Lucy Anne Cecchetto

The appellant appealed his convictions for second-degree murder and firearms offences, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on post-offence conduct, the mental elements for murder and manslaughter, and failed to accurately summarize defence evidence or leave the defence of accident.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant or his neighbour fired the fatal shots.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions.

The court held that the post-offence conduct evidence did not require a special warning, the summary of evidence was fair, and there was no air of reality to the defence of accident.

The appellants, two brothers, appealed their convictions for second degree murder following the stabbing death of the victim during an altercation in an apartment.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding self-defence, provocation, intent, causation, and in responding to jury questions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or responses to the jury, and concluding there was no air of reality to the defences of provocation or self-defence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge made several errors in her jury instructions.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant killed the victim during a sexual assault, relying on forensic evidence and the appellant's post-offence conduct.

The defence argued the sexual intercourse was consensual and pointed to an alternate suspect.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to properly set out the defence's position and the evidence supporting it.

Furthermore, the trial judge's instructions on the appellant's post-offence conduct and fabricated statements were flawed, and she failed to instruct the jury on how to use the alternate suspect's post-offence conduct.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of abducting her child in contravention of a custody order.

She appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to leave the defence of necessity to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the defence because the appellant had other reasonable legal alternatives, such as participating in the family court proceedings to address her concerns about the child's safety, rather than abandoning the process and abducting the child.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding no air of reality to support a finding of manslaughter and in her ruling regarding choice of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge's analysis and conclusions on both grounds.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding his committal to stand trial on a charge of manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the reviewing judge's conclusion that a reasonable jury could find the appellant formed a common intention with a group to assault and intimidate rival gang members, and knew or should have known that bodily harm was likely to result.

The appeal was dismissed.

On a ministerial reference concerning a 1972 murder conviction, the court considered whether previously undisclosed police information about a potentially exculpatory alibi and witness statements, and new expert reports about false confessions, were admissible as fresh evidence.

The majority held that the alibi-related material and related witness information were admissible under the Palmer framework because they could reasonably have affected the verdict, although the Crown's non-disclosure did not render the 1972 trial unfair under the disclosure standards then prevailing.

The majority rejected the recent expert reports as not truly fresh, finding that their substance had already been before the jury through trial experts.

Treating the matter as an appeal, the majority quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial; one judge dissented on the first question and would have refused admission of the fresh evidence.

The Crown appealed from an order granting a new trial following an aggravated assault conviction arising from a gang attack.

The Supreme Court agreed that the jury charge on the defence theory was inadequate and that a new trial was required.

On the fresh evidence issue, the majority held that issue estoppel remains part of Canadian criminal law but is confined to preventing the Crown from relitigating issues previously determined in the accused’s favour, including findings grounded in reasonable doubt.

The Court rejected the contention that a later acquittal on an obstruction charge retrospectively rendered post-offence phone call evidence inadmissible in the earlier trial.

The accused, a young person, was involved in a gun battle on a crowded street during which an innocent bystander was killed by a bullet fired by a rival shooter.

The preliminary inquiry judge committed the accused for trial on second degree murder.

The motion judge quashed the committal for murder but remitted the matter for manslaughter.

Both the Crown and the accused appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the accused's participation in a mutual shootout caused the victim's death.

The Court also held that the accused could be committed for second degree murder under s. 229(c) of the Criminal Code, as he engaged in a dangerous act for an unlawful object that he knew was likely to cause death.

The Crown's appeal was allowed and the committal for second degree murder was restored.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sexual assault.

He appealed the convictions on the grounds that his statement to the police was obtained in violation of his Charter rights and that the trial judge made several errors in his charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant was not detained at the time of his police interview, as he voluntarily cooperated and was not a suspect.

The Court also held that while the trial judge should have given a fabrication instruction regarding the appellant's false statement, the omission did not affect the verdict given the compelling circumstantial evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of various offences, including murder and criminal negligence causing death, relating to the death of their infant son.

The convictions were largely based on the expert testimony of a Crown witness.

Following the dismissal of their appeals by the Court of Appeal, fresh expert evidence became available that discredited the Crown's expert.

The Supreme Court of Canada admitted the fresh evidence and ordered a new trial on all counts, finding that the unreliable expert evidence was central to the Crown's case and could have affected the jury's verdicts on both the homicide and non-homicide charges.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, forcible confinement, and use of an imitation firearm arising from a home invasion.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing identification evidence and Vetrovec concerns regarding a co-accused's testimony.

He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging his trial lawyer prevented him from testifying in his own defence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no errors and the appellant failed to establish his ineffective assistance claim on a balance of probabilities.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial based on the ineffective assistance claim.

The appellant was convicted of armed robbery after acting as the getaway driver.

At trial, he relied on an alibi that was disclosed to the Crown only days before trial.

The trial judge drew an adverse inference against the alibi due to the late disclosure, which hampered police investigation, and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his treatment of the alibi and in assessing credibility based on a co-accused's lack of motive to falsely implicate him.

He also appealed his six-year sentence, citing disparity with the co-accused's four-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's treatment of the alibi or credibility assessment.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the disparity was justified by the co-accused's guilty plea and cooperation with police.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application to quash his committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder.

He argued there was no evidence of the mens rea for first-degree murder adduced at the preliminary inquiry and that he should have been committed for manslaughter only.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was some evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could return a verdict of guilty for first-degree murder, including evidence that the appellant continued to drive the taxicab while the victim was forcibly confined and assaulted, and later made statements implicating himself in the killing.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault against his stepson.

He argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the burden of proof and that his acquittal on one charge was inconsistent with the guilty verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury was properly instructed in accordance with W.(D). and Lifchus, and that there was a rational basis to reconcile the verdicts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and failure to comply with a probation order, as well as his sentence of seventeen months' imprisonment.

The appeal raised multiple issues, including the trial judge's decision to identify jurors by number, the admission of evidence regarding gang rivalry, the adequacy of the Vetrovec warning for an unsavoury witness, and the jury instructions on reasonable doubt and the theory of the defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions, and concluding that the verdict was reasonable and the sentence was fit.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for gross indecency and sexual touching involving his stepson, seeking to strike his guilty pleas.

He argued that his trial counsel was incompetent for failing to identify a s. 10(b) Charter breach and for pressuring him to plead guilty, and that his pleas were involuntary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel's conduct did not fall below the reasonableness standard and that no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The court also upheld the global sentence of 21 months' imprisonment and three years' probation as fit.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their certiorari application regarding the validity of search warrants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in denying standing to one appellant and in dealing with the other appellant's application prematurely.

The Court held that the proper forum to determine the issues was the Provincial Court under sections 111 and 117 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and indeterminate sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider the long-term offender provisions of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the error but argued the curative proviso should apply.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that based on R. v. Johnson, it is only in the rarest of circumstances that a failure to consider long-term offender provisions would not affect the outcome.

A new sentencing hearing was directed.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of criminal negligence causing death and one count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm after driving impaired the wrong way on a 400-series highway.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment and forcing him to proceed unrepresented after his counsel was removed from the record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant was manipulating the system to delay the trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the nine-year imprisonment term due to the severe aggravating factors.