Bruce F. Simpson

The respondent brought a motion to remove the applicant's solicitor due to a conflict of interest arising from prior joint retainers for wills and property transfer.

The applicant brought a cross-motion for summary judgment regarding the joint ownership and sale of a condominium, trailer, and boat.

The court granted the respondent's motion, finding that the solicitor had not discharged the burden of proving no confidential information was exchanged and was likely to be an essential witness.

The applicant's cross-motion for summary judgment was dismissed, as there were genuine issues for trial regarding financial contributions and the nature of ownership, requiring viva voce evidence. interesting_citations_summary: > The decision applies the principles from MacDonald Estate v. Martin regarding solicitor conflict of interest, emphasizing the inference of confidential information in sufficiently related retainers and the high burden on the solicitor to prove no relevant information was imparted.

It also references Hryniak v. Mauldin in the context of summary judgment, reiterating that complex factual disputes, particularly those involving financial contributions and credibility assessments, are not suitable for summary disposition and require a trial. final_judgement: > The Respondent's motion to remove Bruce Simpson as the Applicant’s solicitor of record is granted.

Bruce Simpson is ordered to make himself available for questioning and produce files related to the previous retainers.

The Applicant is ordered to serve and file a brief detailing consideration for the property, boat, and trailer.

The parties are to proceed with a settlement conference.

The Applicant’s Cross-Motion for summary judgment is dismissed.

Leave is granted for each party to proceed with two hours of questioning.

Costs are to be addressed if the parties cannot agree. winning_degree_applicant: 5 winning_degree_respondent: 1 judge_bias_applicant: 0 judge_bias_respondent: 0 year: 2017 decision_number: 4 file_number: "FC-15-2578" source: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2017/2017onsc4/2017onsc4.html" cited_cases: legislation: - title: "Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.

F.3" url: "https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/90f03" case_law: - title: "MacDonald Estate v. Martin, [1990] 3 SCR 1235" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1990/1990canlii32/1990canlii32.html" - title: "Mastron v. Cotton, 58 O.L.R. 251" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/1925/1925canlii464/1925canlii464.html" - title: "Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2014/2014scc7/2014scc7.html" keywords: - Conflict of interest - Solicitor removal - Summary judgment - Family law - Joint ownership - Confidential information - Resulting trust - Family Law Act areas_of_law: - Civil Procedure - Family Law - Legal Ethics --- COURT FILE NO.: FC-15-2578 DATE: 2017/01/03 SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO RE: Diane McCarthy, Applicant AND Marcel Labonté, Respondent BEFORE: Justice Marc R. Labrosse COUNSEL: Bruce F. Simpson, Counsel, for the Applicant Stéphane A. MonPremier, Counsel, for the Respondent HEARD: December 15, 2016 # Endorsement [1] The Respondent has brought a Motion seeking an order that Bruce Simpson be removed as the Applicant’s solicitor of record in this matter and for other related relief.

The Applicant has brought a Cross-Motion seeking summary judgment with respect to the joint ownership by the parties to a condominium, a trailer and a boat.

The Applicant also seeks some additional orders relating to the sale of the condominium and the use of the proceeds of such sale. [2] Prior to the separation of the parties, the Applicant’s solicitor was counsel to both parties and was retained by both parties for the preparation of new wills and for the transfer of one half of the Respondent’s interest in a condominium to the Applicant in 2011.

Having acted on these two joint retainers, the Respondent now objects to Mr. Simpson’s ongoing involvement as solicitor of record for the Applicant in their family law dispute. [3] For the reasons which follow, I am of the view that Mr. Simpson should be removed as solicitor of record for the Applicant because the Applicant has not satisfied me that there was no exchange of confidential information during the previous joint retainers and thus Mr. Simpson is in a position of conflict of interest.

He is also likely to be an essential witness in any trial of this matter.

He will be unable to act as both witness and solicitor for the Applicant and there is risk that confidential information will be used against the Respondent. [4] With respect to the Cross-motion, I am of the view that this request for summary judgment should not have been brought.

The evidence presented by the Applicant in support of her Cross-motion is by no means conclusive.

There are important issues for trial as to the nature of her financial contributions to the joint expenses of the parties and if these contributions result in her having been an equal or joint contributor to the purchase of the condominium, trailer and boat.

The Cross-Motion for summary judgment had no likelihood of success.

It was clearly brought for retaliatory purposes. [5] Finally, the parties consent to an order for questioning.

Leave is therefore granted to the parties to each proceed with two hours of questioning. # Background Facts [6] The parties were in a relationship for approximately 8.5 years.

They began their relationship in August or September 2006 and separated on April 26, 2015.

The parties briefly separated in 2010 but reconciled shortly thereafter. [7] Prior to residing with the Applicant, the Respondent owned a condominium municipally known as 408-40 Laundry Street, Ottawa.

In 2007, the Respondent sold the Laundry Street property and purchased 555 Brittany Drive, Apt 403, Ottawa.

The purchase price was $165,000.

The Respondent paid $65,000 down and took out a line of credit secured against the property for the balance of $100,000.

In 2009, the Respondent increased the line of credit to $225,000. [8] The boat and trailer were both purchased in June 2009.

Title to these assets was put in the name of both parties.

The Applicant’s evidence suggests that her credit card was used to put a $500.00 downpayment on the trailer and a $1,000.00 downpayment on the boat. [9] At the time of the temporary separation in 2010, the parties signed an agreement setting out how they intended to manage their financial affairs.

This agreement provided for the joint ownership of the condominium at 555 Brittany Drive (the “Condominium”) together with the boat and trailer.

There is no dispute that this signed agreement does not satisfy the requirements of s. 55 of the [Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.

F.3](https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/90f03) (“FLA”) and as such it is not a domestic contract. [10] In March 2011, the Applicant signed on to become jointly liable for the line of credit secured against the Condominium when the line of credit was increased by the Respondent. [11] In April 2011, the Applicant and the Respondent retained Mr. Simpson to have the Respondent’s name added to the title of the Condominium as joint owner.

The Respondent claims that he was never advised to seek independent legal advice and no waiver of independent legal advice was signed.

The same also seems to apply to the Applicant when she signed on to the line of credit. [12] Mr. Simpson was also retained by the parties for the preparation of their wills.

The Respondent claims that confidential information was provided to Mr. Simpson during both retainers. [13] The Respondent has claimed that at the time of the transfer to the Applicant, Mr. Simpson stated to the Applicant: “Just because your name is being added onto the title, it does not necessarily mean that you are entitled to half”.

The Applicant does not recall Mr. Simpson making such a statement. [14] The Respondent states that he did not understand that he could be prejudiced by giving effect to the transfer of half his interest in the Condominium to the Applicant. [15] The parties separated on April 26, 2015.

At that time, the amount owing on the joint line of credit exceeded the original price of the Condominium. [16] Mr. Simpson has not provided an affidavit confirming that he did not obtain confidential information from the Respondent during the two retainers.

He relies on two letters written to the Respondent’s counsel setting his position on the issue of confidential information. [17] The Respondent has pleaded the existence of a resulting trust as a result of the gratuitous transfer of half his interest in the Condominium to the Applicant.

The Respondent states that the intention of the transferee at the time of the transfer is a key consideration. # Analysis ## Conflict of Interest [18] The leading case on solicitor conflict of issue is the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in [MacDonald Estate v. Martin, [1990] 3 SCR 1235](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1990/1990canlii32/1990canlii32.html) where the SCC set out the three underlying principles in determining whether a disqualifying conflict of interest exists: (a) The concern to maintain the high standards of the legal profession and the integrity of our system of justice; (b) The countervailing value that a litigant should not be deprived of his or her choice of counsel without good cause; and (c) The desirability of permitting reasonable mobility in the legal profession. (see *MacDonald Estate v. Martin* at page 9) [19] The SCC also stated in *MacDonald Estate* that there are typically two questions to be answered: (a) Did the lawyer receive confidential information attributable to a solicitor and client relationship relevant to the matter at hand? and (b) Is there risk that it will be used to the prejudice of the client? [20] The SCC went on to say that once the court determines that there is a sufficiently related retainer from which it is sought to remove the solicitor, the court should infer that confidential information was imparted unless the solicitor satisfies the court that no information was imparted which could be relevant.

This will be a difficult burden to discharge. (see *MacDonald Estate*, page 21) [21] In the present circumstances, it is relevant to note that these were joint retainers and that the parties would have always been together when information was being conveyed by the Respondent to Mr. Simpson.

As such, in the context of this matrimonial dispute, the Applicant states that there is no information that Mr. Simpson would have that the Applicant does not also have. [22] While I have considered this as a factor in my analysis, it is certainly not determinative.

I am of the view that any information given to Mr. Simpson in the course of either the Condominium transfer and/or the drafting of wills has the potential to be confidential information.

When considering the direction of the SCC in *MacDonald Estate*, the Court must focus on “relevant information” and the need for the solicitor to satisfy the Court that no information was given that could be relevant. [23] There is no doubt that both the instructions provided for the Condominium transfer and the instructions provided for the Respondent’s will are retainers that are sufficiently related to the intention of the Respondent at the time of the transfer.

Mr. Simpson has not satisfied me that no information was given to him which could be relevant to the present dispute for the following reasons: (i) the Applicant does not state that no confidential information was given in either of her July 20, 2016 or August 24, 2016 affidavits; (ii) with respect to a key comment the Respondent alleges was made by Mr. Simpson during the Condominium transfer about the meaning of a joint tenancy (para 22 of his affidavit), the Applicant says she does not recall the statement being made; (iii) Mr. Simpson has not provided an affidavit in these proceedings; (iv) when considering his March 9, 2016 and March 16, 2016 letters, these are not sworn evidence from Mr. Simpson.

Regardless, in the March 9, 2016 letter, Mr. Simpson indicates that he does not have a specific recollection of the details of those meetings; (v) the evidence before the Court suggests that the joint retainers with Mr. Simpson are in issue and neither the Applicant nor Mr. Simpson have demonstrated clear evidence of what transpired during those retainers; (vi) it is clear from Mr. Simpson’s March 9, 2016 letter that he is of the view that the Respondent understood the effect of transferring half his interest in the Condominium.

He has not satisfied the Court that his conclusions are not based on confidential information. [24] I have therefore not been persuaded that Mr. Simpson did not receive confidential information from the Respondent during his previous retainers.

He will surely be a witness should the issue of resulting trust proceed to trial.

The previous retainers are sufficiently related to this family law dispute and there is risk that the information could be used against the Respondent.

As such, the Respondent’s motion to have Bruce Simpson removed as the Applicant’s solicitor of record is granted. [25] I also make the following ancillary orders as requested in the Respondent’s Notice of Motion: (1) Bruce Simpson shall make himself available for questioning in relation to the services he provided to the parties, including the transfer of title of the property municipally known as 555 Brittany Drive, Apt. 403, Ottawa, Ontario K1K 4C5 (“the Property”) on April 8th, 2011, and the drafting of the Respondent’s will; (2) Bruce Simpson shall produce a full executed copy of the Respondent’s will, together with the entire file relating to this particular retainer, within the next thirty (30) days. (3) Bruce Simpson shall produce the entire file relating to the transfer of title of the Property, within the next thirty (30) days. (4) The Applicant shall serve and file a brief setting out all of the consideration she claims to have paid or given for the Property, the boat and the trailer, within thirty (30) days.

The alleged consideration shall be accompanied by supporting documents. (5) The parties shall proceed with a settlement conference, following questioning and the completion of disclosure. ## Summary Judgment [26] The Applicant seeks summary judgment on the following issues: (a) That the Respondent pay to the Applicant the sum of $12,500.00, being one half of the proceeds from the sale of a jointly owned trailer that the parties purchased on June 16, 2009, together with pre-judgment interest; (b) A declaration that the Applicant is a 50% owner of a property registered in the joint names of the parties and known for municipal purposes as Unit 403, 555 Brittany Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, K1K 4C5; (c) An order that the property referred to in the previous paragraph be listed for sale with a realtor agreed to by the parties or appointed by the Court, and an order that next proceeds of sale be divided equally between the parties, subject to the usual accounting as set out in [Mastron v. Cotton, 58 O.L.R. 251](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/1925/1925canlii464/1925canlii464.html), after payment to the Applicant of any monies owing to her from the sale of the boat and payment of the sum of $12,500.00 plus pre-judgment interest as referred to in paragraph 2 (a) above. [27] The Applicant’s motion for summary judgment should not have been brought.

It was clearly retaliatory. [28] The Applicant’s position that she contributed equally to the purchase of the Condominium is clearly an issue for trial.

As for the boat and trailer, the evidence seems to be that the Applicant was a co-owner since the date of purchase however there are issues as to what contributions were made by the Applicant to the purchase of these assets.

These are genuine issues for trial. [29] During the motion, counsel for the Applicant conceded as much but asked the Court to use its fact finding powers as found under FLR Rule 16(6.1) to infer that the various payments found at Tab 9(o) of the Applicant’s Affidavit and the other supporting documents filed by the Applicant could lead to a conclusion that the Applicant had made an equal contribution to the purchase of the Condominium, trailer and boat. [30] Not only do I disagree, but there is no basis to arrive at such a conclusion on the available evidence.

The Applicant could not provide any caselaw to suggest that the various contributions made to ongoing living expenses could defeat a claim for resulting trust or be deemed to be an equal contribution to the Condominium.

Further, there is a lack of information surrounding the cheques at Tab 9(o) to allow the Court to know what these cheques were for.

Counsel for the Applicant could not even advise the Court if the ScotiaLine Visa account and the joint line of credit on the Condominium were linked. [31] While the Court is very familiar with the direction of the SCC in [Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2014/2014scc7/2014scc7.html) and how this decision has been applied in the family law context, there are clearly issues in this matter which require questioning between the parties and a trial.

Further, there is a likelihood that viva voce evidence will be required to assess the credibility of the parties.

I am unable to conclude that this can be done by way of a mini-trial as permitted by FLR Rule 16(6.2) or that a mini-trial will help narrow the issues. [32] If this family law dispute goes to trial, it will likely be a short trial whereby all issues should be dealt with at the same time.

However, the parties will have to give serious consideration to merits of going to a trial on these issues given the financial implications of a trial. [33] Consequently, the Applicant’s Cross-Motion is dismissed. # Conclusion [34] For the reasons set out above, I make the following orders: a.

The Respondent’s motion to have Bruce Simpson removed as the Applicant’s solicitor of record is granted; b.

Bruce Simpson shall make himself available for questioning in relation to the services he provided to the parties, including the transfer of title of the property municipally known as 555 Brittany Drive, Apt. 403, Ottawa, Ontario K1K 4C5 (“the Property”) on April 8th, 2011, and the drafting of the Respondent’s will; c.

Bruce Simpson shall produce a full executed copy of the Respondent’s will, together with the entire file relating to this particular retainer, within the next thirty (30) days; d.

Bruce Simpson shall produce the entire file relating to the transfer of title of the Property, within the next thirty (30) days; e.

The Applicant shall serve and file a brief setting out all of the consideration she claims to have paid or given for the Property, the boat and the trailer, within thirty (30) days.

The alleged consideration shall be accompanied by supporting documents; f.

The parties shall proceed with a settlement conference, following questioning and the completion of disclosure; g.

The Applicant’s Cross-Motion is dismissed. h.

On consent, leave is granted to the parties for each to proceed with two hours of questioning. ### Costs [35] The Respondent has been substantially successful on the Motion and Cross-Motion.

If the parties are unable to agree as to the costs of this Motion for Leave to Appeal, the Respondent will have 15 days to provide written costs submissions of a maximum of 3 pages in length excluding attachments.

The Applicant will then have 15 days to respond, subject to the same limitations for length of the written submissions.

Justice Marc R. Labrosse Date: January 3, 2017

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault offences arising from an incident where police responded to a disconnected 911 call at her residence.

The appellant, who was experiencing a mental health crisis, locked herself in her bedroom and subsequently attacked an officer with a knife when police entered.

The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the police were trespassing, finding they acted reasonably under their duty to protect life.

The court allowed the appeal only to the extent of staying one count under the Kienapple principle and amending another count to particularize the use of a weapon.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing that his guilty plea was invalid and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and fully informed, as the appellant had consulted with three lawyers and understood the consequences.

Furthermore, the appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice amounting to a miscarriage of justice, as there was no reasonable probability he would have been acquitted at trial given the victim's injuries and witness statements.

The Crown applied under s. 490(3) of the Criminal Code to retain a seized laptop hard drive for further investigation, while the respondent sought its return, alleging a warrantless seizure in breach of s. 8 of the Charter.

The police had seized the laptop from the respondent as he left a residence that was subject to a search warrant for child pornography.

The court found the arrest was unlawful and the seizure warrantless, but held the seizure was reasonable due to exigent circumstances, specifically the imminent risk of evidence destruction.

The court granted a 12-month extension for the detention of the hard drive, finding the investigation complex due to the ongoing efforts to decrypt the 26-digit alphanumeric password.

Appeal from a Master's costs order made in bankruptcy-related proceedings arising from an earlier judgment over lottery winnings held in trust.

The appellant creditor had moved to lift the stay of proceedings, while the bankrupt debtor obtained a costs award against her after the stay issue had effectively become moot upon discharge.

The court held that the Master proceeded on wrong principles and made palpable and overriding errors by relying on an expired offer to settle, failing to explain a departure from the principle that costs follow the event, and apparently including costs related to the trustee's unopposed motion.

The $6,000 costs award was set aside and no costs were ordered for the underlying motion.

The applicants sought leave to appeal an arbitral award upholding a co-tenancy committee’s authority to require removal or relocation of a ground-level air conditioning unit installed without approval.

The court held that the arbitrator’s interpretation of the co-tenancy agreement and assessment of whether the alteration was minor or cosmetic involved mixed questions of fact and law, not an appealable question of law under s. 45 of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The court further held that any reliance on condominium jurisprudence did not establish an extricable legal error and that the arbitral decision was reasonable on the record.

Leave to appeal was refused.

In a bankruptcy discharge proceeding, a creditor sought substantial indemnity costs for opposing the bankrupt’s discharge as well as recovery of the trustee’s legal fees and administrative expenses.

The court had previously denied the bankrupt’s discharge and was asked to determine the appropriate costs consequences.

Applying s. 197(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the court held that costs normally follow the event on a partial indemnity basis.

While the creditor was successful in opposing the discharge, the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs and reduced the requested amount to $1,500 to avoid imposing an excessive financial burden that would undermine the debtor’s potential rehabilitation.

Determination of the trustee’s legal costs and expenses was deferred to the final discharge hearing and taxation of the trustee’s accounts.

The appellant appealed a permanent injunction preventing him from interfering with a mutual driveway and sought leave to appeal the costs awarded.

The respondent moved to quash the appeals due to late filing.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal of the injunction order, finding it lacked merit as the appellant had installed a fixed, locked barrier on the driveway.

However, the court dismissed the motion to quash the costs appeal, granted leave to appeal costs, and reduced the motion judge's costs award by $3,000, finding the judge erred in treating a restatement of the claim as an offer to settle attracting substantial indemnity costs.

The defendants moved under Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a long‑standing action for delay or, alternatively, to terminate an interim order freezing a bank account.

The dispute concerned whether certain real property and a bank account were held in trust for the estate of a deceased parent or beneficially owned by two siblings who held legal title.

The action had been commenced more than fourteen years earlier and virtually no steps had been taken to advance it, allegedly due to related estate litigation in the Philippines.

The court found no continuing justification for maintaining the freeze order on the bank account, particularly given the lack of evidence supporting the alleged trust claim and the hardship imposed on the defendants.

The freeze order was vacated and the plaintiffs were ordered to set the matter down for trial within 30 days, failing which the action could be dismissed and the certificate of pending litigation vacated.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at a mental health facility.

He argued his risk could be managed on a conditional discharge and that his detention amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion reasonable given the appellant's lack of community support, history of elopements, and substance abuse issues.

The Court also rejected the Charter argument, noting the detention was not a probable period of indefinite incarceration as the facility offered necessary programming for potential future reintegration.

Following a successful motion for declaratory and injunctive relief concerning a mutual driveway right-of-way, the successful party sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the effect of settlement offers under Rule 49.10.

The evidence showed repeated reasonable settlement attempts by the successful party and an inflexible litigation position by the opposing party, which contributed to the need for the motion.

The court found that the result obtained was at least as favourable as the formal offer to settle and awarded partial indemnity costs to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

Costs were fixed at $20,336.52 plus HST.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking declarations confirming a registered right-of-way over a mutual driveway between neighbouring properties and an injunction preventing interference with that right-of-way.

The parties partially settled the issue of the existence of mutual rights-of-way.

The dispute remained regarding a barrier constructed by the defendant across the driveway which blocked access to the plaintiff’s property.

Applying the test for interlocutory injunctions from RJR‑MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), the court found that the barrier materially interfered with the plaintiff’s property rights and caused ongoing irreparable harm.

The balance of convenience favoured protecting the plaintiff’s recognized right-of-way, and injunctive relief was granted requiring removal of the obstruction.

The Attorney General applied for forfeiture of $5,545 seized during a drug investigation under the Civil Remedies Act.

The respondent brought a motion to strike portions of the supporting affidavit that referred to his criminal record and past drug-related activity, arguing it was inadmissible propensity evidence.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

The respondent appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that similar fact evidence of bad character is admissible in civil forfeiture proceedings where its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, as it is relevant to whether the seized money is proceeds of unlawful activity.

The appellants appealed their convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown conceded that the convictions relied on the theory that the appellant Jean purchased the drugs from the appellant Kapend and a co-accused, and was in possession of the entirety of the drugs hidden in a container in a vehicle.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence could not reasonably support the inference that Jean had knowledge of the cocaine secreted in the container.

As the Crown conceded that Kapend's conviction could not stand if Jean's conviction was quashed, both convictions were quashed and acquittals entered.

The appellant's vehicle was seized by police as proceeds of crime and held under a detention order.

The appellant, claiming to be an innocent third party, commenced a civil action to recover the vehicle and seek damages for its detention.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to dismiss the action, agreeing that the Criminal Code provisions for innocent third party remedies constitute a complete code, precluding parallel civil proceedings absent allegations of actionable police misconduct.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order regarding an insurer's duty to defend.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that based on the plaintiff's pleadings, the possibility that the appellant's statements were made carelessly rather than intentionally could not be ruled out.

Applying the Supreme Court's principle that the mere possibility of a claim falling within the policy triggers the duty to defend, the court set aside the motion judge's order and awarded costs to the appellant.

The deceased was the sole owner of one life insurance policy and the joint owner, with his wife, of a second policy.

He made inadequate provision for his dependant children.

The children applied for dependants' relief under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the jointly-owned policy was not caught by s. 72(1)(f) of the SLRA and therefore did not form part of the deceased's estate for the purpose of dependants' relief.

The court also upheld the applications judge's decision to charge the proceeds of the solely-owned policy for the support of the dependant children.

The appellant appealed a decision including a jointly owned life insurance policy in the deceased's estate under s. 72(1)(f) of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The policy was purchased jointly by the deceased and his spouse to pay down their mortgage, with the survivor receiving the proceeds.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the mere fact of joint ownership of the policy was not enough to trigger s. 72(1)(f), and the policy should be excluded from the estate available for distribution to dependants.

A dissenting opinion would have dismissed the appeal, finding the policy fell within the specific provisions of the Act.

The respondents, a group of neighbours, obtained an injunction from the Superior Court restraining the landlords from operating an illegal rooming house.

When the landlords failed to evict the tenants through the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal, the neighbours obtained a Superior Court order requiring the tenants to vacate the premises.

The tenants appealed, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Tenant Protection Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Tribunal to terminate residential tenancies and evict tenants, thereby ousting the Superior Court's jurisdiction to make such an order.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order regarding child support arrears, imputed income, and costs.

He argued that the judge should have forgiven arrears for the entire time he was in Iran, rather than half, and that too much income was imputed to him upon his return.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable error in the motion judge's discretionary decisions regarding arrears, imputed income, or the modest costs award.