Kaitlyn Nicole Beard

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of sexual interference contrary to section 151(b) of the Criminal Code for kissing and groping the breast area of his teenage stepdaughter.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day followed by three years of probation, along with a ten-year section 161 order, a ten-year SOIRA order, GPS monitoring, and a DNA order.

The sentencing balanced denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives with rehabilitation and restraint principles, recognizing exceptional circumstances that justified a conditional sentence despite the serious nature of the offence.

The Ontario Court of Justice considered a pretrial application under section 486.3(3) of the Criminal Code to appoint counsel to conduct the cross-examination of certain adult witnesses who expressed fear of the self-represented accused, Stephen Doherty.

The accused faced multiple charges arising from two incidents.

The court found that the Crown met the onus on a balance of probabilities that appointing counsel would allow the witnesses to give a full and candid account and be in the interest of the proper administration of justice.

The court provided detailed directions on the selection of counsel, the role and limits of appointed counsel, and the accused’s involvement in instructing counsel.

The decision emphasizes balancing the accused’s fair trial rights with the protection of vulnerable witnesses and efficient court administration.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondent for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The application judge had included a six-month period during which the respondent pursued a good faith application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal in the delay calculation.

The Superior Court of Justice, on appeal, found this to be an error.

The court held that a good faith defence appeal period, being outside the Crown's control, constitutes an "exceptional circumstance" and should be deducted from the total delay.

With this deduction, the total delay was well below the Jordan presumptive ceiling, and thus not unreasonable.

The Crown's appeal was allowed, the stay of proceedings was set aside, and the matter was remitted for trial.