejecting the appellant's argument that it had an obligation under a proposed letter to execute the agreement regardless of whether the landlord waived a condition in its favour.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its action against the City of Toronto for breach of contract and other claims arising from a public tender process.

The trial judge dismissed the action primarily because it was barred by the six-year limitation period under the Limitation Act, finding the appellant knew or ought to have known the material facts by September 1990 but did not commence the action until February 1997.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge's limitation period analysis and found no palpable and overriding error in her alternative findings dismissing the substantive claims.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The City of Hamilton appealed a trial judgment regarding a sewer contract dispute.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to address the principal issue of the effect of exclusion clauses on the contractor's bid, given the timing of a representation made by the City's project engineer.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in awarding solicitor/client costs without hearing submissions.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.