Court of Appeal for Ontario
Huscroft, Thorburn and Dawe JJ.A.
Between
His Majesty the King
Respondent
and
James Labelle
Appellant
Counsel:
Mark C. Halfyard, for the appellant
Kelvin Ramchand and Scott Wheildon, for the respondent
Heard: April 22, 2026
On appeal from the convictions entered by Justice Susan Healey of the Superior Court of Justice, on October 14, 2022.
Thorburn J.A.:
OVERVIEW
1The appellant, James Labelle, was arrested in a high-risk takedown at the conclusion of a drug investigation. His vehicle and residence were searched and large quantities of cocaine and other illegal drugs were found. The appellant sought to exclude this evidence, claiming breaches of his ss. 7, 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights.
2The trial judge held that the police did not use excessive force in arresting the appellant and there was no delay in advising him of his right to remain silent or his right to counsel. However, she found there was a delay in implementing his right to counsel, and that he was not adequately informed of the extent of his jeopardy before his police interview at the station. She therefore excluded the appellant’s police interview but refused to exclude the evidence seized after police searched his home, because she held that it was not obtained pursuant to the Charter infringement.
3The appellant was convicted of three counts of possession of a Schedule I substance for the purpose of trafficking under s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 and one count of possession of proceeds of crime over $5,000 under s. 354(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. A global eight-year sentence was imposed.
4The appellant raises three grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in holding that the police exercised reasonable force in arresting him; (2) the trial judge engaged in impermissible after-the-fact reasoning regarding the alleged delay in advising him of his right to counsel; and (3) the trial judge erred in refusing to exclude evidence seized from the appellant’s residence pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter.
5For reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
6In April 2020, the police received information from confidential informants that the appellant was trafficking cocaine, fentanyl, and oxycodone pills from his vehicle. They then conducted several days of surveillance and observed the appellant meeting with drug users and suspected drug traffickers.
7The police knew that the appellant had a criminal record including:
a) drug offences,
b) unlawful possession of a prohibited firearm; and
c) assault, assault causing bodily harm, and assault with a weapon which pre-dated the firearm conviction.
8The lead investigator authored and obtained a warrant to track the appellant’s movements through his cellphone and monitor incoming and outgoing transmission data. Police conducted additional surveillance for approximately two weeks using tracking and transmission data.
9By April 27, the lead investigator believed the appellant was trafficking illegal drugs and that illegal drugs would be found in his vehicle or his home.
10On April 28, a warrant was obtained to search the appellant’s vehicle and his home.
11The lead investigator decided to involve the Tactics and Rescue Unit (“TRU”), a specialized police force, to help plan the appellant’s arrest because of the appellant’s prior convictions. He also cited police records which showed that the appellant was the victim of an armed robbery in 2015 and a home invasion in 2016 during which intruders stole OxyContin. Given these factors, the police believed there might be some resistance to arrest.
12The TRU agreed to coordinate the appellant’s arrest and a plan was devised to arrest him away from his home for officer safety. Officers planned to execute the search warrant after the appellant was in custody.
Arrest
13On April 29, the appellant and his mother-in-law were stopped in the parking lot of a Tim Horton’s store. Six members of the TRU approached the vehicle, three stationed on each side. Several officers had their guns drawn. Two “distraction devices” were activated on the hood of the vehicle. The devices created a flash, a loud bang and smoke. Officers smashed the front driver, passenger, and rear side tinted windows of the vehicle. The appellant and his mother-in-law were arrested without injury.
14Officers testified that the arrest was effected sometime between 10:13 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.
Caution and Right to Counsel
15Moments after the arrest, at 10:17 a.m., the lead investigator who was on stand-by, returned to the scene to caution the appellant and advise him of his right to counsel. The officer testified that he started by informing the appellant that he was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and advising him of the consequences of any utterance.
16Before he could advise the appellant of his right to counsel, the appellant interrupted the officer and stated, “I know what this is about. I sold to that undercover in the red Kia.”
17At 10:18 a.m., the officer resumed reading the standard right to counsel. The appellant acknowledged that he understood his rights and agreed that he “should” speak to a lawyer. He gave police the name of his lawyer.
18The police seized approximately $15,000 and a cellphone from the appellant during the search incident to arrest.
Right to Counsel
19The appellant was taken to the police detachment and placed in a cell. The lead investigator arrived at the police detachment at 11:02 a.m. and learned that the appellant still had not spoken to his lawyer. He arranged contact with the lawyer, which took place approximately 58 minutes after the appellant’s arrest.
The Interview
20The lead investigator interviewed the appellant while other officers searched the appellant’s home.
21Shortly before the interview began, the lead investigator learned that officers had located unidentified pills and cocaine in the appellant’s home. He proceeded to tell the appellant that a “large amount” of pills had been found at the home, and that he also expected the officers to find a firearm. He asked the appellant whether there was fentanyl or other drugs at the house.
22Officers seized cocaine, oxycodone pills (some of which after testing turned out to be fentanyl), a firearm, and more than $5,000 in cash from the appellant’s home.
THE CHARTER APPLICATIONS
23The appellant alleged that the police infringed his Charter rights by:
a) using excessive force during his arrest, contrary to s. 7 of the Charter;
b) delaying in delivering his caution and right to counsel, contrary to ss. 7, 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter; and
c) failing to inform him of the extent of his jeopardy during the police interview, contrary to ss. 7, 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter.
24The trial judge found that the police did not use excessive force while arresting the appellant. She concluded that the degree of force used was “reasonable, proportionate and necessary” as required by s. 25(1) of the Criminal Code and R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at paras. 32-34.
25Second, she held that there was no delay in advising the appellant of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel at the roadside in the moments following his arrest.
26In her oral reasons, delivered two days after submissions, the trial judge held:
I find that Officer Rickaby read to him the standard caution and rights to counsel within four to five minutes being arrested, during which time he was being searched, and that Mr. Labelle understood both. He was appropriately and sufficiently told of the charge he was facing. The requirements of Section 10(a) and the informational component of Section 10(b) were fulfilled.
27She “reserve[d] the right to provide more complete reasons for [the] decision in writing” and written reasons were provided to the parties on September 22, 2025, one month after the hearing. In her written reasons she held that:
When delivering my oral ruling, I noted that there was a gap of four to five minutes between arrest and delivery of the caution. On further review of the evidence and finding that the arrest time noted by Officer Coakley is the most reliable, I find that the delay was only two minutes.
I find that Officer Rickaby delivered the standard caution and rights to counsel within two minutes of being arrested. The evidence establishes that he acknowledged understanding both.
He was appropriately and sufficiently told of the charge he was facing. I am not persuaded by counsel’s argument that he was given insufficient information. Counsel did not provide any authority for his proposition that an accused person must be told the exact substance when being arrested for an offence contrary to s. 5 of the CDSA. I find that the requirements of s. 10(a) and the informational component of s. 10(b) were fulfilled.
28Third, the trial judge found a breach of the appellant’s s. 10(b) Charter rights arising from the 58‑minute delay in providing access to counsel. She held that while the delay was not inordinately long, none of the officers in the booking area turned their minds to putting the appellant in touch with his lawyer contrary to their recognized practice.
29Fourth, she held that there were further s. 7 and s. 10 Charter breaches arising from the lead investigator’s failure to advise the appellant that his questioning would extend to “other Schedule I substances and firearms”. She noted an accused person must be informed of both the reason for detention and the subject matter of police inquiries. The police must reiterate the right to counsel if they ask questions that go beyond the exploratory stage in connection with a related offence so that the accused can fully assess the risk of self-incrimination and obtain meaningful, informed legal advice: R. v. Sawatsky (1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 767 (C.A.). She held that the appellant might have opted to remain silent “had he been informed of the full extent of his jeopardy and had an opportunity to discuss it with his lawyer.” Instead, he made several inculpatory statements.
30The trial judge found these were serious Charter breaches and excluded the appellant’s entire videotaped statement.
31However, she refused to exclude the evidence seized from the appellant’s home. Although the search was conducted at the time the appellant was being interviewed, there was no change in the focus or location of the search resulting from the appellant’s answers. The information provided by the appellant did not lead to the discovery of any evidence that would not have been discovered in any event during the search. Therefore, the items located were not “obtained in a manner” triggering exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter. Moreover, she found there was no “deliberate effort to disregard the applicant’s section 10(b) right” and that this was not “part of regular police practice”.
32In the alternative, if there was a connection, the trial judge held that she would have admitted the evidence arising from the lawful search warrant under s. 24(2). The weak link between the search and the interview lessened the adverse impact of the breaches. The administration of justice would not be brought into disrepute by the admission of the substantial quantity of controlled drugs seized, and any residual concern about the administration of justice was addressed by the exclusion of the statement.
ANALYSIS
1. The police did not use excessive force during the arrest
33The appellant submits that the trial judge erred in finding that police used reasonable force in arresting him and that his antecedents and his criminal record justified the use of force.
34The determination of whether an officer’s use of force was justified is a question of law reviewable on a correctness standard. However, the trial judge’s “assessment of the evidence and findings of fact must be accorded substantial deference on appellate review”: R. v. Cornell, 2010 SCC 31, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 142, at para. 25; and R. v. Shepherd, 2009 SCC 35, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 527, at para. 20.
35Officers must subjectively believe the force they used was necessary, and their belief must be objectively reasonable: Nasogaluak, at paras. 32-34; R. v. Gilmore-Bent, 2025 ONCA 553, 178 O.R. (3d) 161, at para. 41; R. v. Jarrett, 2021 ONCA 758, 498 C.R.R. (2d) 38, at para. 61.
36The use of force is assessed by “looking at the totality of the evidence through the lens of an officer with training and field experience”, and not according to a standard of perfection: R. v. Mackenzie, 2013 SCC 50, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 250, at para. 83; Nasogaluak, at para. 35. The court should balance the rights of suspects with the requirements of safe and effective law enforcement: Cornell, at para. 24.
37The trial judge’s conclusion that the police decisions to arrest the appellant with guns drawn, use distraction devices, and break his vehicle windows were a reasonable course of action reflects the cumulative effect of the following undisputed facts: (i) the appellant’s criminal history including convictions for possession of a prohibited firearm and drug trafficking; (ii) the officers’ reasonable belief that the appellant was trafficking drugs from his vehicle; (iii) the reasonable inference that drug trafficking is often associated with violence: see, R. v. Pileggi, 2021 ONCA 4, 153 O.R. (3d) 561, at paras. 33-34, and R. v. Lucas, 2014 ONCA 561, 121 O.R. (3d) 303, at paras. 262-63, leave to appeal refused [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 460; and (iv) the knowledge that the appellant had in fact been the subject of two prior armed robberies, including a home invasion robbery in which drugs were taken.
38The trial judge also considered that: (i) while some of the officers’ guns were drawn, they were pointed toward the ground; (ii) the distraction devices the police used only cause harm if exploded on the skin and exploding them on the hood of the car avoided this risk; (iii) the tinting of the car windows made it necessary to break them to identify the occupants of the vehicle; and (iv) there was no evidence that the appellant or his mother-in-law were harmed during the arrest, or that the appellant suffered any physical or psychological harm at the hands of police.
39Taken together, these factors reflect the cautionary measures taken to protect the public and the police and the justification for their concern for community safety.
40Even if there was a low risk that the appellant had a firearm in the vehicle, the police were entitled to design and implement an arrest plan that accounted for this possibility to ensure their safety, as well as the public’s safety, as the arrest took place in a public parking lot. As Chief Justice Dickson held in R. v. Genest, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 59, at pp. 89-91, “[f]ears for the safety of the searchers” and the “possibility of violence” are valid reasons for the use of force so long as it does not amount to a “carte blanche” for inappropriate police conduct.
41For these reasons, I reject the first ground of appeal.
2. The trial judge did not engage in impermissible after-the-fact reasoning in finding no s. 10(b) Charter breach on arrest
42The appellant submits that the trial judge improperly reversed her earlier finding that there was a four-to-five-minute delay before he was advised of his right to counsel after his arrest, and erred in holding that the delay did not breach his s. 10 right to retain and instruct counsel without delay.
43Judges benefit from a presumption of integrity when their reasons are challenged. The test to displace the presumption of integrity is high, as it calls into question the integrity of the trial judge and the administration of justice. To rebut the presumption of integrity, the appellant must present cogent evidence to demonstrate that an informed and reasonable observer would think that the reasons are an after-the-fact justification for the decision rather than an articulation of the reasoning that led to the decision: R. v. Arnaout, 2015 ONCA 655, 127 O.R. (3d) 241, at paras. 18-19, 23, leave to appeal refused [2016] S.C.C.A. No. 51.
44As noted above, the trial judge rendered brief oral reasons subject to minor revisions, and written reasons which were provided later. In her oral reasons she stated there was a four-to-five-minute gap between the appellant’s arrest and the police advising him of his right to counsel, while in the written reasons she found the gap was two minutes. In doing so, the trial judge noted that there was a conflict in the evidence but that she preferred the evidence of the two witnesses who were at the scene.
45The trial judge was entitled to clarify her reasons upon reviewing the record. There is no evidence of improper after‑the‑fact justification.
46The discrepancy between a two‑minute and four‑to‑five‑minute delay does not rebut the presumption of judicial integrity. The trial judge found that in either scenario, in the circumstances here, the appellant was advised of his right to counsel “without delay” as required by ss. 10(a) and (b). The difference is immaterial and does not affect the outcome.
47For these reasons, the appellant has not displaced the presumption of integrity, and I reject this ground of appeal.
3. The trial judge did not err in admitting the evidence from the search of the home
48The appellant does not challenge the validity of the search warrant obtained under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act the day before his arrest or the search of his home. However, he claims that the evidence arising from the search, which was conducted at the same time as the unlawful interview, was obtained in a manner that infringed his Charter rights. He argues that the evidence should have been excluded.
49Evidence is “obtained in a manner” that infringes a constitutional right if there is a connection between the breach and the impugned evidence. The connection may be temporal, contextual or causal: R. v. Pino, 2016 ONCA 389, 130 O.R. (3d) 561, at paras. 50-56; R. v. Boutros, 2018 ONCA 375, 361 C.C.C. (3d) 240, at para. 17.
50However, as noted by this court in R. v. Daye, 2022 ONCA 675, 518 C.R.R. (2d) 63, at para. 8, “[t]he fact that two events happen around the same time does not make those events temporally connected for the purposes of this analysis.”
51Although courts have taken a generous view of the “obtained in a manner” threshold, this court has recognized that a temporal connection may be too remote. Its strength is to be assessed by the trial judge on a case-by-case basis: Pileggi, at para. 102; R. v. Strachan, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980, at pp. 1005-6.
52In this case, the search and the interview were two separate events.
53The search warrant was lawfully obtained the day before the interview. Despite the appellant’s submission that there was a “continuous flow of information in both directions—between the lead investigator conducting the interview and the officers searching the appellant’s residence”, this suggestion is not borne out in the record. There is no evidence that the lead investigator conducting the interview and the officers searching the appellant’s residence were in communication with one another during the interview. While the lead investigator went to the appellant’s residence after the interview and assisted with the ongoing search, there was no evidence that he used information obtained during the interview to direct how the search was conducted.
54As the trial judge correctly recognized, a causal connection between the breach and the seizure of the evidence is not strictly necessary for evidence to be “obtained in a manner” that infringes Charter rights.
55The absence of a causal link is nevertheless significant. Here, the evidence would have been discovered in any event as the warrant was properly obtained before the interview began, and nothing in the appellant’s statement led to evidence being found that would not otherwise have been uncovered. As such, there was no causal link between the breaches and the evidence seized. The trial judge was entitled to find as she did that “[t]he searches were separate transactions from the taking of the statement”.
56In any event, even if s. 24(2) was engaged, all three Grant factors weighed in favour of admission: R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353. The search was conducted pursuant to a lawfully-issued warrant executed by the police in good faith, the issuance of which was not tainted by the breach of the appellant’s Charter rights during the interview. In the absence of any causal connection between the Charter breaches and the search, the breaches had no impact on the appellant’s constitutionally-protected privacy interest in his home: see R. v. Côté, 2011 SCC 46, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 215, at paras. 72-73. Finally, the seized evidence was reliable real evidence that was essential to the Crown’s case.
57I therefore reject this ground of appeal.
CONCLUSION
58For the above reasons, I would dismiss the appeal.
Released: June 16, 2026 “G.H.”
“Thorburn J.A.”
“I agree. Grant Huscroft J.A.”
“I agree. J. Dawe J.A.”