Lucy Anne Cecchetto

The appellants were jointly tried and convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder.

On appeal, the first appellant argued that his trial was rendered unfair because the trial judge permitted the co-accused's counsel to adduce highly prejudicial evidence of his violent disposition and bad character, ostensibly to support the co-accused's defence that he lied to police out of fear.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the propensity evidence lacked sufficient probative value to justify its severe prejudicial effect on the right to a fair trial.

The first appellant's appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The co-accused's appeal from conviction was dismissed, but his sentence for attempted murder was varied to correct an illegal period of parole ineligibility.

The applicant, convicted of murder and assault in the death of his infant son, brought an application seeking production of Crown materials regarding the competency and objectivity of the Crown's paediatric pathology expert, Dr. Smith, in other criminal cases.

The applicant intended to use this material to adduce fresh evidence on his pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Crown's disclosure obligations continue post-conviction, the applicant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the requested material could assist in the appeal and be received as fresh evidence.

The application was dismissed because the applicant offered no evidence to doubt the specific medical opinions given by the expert in this case, meaning evidence of the expert's conduct in other cases could not reasonably be expected to affect the verdict.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and theft, arguing for the first time on appeal that the Crown prosecutor was in a conflict of interest for having previously represented him on an assault charge.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence but found no actual conflict of interest or prejudice, as the matters were independent and no relevant confidential information was used.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the custodial sentence due to the seriousness of the frauds committed against a charitable institution.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault and indecent assault involving young boys over a 12-year period.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of 7 years, considering the serious breach of trust, the appellant's prior convictions for similar offences, and victim impact statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the sentence was within the appropriate range and revealing no basis to interfere.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a stabbing incident.

At trial, the Crown introduced statements made by the appellant to third parties, which contained both inculpatory and exculpatory elements.

The trial judge instructed the jury that only the inculpatory portions of these statements could be used for the truth of their contents.

On appeal, the Crown conceded this was an error, as exculpatory portions of statements introduced by the Crown become evidence for the accused.

The Court of Appeal found the error was highly prejudicial, as it deprived the appellant of the combined defences of self-defence and accident, and declined to apply the curative proviso.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed their sentences of 18 and 16 years imprisonment for a violent 11.5-hour carjacking, kidnapping, and robbery.

The Court of Appeal upheld the severity of the sentences and the parole ineligibility orders, finding the offences to be among the worst group of offences committed by the worst group of offenders.

However, the Court reduced each global sentence by two years to account for pre-trial custody that the trial judge had intended to credit but failed to deduct.

The Court also restructured the sentences for one appellant to correct an error regarding the mandatory minimum for robbery with a firearm.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the Crown's improper cross-examination rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the Crown's cross-examination was sarcastic, personally abusive, and improperly exploited bad character evidence.

The Crown also improperly required the appellant to comment on the veracity of other witnesses and mocked his religious beliefs.

Given the highly prejudicial nature of the cross-examination, the curative proviso could not be applied, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder after the victim was brutally beaten and robbed in an underground parking garage.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred by excluding out-of-court statements from a deceased third party who had confessed to the murder, by misdirecting the jury on reasonable doubt, and by misdirecting the jury on the elements of first-degree murder based on unlawful confinement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the third party's hearsay statements lacked threshold reliability, the reasonable doubt instruction was adequate, and unlawful confinement in the course of a robbery can provide the basis for first-degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was convicted of defrauding an 82-year-old woman of over $1 million USD through a telemarketing scheme and was sentenced to 5 years and 3 months in prison.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment to retain new counsel, misapplying the burden of proof, and allowing cross-examination on a pre-trial Charter affidavit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no miscarriage of justice or unfair trial.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to 4 years imprisonment due to the appellant's lack of a prior record and partial restitution.

The Crown's cross-appeal seeking a fine or restitution was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second degree murder arising from a circumstantial case that they killed the deceased in order to steal and export his newly purchased vehicle.

The Court of Appeal rejected challenges to jury selection, exclusion of alleged third-party suspect evidence, and numerous aspects of the jury charge, including instructions on separate liability, recent possession, reasonable doubt, circumstantial evidence, manslaughter, and post-offence conduct.

The court also held that the co-accused's cut-throat closing address did not warrant severance or a mistrial, and that any improper advocacy was adequately corrected by the trial judge.

The convictions were upheld and the Crown's contingent cross-appeal was not addressed.

The appellant appealed a murder conviction and sentence, advancing grounds including unreasonable verdict, the availability of second degree murder, alleged errors in the trial judge's answers to jury questions, the explanation of the consequences of a not criminally responsible verdict, and sentence.

The court held there was evidence on which the jury could reject the defence of not criminally responsible and find the requisite intent for murder.

It further held that the trial judge properly instructed the jury and appropriately answered the jury's questions, and that the explanation of the consequences of a not criminally responsible verdict accorded with the authorities.

The request for a constitutional exemption from the minimum life sentence without parole eligibility for ten years was rejected.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The respondent was convicted of first degree murder of a 19-month-old child.

At trial, the Crown introduced testimony from two jailhouse informants who claimed the respondent confessed to the killing.

The trial judge did not give a Vetrovec warning to the jury regarding the unreliability of these informants.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction.

A majority of the Court found that either the trial judge did not err in exercising his discretion not to give the warning, or that the error was cured by the overwhelming independent evidence against the respondent.

The appellant challenged a jury conviction on the basis that the trial judge inadequately charged the jury on provocation and erred in the self-defence instruction under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code.

The court held the charge, read as a whole, fully reviewed the evidence and sufficiently conveyed that the jury had to assess the appellant's circumstances in light of the matrimonial dispute.

The court further held that the trial judge properly focused the jury on the central factual dispute concerning who first introduced the hammer into the altercation.

No misdirection was established and the appeal was dismissed.

The accused was convicted of three counts of sexual assault and declared a dangerous offender, receiving an indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal overturned the designation, finding the trial judge failed to consider the gravity of the predicate offences in isolation.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that under s. 753(b) of the Criminal Code, a trial judge need not focus on the objective seriousness of a predicate offence to justify a dangerous offender designation, provided the offender's past conduct demonstrates a present likelihood of inflicting future harm.

The trial judge's findings were reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence.

The appellant and a companion forcibly confined and sexually assaulted a young woman.

While the companion strangled the victim, the appellant held her legs to prevent her from struggling.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder under s. 214(5) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the phrase 'caused the death' in s. 214(5) requires the accused's actions to be a substantial and integral cause of the death.

The Court found that the appellant's act of holding the victim's legs was a substantial cause of her death, as she likely would have resisted the strangulation otherwise.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for indecent assault to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right, based on a dissent in the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court quashed the appeal, finding that the dissent in the Court of Appeal was not on a question of law, and therefore the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

The respondent broke into an apartment building with a loaded sawed-off shotgun to confront his estranged wife.

During a struggle with the man his wife was living with, the gun discharged.

The respondent was convicted of attempted murder based on constructive murder provisions.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the mens rea for attempted murder is the specific intent to kill, overruling its previous decision in Lajoie.