Sean Hanley

The applicant, a transgender man who had not undergone surgery, challenged the requirement under section 36 of the Vital Statistics Act that requires 'transsexual surgery' to change the sex designation on a birth certificate.

The Tribunal considered whether to defer the application pending its decision in another case (XY v. Ontario) challenging the same provision.

Despite the applicant's objections that his circumstances differed, the Tribunal found that deferral was appropriate as the pending decision would have a significant impact on the resolution of the complex legal issues involved.

The applicant filed a human rights application challenging the requirement under section 36 of the Vital Statistics Act that a transsexual person must undergo transsexual surgery to obtain a change of sex designation on a birth certificate.

The Tribunal noted that a very similar case, XY v. Ontario, was currently being heard and proposed deferring the application.

The applicant opposed deferral and requested the materials from the XY case.

The Tribunal denied the request for materials due to privacy concerns and a partial publication ban in XY, and ordered that the application be deferred pending the conclusion of the XY proceedings to avoid unnecessary duplication.

The defendant, Ontario, sought leave to appeal a decision certifying a class action and refusing to strike the plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff's claim alleged that detaining individuals in jail while awaiting a psychiatric hospital bed under a Criminal Code assessment order violated Charter rights and breached fiduciary duties, relying on the decision in R. v. Hussein.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the certification decision because the motion judge accepted the plaintiff's legal interpretation of Hussein as a pleaded fact, and because individual issues regarding the separate purposes of detention and assessment could overwhelm common issues.

The Crown appealed an order of an Ontario Court of Justice judge who purported to exercise delegated habeas corpus powers to declare the accused's detention in jail unlawful.

The accused had been ordered to undergo a mental health assessment at a hospital but was held in jail due to a lack of beds.

A Superior Court judge had remitted the accused's habeas corpus application to the lower court under s. 775 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that the lower court judge's order was not a judgment issued on the return of a writ of habeas corpus, as s. 775 does not permit the delegation of superior court habeas corpus powers to a lower court.

Consequently, there was no statutory jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 784(5) of the Criminal Code.

The respondent Crown brought a motion to dismiss the human rights complaint at a preliminary stage, arguing that previous Charter jurisprudence established it was plain and obvious the complaint could not succeed.

The complainant, an international medical graduate, alleged systemic discrimination based on place of origin regarding access to funded medical residency positions.

The Tribunal dismissed the Crown's motion, finding that the contextual and purposive analysis under the Human Rights Code might yield a different result than the previous Charter cases, particularly given differences in the alleged grounds and factual context.

The Tribunal also dismissed the complainant's motion for a partial publication ban, as no evidence was provided to justify overriding the open court principle.

The appellants challenged the province's policy of seeking compensation for fire services fees from individuals involved in motor vehicle accidents, arguing it violated section 7 of the Charter by potentially deterring people from calling for essential services.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that there was no evidence to support this assertion.

The Court also affirmed that section 7 does not protect purely economic interests and that the province's process of establishing liability through the courts accords with fundamental justice.

The appellant, who had been found not guilty by reason of insanity, applied for a declaration restricting the interpretation of the victim notification requirements under s. 672.5(13.2) of the Criminal Code and challenging their constitutional validity.

The Ontario Review Board had previously adjourned his hearings to notify potential victims, but eventually granted him an absolute discharge when no victims were found.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal for mootness, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case because the appellant had already been discharged and there was no factual record involving actual victims to properly determine the statutory and constitutional issues.

The applicants sought partial indemnity costs following the dismissal of their application for judicial review regarding the closure of two long-term care institutions.

Although unsuccessful on the main issue of the Minister's statutory power to close the facilities, the applicants achieved partial success on the issue of consent for relocating residents.

The Divisional Court awarded the applicants a portion of their costs, emphasizing the importance of access to justice and the applicants' role in advocating for the fundamental interests of approximately 1,000 severely disabled adults.

The applicants, litigation guardians for severely developmentally delayed adults residing in Schedule I facilities, sought judicial review of the Minister of Community and Social Services' decision to close the remaining institutions.

The applicants argued the Minister lacked statutory authority under the Developmental Services Act to close the facilities.

The Divisional Court held that the Minister's broad discretionary power to establish and maintain facilities included the power to close them.

However, the Court declared that the consent of the incapable residents' substitute decision makers is required before they can be transferred to community placements, invoking the parens patriae jurisdiction to protect their fundamental interests.

The complainants alleged that Ontario discriminated against them on the basis of sex and disability by de-listing sex reassignment surgery as an insured service under OHIP.

The Tribunal found that Gender Identity Disorder is a disability and that the de-listing had a disproportionate adverse impact on three of the complainants who had already begun their transition program at the CAMH Gender Identity Clinic.

The Tribunal ordered Ontario to fund the surgery for these three complainants as an interim remedy, finding that the grandparenting provision in the amending regulation was not a reasonable accommodation.

The applicant, a Justice of the Peace, sought judicial review of an Order in Council removing him from office following a public inquiry.

The inquiry commissioner found that the applicant had engaged in a pattern of misconduct, including denying due process and abusing judicial power in three separate incidents.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the commissioner's findings, concluding that it was reasonable to hold a justice of the peace to the same high standard of conduct as a judge.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard multiple appeals from New Brunswick, Ontario, Alberta, and Quebec regarding the constitutional requirement for independent judicial compensation commissions.

The Court clarified the principles from the Provincial Judges Reference, establishing a three-stage analysis for determining whether a government's response to a commission's recommendations meets the standard of rationality.

The Court upheld the government responses in New Brunswick and Ontario, found the Alberta government's response partially irrational but globally effective, and struck down the Quebec government's response for failing to address the committee's core recommendations.

The plaintiffs in a civil action arising from an assault sought production of police and Crown records relating to the young offenders who committed the assault.

The motion judge ordered production under the Rules of Civil Procedure, and a subsequent judge ordered compliance subject to a vetting process.

The Attorney General appealed, arguing that the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) provides the exclusive mechanism for accessing such records.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that section 118(1) of the YCJA clearly and unambiguously limits access to young offender records to the procedures set out in that Act, precluding the Superior Court from ordering production under Rule 30.10 or its inherent jurisdiction.

The appeal was allowed and the production order set aside.

The Attorney General applied for judicial review of a Consent and Capacity Board decision which held that the Board had jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of the community treatment order (CTO) provisions of the Mental Health Act.

The Divisional Court applied the Martin test and concluded that the Board's mandate involves applying facts to prescribed statutory criteria, not deciding questions of law.

Furthermore, the strict statutory timelines for Board hearings rebut any presumption of jurisdiction to hear complex Charter challenges.

The application for judicial review was allowed and the Board's decision on jurisdiction was quashed.

The Government of Ontario applied for judicial review of the Fifth Triennial Report of the Provincial Judges Remuneration Commission, which recommended a 21% salary increase for provincial judges.

The Ontario Conference of Judges brought a separate application for an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Government to implement the recommendations.

The Divisional Court held that while the Commission's recommendations are subject to judicial review on a standard of patent unreasonableness, the Government's application must be dismissed due to its failure to exhaust internal reconsideration remedies under the Framework Agreement and its excessive delay in bringing the application.

The court granted the Ontario Conference of Judges' application and ordered the Government to implement the recommendations retroactively.

The applicant sought an adjournment of its judicial review application because the respondent government failed to communicate its position until delivering its factum just days before the hearing.

The government also filed its own judicial review application at the last minute without a proper record.

The Divisional Court granted the adjournment and awarded costs to the applicant on a complete indemnity basis, finding the delay was entirely the fault of the government's cavalier approach.

The applicants, corporate retailers and their employees, were convicted of carrying on business on a proscribed holiday contrary to the Retail Business Holidays Act.

They sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal under s. 131 of the Provincial Offences Act, challenging the constitutionality of the Act under ss. 2(a) and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding that the unique history of the legislation and the evolution of equality law left sufficient uncertainty regarding the Act's validity to warrant consideration by a full panel.

The respondent estate brought a wrongful death action and sought a declaration that a proposed contingency fee agreement with its lawyers was not prohibited by the Champerty Act.

The applications judge granted the declaration.

The Attorney General appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that contingency fee agreements are no longer per se champertous at common law, as the historic rationale for absolute prohibition is no longer justified and access to justice concerns favour their use.

However, a specific agreement may still be champertous if the lawyer has an improper motive, which can be assessed by examining the reasonableness and fairness of the fee structure.

Because the proposed fee was based on a percentage of recovery without a cap, it was premature to determine its fairness before the litigation concluded.

The appeal was allowed and the declaration set aside.

The respondent was found incapable of consenting to treatment and appealed the decision.

The motions judge, on her own motion, found that the respondent had a constitutional right under s. 7 of the Charter to publicly-funded counsel and ordered the government to pay his legal fees.

The Attorney General was not given formal notice of the constitutional question before the order was made.

The Attorney General appealed and brought a preliminary motion to declare the order invalid.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, holding that s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act is mandatory and the failure to give notice invalidates the decision.

The moving party, a tobacco company, sought leave to intervene in an appeal concerning whether a proposed contingency fee arrangement between the plaintiff and her counsel violated the Champerty Act.

The moving party also sought to expand the evidentiary record.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party did not have a direct interest in the fee arrangement dispute and that expanding the record would unduly delay the appeal.