Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

B E T W E E N:

Kimberley May

Complainant

-and-

Ontario Human Rights Commission

-and-

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario as represented by the Minister of Health and Long-Term Care

Respondent

A N D B E T W E E N:

Rosalyn Forrester

Complainant

-and-

Ontario Human Rights Commission

-and-

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario as represented by the Minister of Health and Long-Term Care

Respondent

A N D B E T W E E N:

Alexis Van Halen

Complainant

-and-

Ontario Human Rights Commission

-and-

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario as represented by the Minister of Health and Long-Term Care and G. Fisher

Respondents

A N D B E T W E E N:

Halle Pasch (now Rockliffe)

Complainant

-and-

Ontario Human Rights Commission

-and-

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario as represented by the Minister of Health and Long-Term Care

Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: Jennifer Scott

Date: December 5, 2011

Citation: 2011 HRTO 2179

Indexed as: May v. Ontario (Health and Long Term Care)

APPEARANCES

Rosalyn Forrester, Complainant ) Self-Represented

Ontario Human Rights Commission ) Anthony Griffin, Counsel

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario ) Robert Charney, Sean Hanley, as represented by the Minister of ) and Darren Thorne, Counsel Health and Long-Term Care, Respondent )

1This Decision deals with six complaints, referred to the Tribunal by the Ontario Human Rights Commission (the “Commission”) under s. 36 of the old Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 (the “Code”). Two of the six complaints, File Numbers HR-0920-05 and HR-1325-07, were withdrawn or resolved before this decision was issued. I find that a third complaint, File Number HR-0965-05, has been abandoned and dismiss it in this decision. Given the rather complicated manner in which the complaints have proceeded before the Tribunal, the history of all six complaints is referred to in these reasons.

2The issue in this case is whether it is an abuse of process to relitigate, on the basis of essentially the same evidence and legal theory, the delisting of sex reassignment surgery in 1998 as an insured service under the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (“OHIP”) in light of the Tribunal’s Decision in Hogan v. Ontario (Health and Long Term Care), 2006 HRTO 32 (“Hogan”), which dealt with the same issue.

BACKGROUND

(a) The Hogan Decision

3On August 26, 1998, the Cabinet of the Government of Ontario decided to delist sex reassignment surgery (“SRS”) as an insured service under OHIP effective October 1, 1998. Cabinet included a grandparent provision which provided SRS would continue to be an insured service if the individual seeking SRS had completed the Gender Identity Disorder (“GID”) Clinic Program at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (“CAMH”) and had been recommended for surgery by the GDI Clinic (the “Clinic”).

4To be eligible for SRS prior to the delisting, an individual had to complete one year of real life experience in the cross gender role before hormone therapy could be prescribed and two years of real life experience in the role before receiving SRS. These requirements were known as the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care and were followed by the Clinic.

5Four individuals— Michelle Hogan, Martine Stonehouse, A.B. and Andy McDonald— filed complaints with the Ontario Human Rights Commission (the “Commission”) challenging the delisting of SRS. The complaints were referred to the Tribunal by the Commission on December 16, 2002. The complaints were heard by a panel of three Tribunal members over 20 hearing days. On November 9, 2005, the Tribunal issued a decision with partial reasons. On November 28, 2006, the Tribunal issued its full reasons in a 164-page decision. This decision is referred to as the “Hogan” decision in these reasons.

6The majority of the panel (referred to as “the Tribunal”) found the delisting of SRS as an insured benefit did not contravene the Code. The Tribunal held that the grandparent provision contravened the Code because it failed to accommodate individuals who were in the process of transitioning at the time of the delisting. The Tribunal found the 35-day grace period (the time between the legislation and its effective date), which required individuals to complete the program and be recommended for surgery, failed to recognize that it took between two and six years to transition from one gender to another. The Tribunal held the grandparent provision failed to accommodate individuals who were in the process of transitioning at the time of delisting (para. 120).

7The effect of the Tribunal’s decision on the claims of the four complainants in Hogan is summarized below.

8Ms. Hogan was in the process of transitioning at the time of delisting. She had been under a psychiatrist’s care for gender issues therapy from 1997 to 2000 and had begun hormone therapy in June or July 1998. Ms. Hogan was referred to CAMH in 2000. In March 2002, the Clinic recommended her for surgery. Ms. Hogan had SRS in May 2003.

9The Tribunal held that had Ms. Hogan been accommodated, she would have been eligible for SRS because she had commenced the male-to-female transition before the delisting. The Tribunal held the fact that Ms. Hogan was not a formal patient of the Clinic as of October 1, 1998, did not work against her because she had received care from at least one doctor to whom the clinic would recommend patients. The Tribunal stated it was not unusual for the Clinic to refer patients to specialists who were not part of the Clinic’s treating contingent provided the treatment was consistent with the Clinic’s and the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care. Ms. Hogan received the Clinic’s recommendation for surgery on March 18, 2002, after satisfying the Clinic that she had completed the requirements of its program. The Tribunal held Ontario knew or ought to have known that the process towards SRS took from two to six years once the patient began the process. Had Ms. Hogan been accommodated, the six-year time limit to have SRS would have expired in March 2003.

10Ms. Stonehouse made two attempts to transition, the first in 1982 and the second in 1994. She had an official name change in September 1994 and commenced hormone therapy in April 1997. In April 1998 she attended a GID clinic in Montreal and contacted the Clinic in September 1998. She attended an appointment at the Clinic in December 1998 and received a recommendation for surgery on August 3, 1999, after completing the Clinic’s program. The Tribunal held that had Ms. Stonehouse been accommodated, the six-year time limit to have SRS would have expired on June 6, 2000.

11A.B. first visited the Clinic in May 1994. She began electrolysis in the fall of 1995 and attended some of the Clinic’s group meetings. The Clinic refused her request for hormone therapy because it believed she was too fragile. A.B. began hormone therapy on October 12, 1996, under the care of another doctor, not through the Clinic. She began her real life experience on February 11, 1998. On May 20, 2001, she received the Clinic’s recommendation for SRS. The Tribunal held that had A.B. been accommodated, the six-year time limit would have expired on February 11, 2004.

12As a result of the Tribunal’s decision, all three complainants were awarded funding for SRS.

13Mr. McDonald was diagnosed with GID in 1976. At the time of the delisting, he was not a patient of the Clinic, nor had he heard of the Clinic. He was referred to the Clinic in September 2000 and had his first visit on May 14, 2001, when he began the formal real life experience as required by the Clinic’s program. He began hormone therapy on July 23, 2002, and was recommended for SRS by the Clinic on December 2, 2003. The Tribunal denied funding for SRS to Mr. McDonald because he was not a patient of the Clinic and he had not begun the treatment or the transition before the delisting on October 1, 1998.

14The Commission and Mr. McDonald appealed the Tribunal’s decision in two separate appeals.

(b) The Complaints in this Matter

15On February 16, 2005, the Commission referred the complaints of Ms. May, Ms. Wootton and Mr. Thomas to the Tribunal. Two months later, on April 13, 2005, the Commission referred the complaints of Ms. Forrester and Ms. Van Halen to the Tribunal. The complaints were adjourned, on the consent of the parties, because of the significant overlap in issues between these matters and the matters that were then before the Tribunal in Hogan.

16As stated above, the Tribunal’s decision in Hogan was released in November 2005, with full reasons in November 2006, and was subsequently appealed.

17By letter dated March 1, 2007, the Commission proposed that the complaints be combined before the Tribunal because they dealt with a common threshold issue, namely, whether the government’s decision to delist sex reassignment surgery was discriminatory. The Commission indicated that a sixth complaint (Pasch) concerning the delisting of SRS had been recently referred to the Tribunal. The Commission proposed that it be combined with the other complaints. The Commission suggested that all of the complaints be adjourned until the resolution of the Hogan appeal before the Divisional Court. In its letter, the Commission stated:

Since these five matters involve the same or similar questions of fact and law, the Commission proposes that they be combined before the Tribunal. This would not only be more administratively efficient, but would also eliminate the undesirable possibility that multiple separate proceedings in the future would result in inconsistent rulings on common issues.

18By letter dated March 2, 2007, the Respondent agreed to the Commission’s proposal that the complaints be combined together for hearing and adjourned pending the resolution of the Hogan appeal.

19On March 9, 2007, the Tribunal wrote to Ms. May, Ms. Wootton, Mr. Thomas, Ms. Forrester, Ms. Van Halen and Ms. Pasch (now Rockcliffe) and asked them to advise the Tribunal if they objected to the Commission’s proposal to join and adjourn their complaints pending the outcome of the Hogan appeal. None of the complainants objected to the Commission’s proposal.

20By Registrar’s letter dated March 21, 2007, the parties were advised that the complaints would be combined and heard together by the same panel of the Tribunal. The complaints were then adjourned pending the outcome of the appeal in Hogan.

21Ms. Roads’ complaint challenging the delisting of SRS was filed in April 2007. It was joined with the other complaints.

22The government re-listed sex reassignment surgery effective June 3, 2008.

23On March 16, 2009, the Hogan appeal was abandoned.

24Mr. Thomas’ complaint was subsequently resolved and as a result, he is not named as a party in this decision.

25A Pre-Hearing Conference Call was held on July 5, 2010. The Commission agreed to provide a summary of the complainants’ allegations of discrimination and their witness statements. The parties were advised the Tribunal would hear the complainants’ evidence first and would then hear submissions regarding the next stage of the hearing with further directions to be issued by the Tribunal.

(c) Commencement of the Hearing

26In January 2011, the hearing into these complaints commenced. The Tribunal heard the evidence of Ms. May, Ms. Rockcliffe, Ms. Roads and Ms. Forrester. Ms. Van Halen had not responded to communications from the Commission or the Tribunal. Ms. Wootton’s evidence was to be scheduled at a later date.

27The Tribunal heard evidence regarding the witnesses’ transition to and receipt of SRS, which they had received at their own expense. This evidence is summarized below.

28Ms. Rockcliffe was diagnosed with gender dysphoria in 2000. Between October and December 2000, she began hormone therapy. In March 2002, she started her real life experience and changed her name in January 2003. In August 2004, she received a letter from an endocrinologist recommending SRS and in August 2005, she received a letter from a psychiatrist recommending SRS. She obtained SRS on October 4, 2005, in Montreal.

29Ms. May began taking hormones in early 1999 and was referred to CAMH in late 1999. On August 26, 2002, she was diagnosed with gender identity disorder at CAMH. In January 2003, she started living full time in the female gender role. On September 30, 2003, she received a recommendation for SRS from a psychiatrist and had SRS in Thailand on October 31, 2003.

30Ms. Roads was referred to the Clarke (now CAMH) in March 1997. The diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder was confirmed in September 1997. Ms. Roads started hormone therapy on September 3, 1998, and changed her name in March 1999. On May 22, 1999, Ms. Roads was full time in the cross gender role. She was recommended for SRS in January 2000 by a psychologist and received a further recommendation for SRS by a psychiatrist in May 2000. Ms. Roads had SRS in Oregon in January 2002.

31Ms. Forrester began hormone therapy in 1997. In October/November 1998, she went to CAMH. In December 1998, she met the criteria for GID. CAMH did not recommend hormone therapy. At the end of 1998, Ms. Forrester started living in the cross gender role. In February 2002, Mr. Forrester received a recommendation for SRS from her family physician. In January 2006, Ms. Forrester received a second recommendation for SRS. Ms. Forrester had SRS in Thailand in March 2006.

(d) Continuation of the Hearing

32A conference call was held on March 8, 2011, to discuss the next steps in the proceeding. The Commission advised that it wanted to file transcripts and rely on some of the evidence in Hogan. Specifically, the Commission requested that the evidence of Dr. Dickey, Maxine Petersen, Susan Fitzpatrick, Mary Catherine Lindberg and Dr. Fedoroff be filed with the Tribunal. Counsel for the Respondent objected to the filing of the transcript evidence in Hogan.

33On March 11, 2011, the Respondent provided written submissions for its objection. It opposed the filing of the transcripts on the basis that it would allow the re-litigation of Hogan and as such, was an abuse of process and constituted improper forum shopping. The Respondent believed the Commission was asking the Tribunal to reverse its decision in Hogan on the basis of the same expert evidence considered in that case.

34On March 30, 2011, the Tribunal issued a Case Assessment Direction requiring the parties to provide detailed pleadings outlining their legal positions in this case, including the impact of the Hogan decision. The complainants were asked to provide submissions if their positions differed from the Commission. The complainants were further advised that if they failed to file submissions, they would be assumed to be taking the same position as the Commission.

35The Commission complied with the Tribunal’s direction on May 2, 2011. The Commission took the position that the delisting of SRS in 1998 was a violation of the Code and submitted its legal argument in support. The argument was the same argument put forward by the Commission in Hogan. The Commission argued the Tribunal was not bound to follow the majority decision in Hogan. The Commission asked the Tribunal to accept transcripts of the evidence in Hogan. If required to call evidence, the Commission indicated it would call Dr. Dickey and Maxine Petersen to give evidence and provided a statement for Dr. Dickey and a report for Ms. Peterson. The information provided for these witnesses is the same information provided in Hogan.

36The Respondent provided its submissions on May 31, 2011, which included its legal argument as to why the delisting in 1998 was not discriminatory. It also submitted a Request to Dismiss the complaints on three bases: abuse of process, subsection 45.1 of the Code and to avoid inconsistency in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence.

37The Tribunal released an Interim Decision on July 1, 2011 (2011 HRTO 1317). The Tribunal denied the Commission’s request to file the transcripts in Hogan and indicated a hearing date would be set to hear the Respondent’s Request to Dismiss the complaints. The Tribunal requested written submissions regarding the Request and included a list of specific questions for the parties to answer in their submissions.

38Ms. Wootton withdrew her complaint to the Tribunal on September 19, 2011.

39Ms. Roads’ complaint was resolved by way of Minutes of Settlement. An order disposing of her complaint in accordance with the terms of the settlement was issued on October 27, 2011.

40Ms. Van Halen has not responded to the Commission’s communications and has not participated in any of the Tribunal’s proceedings, notwithstanding that she has received notice throughout. As a result, Ms. Van Halen’s complaint is deemed abandoned.

REQUEST TO DISMISS

(a) Abuse of Process

41The Request to Dismiss was heard on October 18, 2011. There are three remaining complaints subject to the Request.

42The Commission’s case before the Tribunal is based on two main arguments. One, it argues the delisting of SRS in October 1998 was discriminatory. It relies on the same evidence and legal theory that was relied upon in Hogan to make this argument. It asserts the Tribunal is not bound by the decision in Hogan and may come to a different decision. Two, it argues the Tribunal erred when it allowed the grandparent provision to stand once the Tribunal found the government failed to accommodate the complainants in Hogan. The Commission asserts it should have been struck down.

43The Respondent argues the Commission is attempting to relitigate Hogan and it is an abuse of the Tribunal’s processes to do so. It relies on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, a case involving an employee convicted of sexual assault and subsequently terminated by his employer. The employee grieved the termination and gave evidence at the arbitration hearing that the assault had not occurred. The arbitrator held the presumption raised by the criminal conviction had been rebutted and that the employee had been dismissed without cause. The Supreme Court of Canada held the employee (union) was not entitled to relitigate the finding in the criminal proceeding that the sexual assault had occurred. It relied on the abuse of process doctrine to prevent the relitigation of that issue.

44The Commission argues C.U.P.E. should be interpreted restrictively as it addresses the narrow question of whether or not a person convicted of sexual assault and dismissed from his employment can be reinstated by a labour arbitrator who concludes on the evidence before him the sexual assault did not take place. I disagree with the Commission’s narrow reading of this decision.

45While there is no question the Court’s discussion of the abuse of process doctrine was in the context of the case before it, there is no indication in the decision that the doctrine is limited to the circumstances of that case. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the doctrine itself, which is described by the Court as a flexible tool to prevent misuse of the adjudicative process to the extent that it brings the administration of justice into disrepute. The Court at paragraph 37 of its decision states:

.... Canadian courts have applied the doctrine of abuse of process to preclude relitigation in circumstances where the strict requirements of issue estoppel (typically the privity/mutuality requirements) are not met, but where allowing the litigation to proceed would nonetheless violate such principles as judicial economy, consistency, finality and the integrity of the administration of justice.

46In C.U.P.E. the Court is clear that the desire to challenge a prior finding is not in and of itself improper. That desire, however, must be pursued through proper channels. In this case, the Tribunal’s decision in Hogan was challenged by way of two separate appeals by the Commission and Mr. McDonald to the Divisional Court. Those appeals were abandoned when SRS was relisted in 2008.

47The Respondent’s argument in its Request to Dismiss is best encapsulated in the following paragraph in its written submissions:

For the Commission to have orchestrated the combination and adjournment of the Complainants’ suits, ostensibly to avoid a series of inconsistent decisions, to then abandon its appeal in Hogan, only to now seek to litigate the conclusions drawn from the expert evidence in Hogan before a differently composed Tribunal panel, in the hopes of obtaining a contrary decision, represents a patent abuse of process.

48As is evident by the above excerpt, the Respondent’s argument focuses on the conduct of the Commission. This is not surprising given the Commission has carriage of the complaints as they were filed under the old Code. The Commission was a party in Hogan and is a party to the complaints before me. The issue I have to address is whether it is an abuse of process to hear the complaints before me when the complainants were not parties in Hogan. To answer this question I must review the chronology of their complaints.

49The complaints of Ms. May and Ms. Forrester were filed before the Tribunal released its decision in Hogan. Ms. Rockcliffe’s complaint was filed when Hogan was under appeal. The complaints were then joined because they involved the same issue: the delisting of SRS in 1998. The rationale given by the Commission for combining the complaints was to eliminate multiple proceedings and avoid inconsistent rulings. The complaints were held in abeyance pending the outcome of Hogan appeal. The complainants did not object to proceeding in this way.

50It is clear from the chronology that the complainants understood the Hogan decision, including the appeal, applied to their complaints. If the appeal had proceeded and the Tribunal’s decision was overturned, they would have argued the appeal decision was binding on their complaints.

51The fact that the complainants were not parties in Hogan does not prevent the application of the abuse of process doctrine. The abuse of process doctrine is a flexible tool that is used to protect the fairness and integrity of the administration of justice by respecting the finality of proceedings. It does not require the parties to be the same in both proceedings. In that way, it is different from the doctrine of issue estoppel. It does, however, require that both proceedings deal with the same legal issue. In this case, the issue before me and before the Tribunal in Hogan is the same.

52In C.U.P.E. there was an attempt to relitigate a criminal finding in an administrative proceeding. This case involves relitigating the identical human rights issue before the same administrative body. Essentially, the Commission and the complainants are asking the Tribunal to act as an appellate body over an earlier decision of the Tribunal even though the appeal of that decision was abandoned. As the court noted in C.U.P.E., the justice system is not harmed when decisions are challenged through the appropriate forums. It is harmed when those appropriate routes are circumvented (at para. 46).

53I find it is an abuse of the Tribunal’s process to relitigate the delisting of SRS in 1998. The complainants agreed to put their complaints on hold pending the appeal of Hogan presumably because they understood they would be bound by the appeal decision. When the appeal was abandoned, they agreed to the Commission’s theory of the case and method of advancing it in the complaints before me. They are in effect in the same position as the Commission. They are attempting to reargue the same case on the same evidence and legal theory as that advanced in Hogan. The only difference is a different Tribunal panel. In effect, the Commission and the complainants are asking me to stand in the stead of the Divisional Court because the appeals were abandoned. To permit this would bring the Tribunal’s adjudicative processes into disrepute as it is contrary to all of the principles underlying the application of the abuse of process doctrine: judicial economy, consistency, finality and the integrity of the administration of justice.

54For these reasons, the complaints concerning the delisting of SRS in 1998 are dismissed because it would be an abuse of the Tribunal’s processes to hear them. I will now determine whether there are additional allegations of discrimination in the complaints before me.

(b) Additional Allegations of Discrimination

55During the hearing, the complainants gave evidence about additional services they obtained during the transitioning process and their associated costs. Such services included electrolysis, voice surgery, facial feminization surgery, hair transplants, rhinoplasty and breast augmentation surgery. Not all of these services were received by all of the complainants. Some of the complainants alleged the failure to fund these additional services contravenes the Code. They also asserted it was discriminatory to restrict approval for SRS to CAMH, a program available only in Toronto.

56There are no allegations in the complaints that the failure to fund additional services contravenes the Code. Similarly, there are no allegations relating to the administration of the program at CAMH. While some of the complaints do contain information about additional services, the services are described as part of the transitioning process during the real life experience leading to SRS. They are not relied upon as separate services entitled to funding. The essence of the complaints is SRS and the only allegation of discrimination is the delisting of that service in 1998.

57Even if the additional allegations had been set out in the complaints, they are not stand-alone complaints as they are inextricably linked to SRS. For example, the complaint about the administration of the SRS service at CAMH depends on the service being in existence. Similarly, the complaint about additional services relies upon SRS. The complainants argue that services in addition to SRS are required to fully transition. They do not argue that further services independent of SRS are required to transition. I find the additional complaints are tied to SRS and cannot be heard in isolation. If the delisting of SRS cannot be heard for the reasons stated, neither can the additional claims that depend upon that service.

58The complaints of Ms. Rockcliffe, Ms. May and Ms. Forrester will not be heard for the reasons stated. In light of this decision, it is not necessary to consider the Respondent’s arguments under section 45.1 of the Code and the additional case law that was sent to the Tribunal after the oral hearing on the Request to Dismiss.

APPLICATION OF HOGAN

59In light of my finding that it would be an abuse of process to relitigate the issue in Hogan, a question remains as to whether any of the three remaining complainants are entitled to accommodation for the reasons identified in Hogan.

60The Commission and the Respondent take the position that none of the three complainants are entitled to be accommodated because they were not patients of the Clinic and had not begun treatment or transitioning before the delisting of SRS on October 1, 1998.

61While this is true for Ms. May and Ms. Rockcliffe, both of whom began transitioning after the delisting, it does not appear to be accurate with respect to Ms. Forrester. Ms. Forrester began hormone therapy in 1997. In October/November 1998, she went to CAMH, the date of which is unclear on the evidence before me. Thus her circumstances may be similar to Ms. Hogan, who commenced hormone therapy in June 1998 and was referred to CAMH in 2000. While I recognize Ms. Forrester did not receive a recommendation for surgery from CAMH, the fact that the benefit was delisted may have been the reason why.

62As the Tribunal acknowledged in Hogan (at para. 18 of the November 9, 2005 decision), individuals went to CAMH prior to the delisting because they knew it was the only clinic in Ontario that had an arrangement with OHIP to consider SRS as an insured service. The question which remains is whether Ms. Forrester can seek accommodation given that she did not continue with CAMH after SRS was no longer an insured service.

63The Tribunal will receive written submissions from the Commission, Ms. Forrester and the Respondent as to whether Ms. Forrester is entitled to be accommodated consistent with the approach taken in Hogan.

64The Tribunal agrees Ms. May and Ms. Rockcliffe are in the same shoes as Mr. McDonald. They began their transition after the benefit was delisted. As such, they are not entitled to accommodation based on the analysis in Hogan: they were not patients of the Clinic and they had not begun the treatment or transition before the delisting.

CONCLUSION

65It is difficult to leave this decision without commenting on one issue. The ability of the complainants in this matter to receive funding was dependent on the timing of the different funding decisions and their own personal journeys. The SRS benefit was delisted in 1998 and relisted in 2008. If the complainants had begun their transitions before the delisting, they would have been entitled to SRS funding provided the surgery was obtained within six years of the commencement of their transition. The time to transition was extended significantly under the Hogan decision. For example, A.B.’s period of transition was extended until 2004, six years after the benefit was delisted and two years before it was relisted. Ms. May and Ms. Rockcliffe are not entitled to funding because they commenced their transition too late in terms of the delisting or too early in terms of the relisting. While the timing of the funding decisions is not discriminatory under Hogan, it is heartbreaking to these women who have been denied funding because their personal journeys were out of sync with the funding decisions that were made.

ORDER

66The complaints of Ms. May and Ms. Rockcliffe are dismissed. The complaint of Ms. Van Halen is dismissed as abandoned. The Tribunal will receive written submissions as to whether Ms. Forrester is entitled to the accommodation set out in Hogan. The submissions of Ms. Forrester and the Commission are due 20 days from the date of this decision. The submissions of the Respondent are due 30 days from the date of this decision.