COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Zarnett, Favreau and Madsen JJ.A.
BETWEEN
His Majesty the King
Respondent
and
Cadence Gordon Beauparlant
Appellant
Stefan Rinas, for the appellant
Kelvin Ramchand and Brandt Chu, for the respondent
Heard and rendered orally: June 4, 2026
On appeal from the convictions entered by Justice David A. Broad of the Superior Court of Justice, on March 4, 2022.
REASONS FOR DECISION
1A police officer arrested the appellant, subjectively believing that he was the driver of a vehicle who had left the scene of an accident in which a person had been injured. In a search incident to arrest, the police found fentanyl in his jacket pocket; a prohibited knife, money, and illicit pills in his satchel; and additional money in his vehicle. He was charged with possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking, possession of a prohibited weapon, and possession of proceeds of crime.
2The trial judge found the appellant’s rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter had been violated. The police officer’s subjective belief that he had grounds for arrest were not objectively reasonable. As there was no lawful arrest, the search incident to arrest was also unlawful.
3The trial judge, nonetheless, admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after consideration of the factors of R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353. The appellant was convicted on all counts. The appellant challenges the trial judge’s s. 24(2) ruling.
4A trial judge’s assessment of the Grant factors is normally afforded considerable deference on appeal. When all proper factors have been considered and no unreasonable findings have been made, an appellate court must show deference to the trial judge’s ultimate determination. Deference is displaced by an error in principle, a palpable and overriding factual error, or an unreasonable determination. In such circumstances, a fresh s. 24(2) analysis must be undertaken, having regard to the trial judge’s factual findings.
5In our view, no error that displaces deference has been shown.
6On the first Grant factor, the trial judge was entitled to find that the breaches were not at the serious end of the spectrum, which the appellant fairly concedes was his core finding. Although the trial judge used an inapt phrase in saying this factor favoured admission, a finding with the more accurate terminology--that the factor only weakly pulled toward exclusion--remains consistent with his reasoning.
7The appellant does not challenge the finding that the police officer had a sincere subjective belief that the appellant matched the description he had been given in police dispatches based on 911 calls, on which he concluded he had reasonable and probable grounds to make an arrest. We see no error in the trial judge’s consideration of this and the additional circumstances—that the appellant was walking away on a rural road as evening approached and did not stop when the officer called out to him and flashed his lights. The officer’s error in not verifying the information he was given was found by the trial judge to be just that: an error that was not willful or reckless.
8The trial judge found that the second Grant factor favoured exclusion, while the third Grant factor favoured admission given the reliability of the evidence and the gutting effect on the Crown’s case if it was excluded. The appellant challenges, however, the balancing of the three factors.
9We do not give effect to that complaint. The public interest in adjudication on the merits was strong and the offences serious. Moreover, the trial judge did consider the cumulative effect of the breaches both under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter in his overall assessment.
10The appeal is therefore dismissed.
“B. Zarnett J.A.” “L. Favreau J.A.” “L. Madsen J.A.”