Jessica Szabo

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering his detention in a Secure Forensic Unit and retaining an electronics supervision clause.

The appellant argued the disposition was not the least onerous and restrictive option and that the Board improperly rejected a joint submission to remove the electronics clause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds, finding the Board's decisions reasonable given the appellant's recent elopements and worsening auditory hallucinations.

However, the appeal was allowed in part to reinstate clauses for indirectly supervised and accompanied privileges, which the Board had mistakenly removed.

The appellant challenged an Ontario Review Board disposition under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code.

Following a material change in living circumstances and concession that practical utility of the appeal had dissipated pending the next annual review, the court dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board upholding his treating physician's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The appellant argued he did not have a mental illness and his beliefs about being persecuted by foreign intelligence were real.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the Board did not err in concluding the appellant suffered from a delusional disorder and that his complete lack of insight into his condition rendered him incapable of appreciating the consequences of refusing treatment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment under the Health Care Consent Act.

The appellant, who had been found Not Criminally Responsible for uttering death threats, suffered from a delusional disorder and refused antipsychotic medication, denying he had a mental illness.

Applying the Vavilov framework, the Superior Court of Justice reviewed the Board's decision on a standard of palpable and overriding error.

The court found no error in the Board's conclusion that the appellant's refusal of treatment was a result of his delusional disorder, rendering him unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his decision.

The appeal was dismissed.