Osborne Godfrey Barnwell

The appellant father appealed an order permitting the respondent mother to relocate to Argentina with their child.

The appeal was limited to whether the trial judge erred in refusing to admit documentary evidence regarding the security of persons in Argentina, specifically reports from Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department.

The appeal judge dismissed the appeal, finding the documents were inadmissible hearsay and would not have materially impacted the result.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, noting the trial judge properly focused on the best interests of the child, the mother's reasonable plan, and the stability and support available in Argentina.

The appellants, two black men, appealed the dismissal of their civil actions against the police for alleged misconduct, including racial profiling, assault, and arbitrary detention arising from a traffic stop and subsequent arrest.

They argued the trial judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias, acted unfairly, and made palpable and overriding errors in rejecting their racial profiling claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no apprehension of bias, no procedural unfairness, and no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings that the police conduct was justified by the appellants' dangerous driving and flight, rather than racial profiling.

The appellant sued an Assistant Crown Attorney for defamation after the respondent provided incorrect information about the appellant's criminal record to another Crown Attorney during a bail hearing.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding the action was statute-barred and protected by qualified and absolute privilege, with no evidence of malice to defeat the privileges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing there was no genuine issue for trial regarding malice and that absolute privilege applied to communications made in respect of court proceedings.

The appellant sued several Crown Attorneys, a probation officer, and a lawyer for intentional torts, including abuse of public office, arising from his prosecution for breach of bail conditions and domestic assault.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim, finding it failed to plead sufficient facts to establish the requisite malice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that a high threshold of proof is required to establish liability for prosecutorial misconduct and that the appellant's allegations amounted to mere speculation or impermissible collateral attacks on his bail order.

The appellant appealed and the respondents cross-appealed from a judgment concerning restitution, negligent misrepresentation, conversion, and assignment/preference issues.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or legal analysis.

Both the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed without costs.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict dismissing their action against the police services board, alleging errors in the trial judge's jury charge regarding sections 8, 9, and 12 of the Charter, as well as appealing the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions and noting that the trial was essentially about credibility, which the jury resolved in favour of the respondent.

The court also upheld the trial judge's costs award, finding no basis to interfere with his discretion under Rule 49.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court order dismissing her application for judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision.

The appellant argued the Tribunal failed to consider a doctor's letter in its refusal to reconsider her application regarding her carpal tunnel disorder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the failure to refer to the letter did not mean it was not considered, and the Tribunal's decision was not patently unreasonable.

The appellant sought to appeal a retail sales tax assessment but served the notice of appeal on the Minister one day after the 90-day statutory limitation period expired.

The motions judge dismissed the appellant's motion to extend the time for service and allowed the Minister's cross-motion to strike the appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that neither section 29 of the Retail Sales Tax Act, the Rules of Civil Procedure, nor the Courts of Justice Act grant the court jurisdiction to extend the strict 90-day statutory limitation period for instituting an appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal denying her request to reconsider a previous decision that denied her benefits for carpal tunnel syndrome.

The Tribunal had found a lack of temporal connection between her condition and her work.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was patent unreasonability and found that the Tribunal's findings of fact and refusal to reconsider were supported by medical evidence.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.