WARNING
The President of the panel hearing this appeal directs that the following should be attached to the file:
An order restricting publication in this proceeding under ss. 486(1), (2), or (3) of the Criminal Code shall continue. These sections of the Criminal Code provide:
- (1) Any proceedings against an accused shall be held in open court, but the presiding judge or justice may order the exclusion of all or any members of the public from the court room for all or part of the proceedings if the judge or justice is of the opinion that such an order is in the interest of public morals, the maintenance of order or the proper administration of justice or is necessary to prevent injury to international relations or national defence or national security.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the “proper administration of justice” includes ensuring that
(a) the interests of witnesses under the age of eighteen years are safeguarded in all proceedings; and
(b) justice system participants who are involved in the proceedings are protected.
(3) If an accused is charged with an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155 or 159, subsection 160(2) or (3) or section 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 212, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02 or 279.03 and the prosecutor or the accused applies for an order under subsection (1), the judge or justice shall, if no such order is made, state, by reference to the circumstances of the case, the reason for not making an order. R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 486; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 203, c. 19 (3rd Supp.), s. 14, c. 23 (4th Supp.), s. 1; 1992, c. 1, s. 60(F), c. 21, s. 9;1993, c. 45, s. 7;1997, c. 16, s. 6;1999, c. 25, s. 2(Preamble); 2001, c. 32, s. 29, c. 41, ss. 16, 34, 133;2002, c. 13, s. 20;2005, c. 32, s. 15, c. 43, ss. 4, 8;2010, c. 3, s. 4;2012, c. 1, s. 28.
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Simmons, Tulloch and Huscroft JJ.A.
BETWEEN
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
and
Royden Wood
Appellant
Bradley R. Burgess, for the appellant
J. Sandy Tse, for the respondent
Heard and released orally: April 7, 2015
On appeal from the conviction entered on November 1, 2011 and the sentence imposed on April 27, 2012 by Justice D.R. McDermid of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting with a jury.
ENDORSEMENT
1We reject the appellant’s submission that the application judge erred in failing to grant a change of venue. The application judge’s reasons indicate he was fully aware of the publicity surrounding both the appellant’s previous trial and the current charges. He concluded that the appellant had failed to meet the threshold of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of partiality or prejudice that could not be overcome by the usual trial safeguards. We see no basis on which to interfere with this conclusion.
2We see no merit in the appellant’s claim that the jury charge was unbalanced because of the number of times the trial judge referred to the requirements for vitiating consent. The trial judge set out the defence position that the sexual assaults did not happen on numerous occasions. He was required to explain the requirements for vitiating consent in setting out the essential elements of each offence as against each complainant. These explanations did not make the jury charge unbalanced.
3Similarly, we reject the appellant’s assertion that the verdict was unreasonable because of the striking similarity of the evidence of some of the complainants and the fact that the jury made findings of guilt in relation to three of them but acquitted in relation to two others. In our view, the verdicts are reconcilable. There were distinct features of the evidence of each complainant that may have led the jury to accept or reject the evidence of each of them.
4Finally, we are not persuaded that the trial judge erred in imposing a total sentence of six years’ imprisonment. The offences of which the appellant was convicted involved acts of sexual intercourse on two of the victims and sexual abuse of a third over a significant period of time and in the context of a pastor-parishioner relationship. In our view, the trial judge made no error in identifying denunciation and deterrence as the primary sentencing principles and in giving secondary importance to rehabilitation. Further, in our view, the trial judge was alive to the mitigating factors that were present. We see no error in principle and no other basis on which to interfere with the sentence imposed.
5Accordingly, the conviction appeal is dismissed. Leave to appeal sentence is granted, but the sentence appeal is dismissed.
“Janet Simmons J.A.”
“M. Tulloch J.A.”
“Grant Huscroft J.A.”
