Osborne Godfrey Barnwell

The appellant appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Teachers, which proceeded in his absence after denying his request for an adjournment.

The appellant also brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence, claiming he had not received a letter outlining the shortcomings of his medical documentation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for fresh evidence, finding the appellant had received the letter and his failure to provide the evidence earlier was due to a lack of diligence.

The court also dismissed the appeal, holding that the Committee's refusal to grant a further adjournment was a proper exercise of discretion and not a denial of natural justice, as the appellant had failed to comply with the reasonable conditions attached to a previous adjournment.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment following a jury verdict in a motor vehicle accident case.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by suggesting a Town official's expected evidence regarding traffic light timing was expert opinion, and by recalling and recharging the jury after their initial verdict stated the respondent 'may have had an opportunity to avoid colliding'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge had not ruled on the admissibility of the uncalled witness's evidence, and properly recharged the jury because the initial verdict did not meet the legal definition of negligence.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision in favour of the respondent bank regarding a loan default.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence, including an affidavit from a signing officer, to argue the loan was intended for a company rather than him personally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence was available prior to the summary judgment hearing and lacked sufficient detail to be meaningful.

The court held the appellant failed to put his best foot forward, and the motion judge made no errors in granting summary judgment.

The applicant, a restaurant owner of Somali origin, alleged that a parking enforcement officer targeted him and his patrons by issuing parking tickets and making racist comments.

The respondents requested that the application be dismissed because many of the allegations related to events that occurred more than a year before the application was filed.

The Tribunal dismissed the allegations relating to the period from 2002 to 2005, finding they were not part of a series of incidents with the later events and that there was no good faith explanation for the delay.

The Tribunal ordered a half-day oral hearing to hear evidence regarding the alleged discriminatory comments made in 2009 and 2010.

The respondents requested an order to remove the individual respondent, Marsha Smith, from the human rights application.

The organizational respondent, the Ministry of Government Services, accepted vicarious liability for the alleged discriminatory conduct, which arose in the context of employment.

Applying the factors from Persaud, the Tribunal found no compelling reason to continue the proceeding against the individual respondent, as the Ministry could remedy any Code infringement and the applicant would not be prejudiced.

The request was granted and the application was dismissed against the individual respondent.

The plaintiff brought a medical negligence action alleging a wrongful hysterectomy performed during a scheduled myomectomy procedure.

The physician converted the surgery intra-operatively to a hysterectomy after discovering adenomyosis, asserting that the patient had been informed of and accepted the risk.

The court found the physician failed to disclose the possibility of a non-emergency hysterectomy performed solely to relieve pain and bleeding symptoms, and that the patient had not consented to such a procedure.

Applying the informed consent test from Reibl v Hughes and Arndt v Smith, the court held that a reasonable person in the patient’s circumstances—who strongly desired pregnancy and had an upcoming fertility consultation—would not have accepted the risk.

Liability was established and the court awarded $75,000 in general damages for loss of reproductive capacity and related psychological harm.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of race, ancestry, ethnic origin, place of origin, age, and reprisal, following the termination of her employment.

The respondent claimed the termination was due to funding cuts.

At a summary hearing, the Tribunal found that the applicant's allegations, if proven, could establish a connection to the Code, and therefore declined to dismiss the application for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal also removed one personal respondent and declined to add another, noting the corporate respondent accepted full liability for their actions.

The appellant, an inmate, appealed the dismissal of his action for malicious prosecution and Charter damages against a police officer and the Crown.

The appellant had been charged with assault causing bodily harm following a prison fight, but the charge was later withdrawn.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings that the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charge and did not act with malice.

The court also confirmed that mala fides is required to establish a breach of section 7 of the Charter in this context, and that the appellant sued the wrong level of government for his transfer to a maximum-security facility.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation claim following a jury trial.

He argued that the jury's verdict was perverse, that the trial judge erred in law regarding the defences of qualified privilege, responsible communication, and fair comment, and that the jury charge was unbalanced.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the jury's verdict, a sound basis in law for the defences left to the jury, and no unfairness in the jury charge.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded to each set of respondents.

The applicant, a Municipal Standards Officer, alleged racial discrimination after being denied a transfer back to his preferred office location.

He claimed that a less senior employee was transferred instead of him due to discrimination.

The Tribunal found that the transfer of the less senior employee was done in accordance with the collective agreement's temporary-to-permanent conversion process, and there was no evidence of racial discrimination.

Other allegations of discrimination were also dismissed as they were either out of time or lacked any connection to the applicant's race.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board that partially denied her claim for compensation following the shooting death of her son.

The Board had denied her claim for mental or nervous shock and reduced her award for funeral expenses because the victim's behaviour contributed to his death.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Board's application of the legal test for mental or nervous shock or its reduction of funeral expenses under s. 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act.

A motion to admit fresh evidence was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claims against the respondent physicians and hospital arising from her involuntary committal in a psychiatric wing.

The motion judge granted summary judgment solely because the appellant failed to provide an expert opinion establishing a breach of the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant's claims included allegations of failure to follow statutory procedures under the Mental Health Act, which do not necessarily require expert medical opinion to be established.

The appellant was admitted to a hospital as an involuntary patient for a psychiatric assessment and released the following day.

More than two years later, she commenced an action alleging unlawful detention and sought to add the assessing physician as a defendant.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the appellant knew or ought to have known the material facts shortly after her release, and confirmed that limitation periods of general application apply to claims for personal remedies under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The applicant requested to add Frank Nigro as a personal respondent to a human rights application.

The Tribunal found that although he was not named in the initial application form, there was a compelling juridical reason to add him because his individual conduct was the central issue in the allegations of racial discrimination and sexual harassment.

The request to add the personal respondent was granted.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying her claim for nervous shock after witnessing her brother's death.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review for questions of law is correctness.

The Court found that the Board applied the correct standard of proof and properly concluded that there was insufficient medical evidence to establish a recognizable psychiatric or psychosomatic condition.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant brought a motion to stay the execution of two writs of seizure and sale, pending an appeal of an order that refused to schedule her motion for a stay.

The underlying order was based on the appellant's failure to file material challenging her criminal conviction, which formed the basis of the respondent's summary judgment against her.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the appealed order was interlocutory, not final.

The court also noted the appellant's history of alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and her failure to file the necessary materials to support her claims.

The appellant, a Black African-Canadian, was subjected to a strip-search and a 'loo search' by Customs officials upon returning to Canada from Jamaica.

No drugs were found.

He sued the Crown and the Customs officers for damages, alleging racial profiling.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no racial profiling, but held that the senior officer had misunderstood her duties under s. 98(3) of the Customs Act by merely reviewing the subordinate officer's decision rather than forming her own independent belief.

The appellant appealed, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and relying on the s. 98(3) breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no apprehension of bias and holding that the trial judge erred in her interpretation of s. 98(3).

The Court clarified that s. 98(3) requires a review of the initial decision to search, not a de novo investigation by the senior officer.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent bank, which was based on the appellant's criminal conviction for fraud relating to the same transactions.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence alleging ineffective assistance by her civil and criminal counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the motion judge and concluding that the fresh evidence lacked a credible basis.

The court held that allowing the appeal would permit an abuse of process by relitigating the summary judgment, the criminal conviction, and the criminal trial.

The appellant father appealed an order permitting the respondent mother to relocate to Argentina with their child.

The appeal was limited to whether the trial judge erred in refusing to admit documentary evidence regarding the security of persons in Argentina, specifically reports from Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department.

The appeal judge dismissed the appeal, finding the documents were inadmissible hearsay and would not have materially impacted the result.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, noting the trial judge properly focused on the best interests of the child, the mother's reasonable plan, and the stability and support available in Argentina.

The appellants, two black men, appealed the dismissal of their civil actions against the police for alleged misconduct, including racial profiling, assault, and arbitrary detention arising from a traffic stop and subsequent arrest.

They argued the trial judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias, acted unfairly, and made palpable and overriding errors in rejecting their racial profiling claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no apprehension of bias, no procedural unfairness, and no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings that the police conduct was justified by the appellants' dangerous driving and flight, rather than racial profiling.