Kelvin Ramchand

The appellant was arrested while attempting to facilitate a drug transaction with an undercover officer.

He claimed to be acting as a police agent under the direction and control of a detective.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's O'Connor application for third-party police records, found no air of reality to the police agent defence, and refused to leave it with the jury.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's rulings on the O'Connor application, the air of reality finding, the jury instructions, and the Crown's closing submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The offender pleaded guilty to trafficking 1.08 grams of powder cocaine to an undercover police officer.

The offender committed the offence to support an addiction to online gaming.

The court found that the offender's meaningful steps towards rehabilitation, gainful employment, and the connection between the offence and his addiction constituted exceptional circumstances.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 30 months of probation, prioritizing rehabilitation and restraint over general deterrence and denunciation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence of ten years' imprisonment.

The conviction appeal raised two grounds: (1) that the conviction was unreasonable given the inconsistency with a co-accused's acquittal, and (2) that the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter s. 11(b) application regarding trial delay.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds.

The trial judge's findings were reasonable, as the co-accused testified and was believed while the appellant's witness was rejected as untruthful.

The trial delay of 27 months fell within the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The sentence of ten years was upheld as fit given the large quantity of cocaine involved and the appellant's prior conviction for the same offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter s. 11(b) application for unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal, hearing the appeal concurrently with a co-accused's similar appeal, found no unreasonable delay, agreeing with the trial judge's calculation of 27 months net delay.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The accused, Carlos Silva, brought a pre-trial application to exclude evidence obtained through search warrants and an arrest, alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown brought a cross-application to admit certain police notes and reports as hearsay evidence.

The court dismissed the accused's application to exclude evidence, finding the search warrants and arrest lawful, and that no Charter rights were violated.

The court partially granted the Crown's application, admitting property reports and an exhibit list, but excluding an officer's notes due to reliability concerns stemming from the officer's fentanyl overdose death shortly after the seizure.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The court applied the *Jordan* framework, noting it was a transitional case.

The total delay, calculated from the date the information was sworn to the anticipated end of trial, was 28 months and 12 days, which was below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The defence conceded 14 days of delay.

The court rejected the defence's argument to include pre-charge delay in the s. 11(b) calculation and found no actual prejudice to the right to a fair trial under ss. 7 and 11(d) due to pre-charge delay or missing evidence.

The court found the defence took meaningful steps to expedite, but the proceedings did not markedly exceed reasonable time requirements.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused were charged with possession of narcotics for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and money laundering following the execution of search warrants at two condominiums.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove constructive possession of large quantities of cocaine, marijuana, oxycodone, and psilocybin, as well as significant amounts of cash.

The court found that the circumstantial evidence, including keys, documents, and debt lists, overwhelmingly established that both accused were in possession of the narcotics and that the cash was derived from trafficking.

Both accused were found guilty on all counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and related weapons offences, as well as his five-year sentence for trafficking.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding his presence in the bathroom and possession of the cocaine, that the verdict was unreasonable due to unexplained contradictions, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because a key witness was not called.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility were supported by the evidence and owed deference, that fresh evidence regarding ineffective assistance did not meet the Palmer test, and that the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range.

The accused, charged with drug trafficking offences, brought applications to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging violations of their rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The police obtained search warrants for a condominium and a vehicle based on information from a confidential informant.

Prior to executing the warrants, police discovered the accused's vehicle at a different condominium, arrested him, and made a warrantless exigent entry into the unit to prevent the destruction of evidence.

The court found the initial warrants were validly issued and that the exigent entry was lawful under s. 11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The court also dismissed challenges to a strip search and an alleged delay in facilitating the right to counsel.

The applications were dismissed.

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging the validity of a surety warrant for arrest and the searches conducted following his arrest.

The applicant argued breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter.

The court found that although the surety warrant was not properly executed through the required procedure (the accused did not go into actual custody), it remained validly in existence on the CPIC system and grounded a lawful arrest.

The court rejected all Charter arguments, finding no breach of section 9 (arbitrary arrest), no breach of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) for either the pat-down search or the strip search, and no breach of section 10 (right to counsel).

The evidence was admitted at trial.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following a police stop of a van in a residential neighbourhood where break-ins had occurred.

The Court of Appeal found that the initial traffic stop constituted an arbitrary detention in breach of section 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as the officer had no reasonable grounds to suspect the occupants were involved in the break-ins and no legitimate highway traffic purpose for the stop.

Although the arrest and search incident to arrest were found to be lawful based on the smell of fresh marijuana, and the post-arrest strip search was found to be unlawful, the Court determined that the arbitrary detention tainted all subsequent police conduct.

Applying the section 24(2) analysis, the Court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of the Charter violations, finding that the seriousness of the police misconduct and its strong negative impact on the appellant's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in fentanyl (six 100 microgram fentanyl patches), possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of the proceeds of crime.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that guilt was the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence.

However, the court found that the trial judge erred in principle by considering the appellant's pending oxycodone trafficking charges as an aggravating factor at sentencing.

The court reduced the sentence from 33 months to 20 months custody.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 11(b) of the Charter alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was 34 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

After deducting 56 days of defence delay, the net delay remained above the ceiling.

The Crown argued that the adjournment of the preliminary inquiry due to a co-accused's retainer issues constituted an exceptional circumstance.

The court rejected this argument, finding the Crown could have remedied the delay by severing the accused.

The court found a violation of s. 11(b) and stayed the charges.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 20 months imposed by the trial judge for his involvement in a commercial conspiracy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding that the trial judge properly considered all relevant sentencing factors, including the commercial nature of the enterprise and the appellant's level of involvement.

The court also found that the trial judge adequately considered the parity principle in distinguishing the appellant's sentence from that of a co-conspirator who received 30 months.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to traffic two kilograms of methamphetamine and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

The conviction was based on intercepted communications obtained via a wiretap authorization.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his Garofoli application, refusing leave to cross-examine the affiants, and failing to excise importation references from the affidavit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the police had reached an investigative impasse and established investigative necessity for the wiretap.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the seven-year term was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's record and the need for deterrence.