Kelvin Ramchand

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging the validity of a surety warrant for arrest and the searches conducted following his arrest.

The applicant argued breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter.

The court found that although the surety warrant was not properly executed through the required procedure (the accused did not go into actual custody), it remained validly in existence on the CPIC system and grounded a lawful arrest.

The court rejected all Charter arguments, finding no breach of section 9 (arbitrary arrest), no breach of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) for either the pat-down search or the strip search, and no breach of section 10 (right to counsel).

The evidence was admitted at trial.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following a police stop of a van in a residential neighbourhood where break-ins had occurred.

The Court of Appeal found that the initial traffic stop constituted an arbitrary detention in breach of section 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as the officer had no reasonable grounds to suspect the occupants were involved in the break-ins and no legitimate highway traffic purpose for the stop.

Although the arrest and search incident to arrest were found to be lawful based on the smell of fresh marijuana, and the post-arrest strip search was found to be unlawful, the Court determined that the arbitrary detention tainted all subsequent police conduct.

Applying the section 24(2) analysis, the Court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of the Charter violations, finding that the seriousness of the police misconduct and its strong negative impact on the appellant's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in fentanyl (six 100 microgram fentanyl patches), possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of the proceeds of crime.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that guilt was the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence.

However, the court found that the trial judge erred in principle by considering the appellant's pending oxycodone trafficking charges as an aggravating factor at sentencing.

The court reduced the sentence from 33 months to 20 months custody.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 11(b) of the Charter alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was 34 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

After deducting 56 days of defence delay, the net delay remained above the ceiling.

The Crown argued that the adjournment of the preliminary inquiry due to a co-accused's retainer issues constituted an exceptional circumstance.

The court rejected this argument, finding the Crown could have remedied the delay by severing the accused.

The court found a violation of s. 11(b) and stayed the charges.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 20 months imposed by the trial judge for his involvement in a commercial conspiracy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding that the trial judge properly considered all relevant sentencing factors, including the commercial nature of the enterprise and the appellant's level of involvement.

The court also found that the trial judge adequately considered the parity principle in distinguishing the appellant's sentence from that of a co-conspirator who received 30 months.