Michelle Campbell

The young person appealed the adult sentence imposed by the trial judge.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to a suspended sentence followed by six months of probation, taking into account 149 days of pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the summary conviction appeal judge erred by holding a property owner must call police before using force against a trespasser.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal.

The Court noted that while requiring a property owner to call police before using force would be an error inconsistent with s. 41 of the Criminal Code, the appellant used excessive force even on his own version of events, as the trespassing complainant was not creating a disturbance.

The Crown appealed a sentence of six months' imprisonment and one year of probation imposed on the respondent for the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence manifestly inadequate given the extreme breach of trust, the victim's developmental vulnerabilities, and the devastating impact on the family.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to two years less a day of imprisonment followed by two years of probation.

The appellant, a young first offender, pleaded guilty to armed robbery after he and a co-perpetrator beat a store proprietor with a bat and iron bar.

He appealed his 15-month custodial sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence and raising a parity argument regarding his co-perpetrator.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's thorough reasons and deferring to the trial judge's exercise of discretion regarding both the custodial term and the distinction drawn between the perpetrators.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder following a trial where the cause of death and similar fact evidence were central issues.

The Crown alleged the appellant killed his partner during a contraband liquor deal, while the defence argued the death was accidental due to commotio cordis.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge misdirected the jury by misstating expert evidence regarding carbon monoxide and confusing medical diagnosis with legal causation.

The trial judge also erred in admitting the entirety of a fictitious 'Mr. Big' murder plot as similar fact evidence, as it lacked sufficient distinctiveness and was highly prejudicial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and accessing child pornography.

He argued the convictions were unreasonable due to inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and that the trial judge erred in relying on certain photographs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and concluding there was sufficient evidence to support the child pornography conviction.

The Court also declined to consider a 'private use' exception raised for the first time on appeal due to an insufficient evidentiary record.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of criminal negligence causing death after driving erratically at high speeds while under the influence of alcohol, striking a parked car and killing two people.

He was sentenced to two years less a day of incarceration, three years of probation, and a ten-year driving prohibition.

On appeal, the appellant argued for a conditional sentence and sought to introduce fresh evidence of his rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the custodial sentence, finding no error in the sentencing judge's emphasis on denunciation and general deterrence.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to reduce the driving prohibition from ten years to five years, noting that a longer prohibition would unreasonably hamper the young appellant's future employment prospects.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on a youthful first offender convicted of sexually assaulting an unconscious 14-year-old complainant after heavy drinking.

The Court of Appeal held that, despite strong rehabilitative prospects, family support, and strict bail compliance, the gravity of the offence and the offender's callous post-offence conduct required a custodial sentence to give proper effect to denunciation and general deterrence.

Applying the conditional sentence framework and the demonstrably unfit standard, the court found the community-based sentence outside the acceptable range.

In light of the respondent's completion of 16 months of the conditional sentence before appeal, the sentence was varied to nine months' imprisonment followed by six months' probation.

The Crown appealed a 60-day sentence imposed on the respondent for a third domestic assault against his same-sex partner.

The assault occurred less than 48 hours after the respondent's release from jail for a previous assault on the same victim, and in breach of release conditions.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by overemphasizing compassion and the victim's professional background as a psychiatrist, while giving insufficient weight to deterrence and denunciation.

The appeal was allowed and a sentence of 12 months was substituted.

The appellant pleaded guilty to nine counts of theft related to his role as the mastermind of a scheme where younger individuals stole motor boats and construction equipment valued at approximately $65,000.

He appealed his sentence of imprisonment, arguing the sentencing judge failed to adequately explain why a conditional sentence was not warranted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was within the appropriate range and the sentencing judge gave cogent reasons emphasizing denunciation for the planned and well-developed scheme.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting the complainant.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by relying on his passive demeanour and lack of eye contact to reject his testimony, and by allowing the Crown to cross-examine him on why the complainant would lie.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's reliance on the appellant's demeanour was legally flawed and vitiated the conviction.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, which included a consecutive sentence for a conviction under s. 345 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge gave thorough and balanced reasons, the global sentence of eighteen months plus five months pre-trial custody credit was fit, and the consecutive structure caused no prejudice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and related offences arising from a shooting in a high school gymnasium, as well as his 18-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing expert evidence on eyewitness identification, admitting in-dock identification, and in the jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 18-year sentence was manifestly fit given the aggravating factors, including the appellant's record and the danger posed to bystanders.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, sexual assault, forcible confinement, and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle.

During jury selection, the trial judge departed from the statutorily mandated procedure under s. 640(2) of the Criminal Code by having the first two jurors act as triers for the challenge for cause for the entire panel, rather than rotating them.

The Court of Appeal held that this was a fundamental jurisdictional error that resulted in an improperly constituted court.

The error could not be cured by the proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of stolen prohibited weapons and his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred by stating he was 'deemed' to have knowledge the weapons were stolen under the doctrine of recent possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge understood the inference was permissive despite using the word 'deemed'.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The trial judge erred by imposing a longer sentence on the appellant than his co-accused while purporting to apply the parity principle.

The sentence was reduced from two years to 18 months.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges of sexual abuse, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding similar fact evidence, excluding a decision of the College of Physicians and Surgeons, and permitting cross-examination on prior complaints.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the test for concoction regarding the similar fact evidence, properly exercised his discretion to exclude the College decision due to prejudicial effect, and appropriately instructed the jury on the use of prior complaints for assessing credibility.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving 'over 80', raising two grounds.

First, he argued the roadside demand was invalid because the officer did not use the word 'forthwith', which was dismissed based on recent jurisprudence.

Second, he argued his section 7 Charter rights were violated because the technician failed to keep a printout of an aborted second breath sample analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code, a qualified technician may determine in good faith that a sample is unsuitable and demand a further sample.

The results of the aborted analysis of an inadequate sample could not have assisted the defence.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a young person charged with robbery.

The trial judge excluded the young person's statement to the police because the officer failed to explain that any statement was required to be made in the presence of a consulted third party, as mandated by section 146(2)(b)(iv) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that there is a significant difference between a young person's right to have a third party present and the requirement that a statement be taken in their presence.

The failure to provide this information was not a mere technical irregularity under section 146(6).

The appellant appealed a restitution order imposed as part of her sentence.

The sentencing judge had imposed the order primarily to save the victim the expense of civil litigation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the restitution order, noting that the appellant was unemployed and bankrupt, and therefore had no ability to pay.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting his statement to police without holding a voir dire or obtaining a clear waiver.

The Crown conceded the error, and the Court of Appeal found the Crown failed to demonstrate no substantial wrong was occasioned.

The Court allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, noting that the trial judge's reasons suggested the appellant entered the building out of curiosity and only formed the intent to commit an indictable offence once inside, whereas the law requires intent to coincide with entry.