Osborne Godfrey Barnwell

The appellant sued an Assistant Crown Attorney for defamation after the respondent provided incorrect information about the appellant's criminal record to another Crown Attorney during a bail hearing.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding the action was statute-barred and protected by qualified and absolute privilege, with no evidence of malice to defeat the privileges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing there was no genuine issue for trial regarding malice and that absolute privilege applied to communications made in respect of court proceedings.

The appellant sued several Crown Attorneys, a probation officer, and a lawyer for intentional torts, including abuse of public office, arising from his prosecution for breach of bail conditions and domestic assault.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim, finding it failed to plead sufficient facts to establish the requisite malice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that a high threshold of proof is required to establish liability for prosecutorial misconduct and that the appellant's allegations amounted to mere speculation or impermissible collateral attacks on his bail order.

The appellant appealed and the respondents cross-appealed from a judgment concerning restitution, negligent misrepresentation, conversion, and assignment/preference issues.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or legal analysis.

Both the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed without costs.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict dismissing their action against the police services board, alleging errors in the trial judge's jury charge regarding sections 8, 9, and 12 of the Charter, as well as appealing the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions and noting that the trial was essentially about credibility, which the jury resolved in favour of the respondent.

The court also upheld the trial judge's costs award, finding no basis to interfere with his discretion under Rule 49.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court order dismissing her application for judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision.

The appellant argued the Tribunal failed to consider a doctor's letter in its refusal to reconsider her application regarding her carpal tunnel disorder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the failure to refer to the letter did not mean it was not considered, and the Tribunal's decision was not patently unreasonable.

The appellant sought to appeal a retail sales tax assessment but served the notice of appeal on the Minister one day after the 90-day statutory limitation period expired.

The motions judge dismissed the appellant's motion to extend the time for service and allowed the Minister's cross-motion to strike the appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that neither section 29 of the Retail Sales Tax Act, the Rules of Civil Procedure, nor the Courts of Justice Act grant the court jurisdiction to extend the strict 90-day statutory limitation period for instituting an appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal denying her request to reconsider a previous decision that denied her benefits for carpal tunnel syndrome.

The Tribunal had found a lack of temporal connection between her condition and her work.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was patent unreasonability and found that the Tribunal's findings of fact and refusal to reconsider were supported by medical evidence.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicants filed complaints alleging that their union breached its duty of fair representation under section 74 of the Labour Relations Act during their grievance arbitration.

The applicants claimed that union counsel was uncaring, incompetent, failed to call corroborating witnesses, and fell asleep during the hearing.

The Board dismissed the applications, finding that union counsel's strategic decisions, including not calling certain witnesses and not seeking judicial review of the arbitrator's award, were reasonable judgment calls.

The Board concluded that the union's conduct was not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith, and that the applicants received adequate representation.

The grievor, a Human Resources Consultant, took a two-year leave of absence to avoid being declared surplus during a downsizing and to reach ten years of continuous service for retirement benefits.

During his leave, several vacancies arose and were filled through open competitions.

The grievor filed a grievance claiming he should have been considered for direct assignment to these positions or, alternatively, that the employer had a duty to inform him of the vacancies and his options.

The Public Service Grievance Board dismissed the grievance, finding that the grievor was not a surplus employee while on leave and therefore had no right to direct assignment.

The Board also found no breach of any duty to inform, as the grievor had made incorrect assumptions about his status and failed to maintain contact with the employer to seek advice.