John A. Scollin

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine after selling drugs to an undercover police officer.

The transactions were instigated by a police informer who repeatedly requested drugs from the appellant over several months.

The appellant argued the defence of entrapment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

The majority held that, assuming the defence of entrapment is available under Canadian law, it did not arise on the facts of this case, as the evidence amounted to no more than persistent solicitation.

A strong dissent would have recognized the defence of entrapment and stayed the proceedings, finding the police conduct to be a calculated scheme of ensnarement.

The Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Confidentiality of Health Records in Ontario sought to compel RCMP officers to disclose the identities of physicians and hospital employees who had provided patients' medical information to the police without authorization.

The officers claimed police-informer privilege.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police-informer privilege is a rule of law that applies generally, including in civil proceedings and public inquiries, to protect the identity of those who furnish information to the police in the course of their duties.

The privilege belongs to the Crown and is not defeated by the fact that the informants may have breached a duty of confidentiality in providing the information.

The appeal was allowed and the officers were not required to disclose the identities.

The appellants were acquitted at trial of unlawfully importing heroin.

The trial judge found a reasonable doubt regarding the nature of the substance because the analyst had compared the suspect substance's graph to a standard graph of unknown preparation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, assuming the standard graph was prepared in Ottawa.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appellants' appeal and restored the acquittals.

The Court held that the trial judge's factual determination regarding the analyst's procedure could not be overturned on a Crown appeal limited to questions of law.

Furthermore, the analyst's reliance on an unverified standard graph constituted 'evidence to the contrary' under s. 9 of the Narcotic Control Act, which was capable of rebutting the presumption created by the certificate of analysis.

These consolidated reference appeals concerned whether the federal Houses could unilaterally seek patriation of the Constitution with an amending formula and entrenched rights guarantees that would affect provincial powers.

The Court held that, as a matter of law, the federal Houses had authority to pass the Resolution and provincial consent was not legally required.

However, a majority also held that a constitutional convention required a substantial degree of provincial consent before requesting the Parliament of the United Kingdom to enact amendments affecting federal-provincial relationships.

The appeals therefore produced the Patriation Reference's central dual holding: legal authority existed, but unilateral action would breach constitutional convention.

The respondent corporation was charged with an offence under the Canada Grain Act.

At trial, the Crown attempted to call the manager of the respondent's elevator as a witness.

The trial judge ruled the manager was not compellable, equating his testimony to compelling the corporation itself, and acquitted the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that an employee or officer of a corporation, even if considered its 'directing mind and will', is a compellable witness for the prosecution.

The privilege against self-incrimination applies to the accused corporation, not to its individual employees testifying at trial.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in a restricted drug after the substance was added to Schedule H of the Food and Drugs Act via a regulation published in the Canada Gazette.

The appellant argued that he was unaware of the regulation and had exercised due diligence in attempting to ascertain the law.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that section 19 of the Criminal Code is an absolute bar to a defence of ignorance of the law, including subordinate legislation.

The Court further clarified that the defence of due diligence applies only to the fulfilment of a duty imposed by law, not to the ascertainment of the law's existence.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to effect an unlawful purpose under s. 423(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, specifically to prevent members of a union from participating in lawful union activities under s. 110(1) of the Canada Labour Code.

The Provincial Court quashed the information, but the Supreme Court of Ontario and the Court of Appeal ordered the matter to proceed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that 'unlawful purpose' in s. 423(2)(a) means contrary to law (prohibited by federal or provincial legislation).

Since preventing participation in union activities is not explicitly prohibited by legislation, the information did not disclose an offence known to law.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in a restricted drug, arguing that ignorance of subordinate legislation could serve as an excuse or a defence of due diligence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, relying on the reasons provided in the concurrent appeal of the appellant's accomplice, Molis v. The Queen.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Commission.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Federal Court of Appeal's decision.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in a restricted drug, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of intercepted private communications.

The appellant contended there was no evidence upon which the authorizing judge could have granted the wiretap authorization.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed this ground of appeal, holding that even if such an authorization is reviewable by a trial judge, the Court would not interfere with the concurrent findings that there was some evidence to support the authorization.