Ildikó Erdei

The offender pleaded guilty to multiple serious firearms and drug trafficking offences stemming from two separate incidents, the second of which occurred while he was on bail for the first.

The court found the offender was a commercial drug trafficker using firearms as tools of the trade, necessitating a sentence emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

Applying the totality principle and accounting for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, the court imposed a global sentence of 10.5 years imprisonment, less credit for time served.

The appellant was convicted by jury of two counts of trafficking cocaine and one count of assaulting a peace officer with a weapon after police executed a search warrant on his apartment.

He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on the defence of mistake of fact regarding the assault charge, and in failing to relate the evidence summary to material issues and the defence position.

The court found no merit in either ground, holding that the trial judge's instructions adequately required the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant knew the officer was a peace officer engaged in executing his duty, which effectively encompassed the mistake of fact defence.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The court sentenced Michael Alexander Llanos for multiple drug trafficking offences and possession of a prohibited weapon, following a judge-alone trial.

The decision reviews the facts, the offender’s background, the objectivity of the pre-sentence report, and the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody.

The court found Mr. Llanos to be a mid-level fentanyl trafficker and imposed a global sentence of 5.5 years’ imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody, with ancillary orders including a lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA order.

The court considered both aggravating and mitigating factors, including the gravity of fentanyl trafficking, the offender’s addiction and medical issues, and the harshness of his pre-sentence incarceration.

The court granted the applicant’s Charter application, finding that the police used their Highway Traffic Act powers as a pretext to stop the applicant’s vehicle to investigate a possible drug transaction, resulting in arbitrary detention contrary to section 9.

The subsequent search and seizure of drugs and a firearm were not justified under the plain view doctrine and violated section 8.

The applicant’s right to counsel under section 10(b) was also breached due to an unreasonable delay in facilitating access to duty counsel.

The court excluded the evidence under section 24(2), concluding that admitting it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Ashley Gallie pleaded guilty to multiple offences including possession of a prohibited firearm, careless storage of a firearm, possession of cocaine and fentanyl for trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime over $5000.

The sentencing judge considered her difficult personal history, Indigenous heritage, and the impact of family separation in imposing an 18-month consecutive sentence, resulting in a global six-year sentence when combined with a prior 4.5-year sentence.

The decision carefully balances principles of denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and totality, while applying Gladue principles despite the offender's limited connection to her Indigenous culture due to historical dislocation.

The court found Michael Alexander Llanos guilty of possession of drugs and a prohibited weapon (black brass knuckles) for the purpose of trafficking, following a search of his apartment.

The case turned on circumstantial evidence, including the location and packaging of drugs, the presence of drug paraphernalia, and the nature of Llanos' relationship with his deceased girlfriend, Kyla Joyner.

The court rejected alternative theories that Joyner possessed the drugs for herself or for others without Llanos' knowledge, finding that the only reasonable inference was that Llanos had knowledge and control over the contraband.

Hearsay statements by Joyner were ruled inadmissible.

This decision addresses the admissibility of discreditable conduct evidence in a drug trafficking prosecution.

The court considered whether text messages and viva voce testimony about the accused’s relationship with the deceased co-accused, Kyla Joyner, were admissible to prove joint or constructive possession of drugs and weapons.

The court allowed the admission of certain text communications and limited testimony, finding their probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect, especially in a judge-alone trial.

The ruling clarifies the application of the four-step framework for admitting discreditable conduct evidence and the importance of context in assessing control and knowledge in joint possession cases.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and other offences, receiving a net sentence of four years and seven months.

On appeal, he sought to introduce fresh evidence and argued the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider his drug addiction and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions as mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly elicited information from the self-represented appellant, who had stated his addiction did not motivate the offence.

The court also held the sentencing judge appropriately weighed the harsh pre-sentence conditions against the seriousness of the offence.

The court considered an application by Adrian Davey to stay proceedings on the ground of entrapment after he pleaded guilty to trafficking cocaine and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The court reviewed the sufficiency of disclosure to the defence and whether police had reasonable suspicion before offering Davey the opportunity to commit the offence.

The application was dismissed, with the court finding that the police had reasonable suspicion at the relevant time and that the defence was able to make full answer and defence.

The defendant was charged with possession of cocaine and crack for the purpose of trafficking, and trafficking.

The case involved a Charter application to exclude evidence (drugs and shipment receipt) due to a s. 8 Charter violation by police for failing to file a timely Report to Justice.

The court found a s. 8 violation but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, balancing the Grant factors, noting the police conduct was negligent but not serious, and the impact on the defendant was minimal.

On the merits, the court found the defendant guilty of trafficking, concluding that he was the person who dropped off the package and knew its contents, or was wilfully blind, based on circumstantial evidence including fingerprints and suspicious shipping practices.

Adrian Williams pleaded guilty to possession of Fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The court considered sentencing principles including proportionality, parity, and totality, as well as an Enhanced Pre-Sentence Report detailing the offender's background, including experiences with anti-Black racism and systemic discrimination.

The Crown sought a four-year consecutive sentence, while the defence proposed three years, arguing the Fentanyl was diluted.

The court imposed a four-year sentence, consecutive to a prior manslaughter conviction, finding the Crown's proposal fit after weighing aggravating factors (subsequent manslaughter conviction, criminal record, institutional misconduct) against mitigating factors (guilty plea, family support, job offer, and social context as it relates to moral culpability).

The appellant, Thanh Nguyen, appealed his convictions for several possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime offences.

He argued that the verdicts were unreasonable, alleging that the trial judge erred by convicting him on circumstantial evidence that supported innocent inferences, engaged in illogical reasoning, and that the verdicts were inconsistent with his acquittal on a firearm charge.

He also contended that the trial judge erred in admitting unqualified opinion evidence from a police officer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable and any error in admitting opinion evidence harmless under the curative proviso.

Kevin Tran appealed his convictions for narcotics, proceeds of crime, and firearm offences.

He argued that the verdicts were unreasonable, the trial judge erred in not excluding evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the trial judge erred in not staying proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b).

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable, the s. 24(2) decision correct (despite an unconstitutional warrant, evidence was admissible due to good faith), and the s. 11(b) delay justified by exceptional circumstances related to a joint trial.

The accused brought an application to stay the proceedings, alleging a violation of his section 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court analyzed the delay, including a 'gap period' where the Crown had temporarily stayed the charges under section 579 of the Criminal Code to protect a larger ongoing investigation.

The court found that the Jordan clock did not run during this gap period, as the stay was not an illegitimate end-run around the presumptive ceiling.

After deducting 90 days for the exceptional discrete event of the COVID-19 pandemic, the net delay was calculated at 13 months and 7 days, well below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, citing a delay of over 20 months.

The Crown argued the delay was justified by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional complexity of the case, which involved a large-scale drug investigation with multiple co-accused, wiretaps, and voluminous disclosure.

The court adopted a conservative approach, attributing three months of delay to the COVID-19 backlog as a discrete exceptional event, bringing the net delay below the presumptive ceiling.

Furthermore, the court found the case was particularly complex, justifying the overall delay.

The application for a stay of proceedings was denied.

The accused was charged with possession of crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, possession of identity documents, and breach of probation.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove the accused had knowledge and control of drugs found in a backpack in a taxi and in a locked bedroom at his residence.

The court found the circumstantial evidence overwhelming and convicted the accused on the drug, proceeds of crime, identity document, and probation breach charges, but acquitted him of possessing property knowing it was obtained by crime due to lack of evidence regarding his knowledge of the IDs' origins.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest.

Trial counsel had previously represented the appellant's co-accused (her former husband), who was discharged after providing a statutory declaration denying knowledge of the drugs.

Counsel then represented the appellant, despite her denial of guilt and desire to plead not guilty.

Counsel conceded that the case's outcome hinged solely on a search warrant challenge, without consulting the appellant.

When the challenge failed, counsel proceeded with a nolo contendere procedure, resulting in a finding of guilt without a guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found a clear conflict of interest, as counsel's duty to the former co-accused was adverse to the appellant's interests, rendering the verdict unreliable and a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered, with the Crown indicating no re-prosecution.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a certiorari application challenging her committal for trial on charges of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and cultivating marijuana.

The Court of Appeal upheld the committal, finding that there was evidence capable of supporting the inference that the appellant was working at the commercial grow-operation on the day of her arrest and that the evidence, considered as a whole, constituted some evidence of her involvement as a party in the alleged offences.

The appeal was dismissed.

Three defendants applied for orders staying criminal proceedings on the grounds that their right to be tried within a constitutionally tolerable time had been breached.

The applicable ceiling for Ontario Court of Justice cases is 18 months.

The Crown argued that when defence delay periods were subtracted, the total delay did not exceed the ceiling.

The court found that two applicants' delay did not exceed the 18-month threshold after deducting defence delay caused by their decision to change counsel.

For the third applicant, although the delay exceeded the Jordan guidelines by nine days, the court found exceptional circumstances existed that rebutted the presumption of unreasonable delay.

All three applications were dismissed.