Sherry A. Kettle

The plaintiff brought an action against the defendants for environmental contamination migrating from the defendants' property onto the plaintiff's adjacent lands.

The court found that chlorinated solvents (TCE) originated from the defendants' property and flowed via groundwater onto the plaintiff's lands.

The court held the defendants liable in nuisance, negligence, and trespass.

The court also pierced the corporate veil, finding the individual defendant jointly and severally liable due to his egregious conduct and failure to remediate the property despite promises to do so.

The court ordered the defendants to remediate their property and awarded damages of $1,809,908.80, with a further $2,800,000 payable if remediation is not completed on schedule.

The defendants brought a motion on the eve of trial seeking an adjournment, leave to serve a late expert report, and leave to amend their Statement of Defence to add a counterclaim.

The underlying action involved allegations of environmental contamination flowing from the defendants' property to the plaintiff's property.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the individual defendant, who had been self-represented for much of the litigation, had known about the issues for years but failed to act until the eve of trial.

The court held that granting the relief would cause significant delay and non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiff.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order requiring it to return a pre-authorized debit payment of $83,734.05 made post-NOI (Notice of Intention to file a proposal) to the respondent, less amounts owing for post-NOI fuel purchases.

The motion judge found the payment constituted a prohibited remedy under section 69(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to consider whether the parties had entered into a legitimate agreement to pay past debts in order to secure future fuel supply.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The debtor company filed a Notice of Intention to Make a Proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

Three days later, a fuel supplier processed a pre-authorized debit for pre-NOI arrears.

The debtor sought the return of the funds, arguing the payment violated the stay of proceedings under s. 69(1)(a) of the BIA.

The court held that processing the pre-authorized debit constituted a 'remedy' captured by the stay, as it gave the supplier an advantage over other creditors.

The supplier was ordered to return the funds, less a set-off for fuel supplied post-NOI.

The applicants sought to discharge a collateral mortgage without paying a $4.25 million 'Participation Amount' owed to the respondents.

The applicants argued the Participation Amount was invalid on several grounds, including that it was a clog on the equity of redemption, offended section 8 of the Interest Act, constituted a criminal rate of interest under section 347 of the Criminal Code, violated the Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, and was an unenforceable penalty.

The court rejected all these arguments, finding the Participation Amount was a valid collateral advantage agreed to by sophisticated commercial parties in exchange for forbearance.

The court ordered the funds held in court to be paid to the respondents.

The plaintiff sought an order declaring the self-represented defendant a trespasser and requiring her to deliver vacant possession of a rental property.

The defendant had been living rent-free in the property since 2003 after vacating her mortgaged home due to severe structural and mold issues.

The parties disputed the terms of the oral agreement governing her occupancy of the rental property.

Finding that the material facts were in dispute, the court directed a trial of the issue pursuant to Rule 38.10 and ordered a teleconference to discuss joining the matter with the defendant's related ongoing actions.

The mortgagors brought a motion for leave to file an expert report regarding the calculation of a criminal rate of interest under s. 347 of the Criminal Code, after having conducted cross-examinations.

The mortgagees opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion seeking an order that the mortgagors pay an additional sum into court to secure the increased interest and costs resulting from the delay.

The court granted the mortgagors leave to file the expert report, but ordered them to pay an additional $106,500 into court to mitigate the prejudice to the mortgagees caused by the delay and the need to respond to the late-filed report.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for damages arising from the purchase of a defective wind turbine from one of the defendant corporations.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against two affiliated corporations, arguing they were separate legal entities.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs' claims regarding lifting the corporate veil, agency, and pure economic loss for negligent manufacture raised genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly given the conflicting evidence on the degree of control and integration among the corporations.