Jeffery Elder Couse

The appellant appealed his 21-month custodial sentence for aggravated assault, arguing the sentencing judge erred in applying the parity principle by imposing a sentence almost double that of his co-accused, who pleaded guilty and had a criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The court affirmed that the sentencing judge properly considered the parity principle and other factors like denunciation and deterrence, noting that the co-accused's guilty plea was a mitigating factor not available to the appellant, justifying the disparity.

This decision addresses motions by proposed interveners in a criminal appeal concerning the constitutionality of Criminal Code provisions related to sexual services.

The respondent, N.S., was charged with offences under ss. 286.2(1), 286.3(1), and 286.4, which were declared unconstitutional by the trial judge.

The Crown appealed this decision and sought a stay of the declaration.

Proposed interveners, including sex workers' rights organizations, sought leave to intervene in the appeal and the stay motion.

They also requested to delay the appeal pending a separate civil application challenging broader Criminal Code provisions and to introduce fresh evidence.

The court granted leave to intervene in both the stay motion and the appeal, but denied the requests to delay the appeal and to augment the factual record.

The court emphasized the need for expeditious resolution of criminal appeals, particularly those involving constitutional challenges with conflicting jurisprudence, and reiterated that interveners act as friends of the court, not parties, and generally cannot expand the evidentiary record or issues.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for a stay of convictions for trafficking heroin and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing police entrapment in "dial-a-dope" operations.

The appeal centered on the application of the Supreme Court's R. v. Ahmad framework for entrapment, specifically regarding the "reasonable suspicion" test.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge applied an incorrect analytical approach by relying on "bona fide investigation" as a standalone justification, her ultimate conclusion of no entrapment was correct.

The Court determined that reasonable suspicion was formed during the initial and subsequent communications with the appellant before the opportunity to commit the crime was presented.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, J.L., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference against his daughter, C.L. The appeal challenged the trial judge's admission of three out-of-court statements made by C.L.: two under the principled exception to the hearsay rule and one under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the video-recorded statement was not made within a reasonable time and not adopted by the complainant, and that the first two statements failed the necessity and threshold reliability criteria, particularly regarding potential influence from the mother and alternative explanations for the abuse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the hearsay exceptions, including the assessment of reasonable time, adoption, necessity (distinguishing from cumulative hearsay), and substantive reliability (ruling out speculative alternative explanations and addressing concerns about maternal influence).

The appellant, Freddy Mawick, appealed his conviction for fraud over $5000, arguing that evidence used against him was obtained in violation of his s. 8 Charter rights and should have been excluded.

The evidence included information from UPS and financial institutions, some obtained via production orders and some without judicial authorization.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the UPS information, that the production orders were validly issued based on reasonable grounds, and that any alleged Charter breaches were minor and did not warrant exclusion under s. 24(2).

The court affirmed that the Crown does not need to show that records will afford evidence directly against the accused for a production order to be valid, only that they are relevant to the offence.

The appellant, Bevon Marshall, appealed a cumulative sentence of 21.5 years for various criminal offences, including robbery, firearms offences, drug trafficking, and aggravated assault, imposed by three different judges.

He also appealed the duration of a ten-year long-term supervision order (LTSO).

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming that the sentencing judges properly applied the totality principle and that the sentences were fit.

The court upheld the 10-year LTSO, concluding that the expert evidence and the appellant's extensive criminal history established a substantial risk of violent re-offence, justifying the order's maximum duration.

The appellant was convicted of wilfully causing unnecessary pain to his dog by spraying it with bear spray and assaulting it, contrary to s. 445(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay statements from his mother for their truth.

The appeal court reviewed the trial judge's application of the principled exception to the hearsay rule, specifically regarding substantive reliability as per R. v. Bradshaw.

The court found that while the trial judge made some errors in identifying corroborative evidence, the overall analysis correctly concluded that the hearsay statements were admissible due to compelling circumstantial evidence negating untruthfulness or mistake.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought to vary bail conditions to permit driving, citing material changes in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the disproportionate length of the driving prohibition compared to potential Highway Traffic Act penalties, and the need to care for his ill mother.

The Crown opposed, arguing the driving prohibition addressed secondary ground concerns related to Criminal Code charges.

The court found the pandemic and associated delays constituted a material change, and that the driving prohibition was not directly and necessarily related to the criminal offences alleged.

The application was granted, varying the bail conditions to allow driving for work, with surety, or for necessities of life, and requiring identification.

The appellant, a former fashion photographer, appealed his convictions for six counts of sexual assault and one count of sexual exploitation involving four young women, and his subsequent 51-month imprisonment sentence.

The appeal raised four grounds: the application judge's refusal to sever charges, the trial judge's decision to admit cross-count similar fact evidence, alleged errors in the jury charge, and the fitness of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in the lower court's decisions regarding severance, similar fact evidence admissibility, or jury instructions, and concluding the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range for the offences committed.

The appellant was convicted of six offences: conspiracy to traffic firearms, conspiracy to traffic cocaine, possession of a firearm for the purpose of transfer, possession of an unlicensed firearm, possession of a firearm with its serial number removed, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The appeal raised three grounds: the jury selection procedure, the refusal to sever charges, and jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the jury selection ground, finding that the trial judge erred in ruling he lacked jurisdiction to order exclusion of unsworn jurors while using rotating triers.

The appellant had specifically requested this procedure and was deprived of his chosen option when forced to select between static triers with full exclusion or rotating triers with no exclusion.

The Court found this error could not be cured by the curative proviso and ordered a new trial.

Seven appellants appealed their convictions for offences relating to a conspiracy to import and traffic in cocaine, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing their applications for a stay of proceedings based on breach of their Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The appellants contended that the 30-month presumptive ceiling under the Jordan framework should not apply because the Crown preferred an indictment, thereby creating a one-stage proceeding subject to an 18-month ceiling.

They also argued that delay in preferring the indictment constituted "wasted" time and that systemic or institutional delay was not adequately considered.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the 30-month ceiling applied to cases tried in superior court regardless of whether a preliminary inquiry occurred, that the Crown's delay in preferring the indictment was justified and did not constitute wasted time, and that the case's particular complexity justified the delay beyond the presumptive ceiling.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a sentence of 30 months custody (21.5 months effective) imposed after conviction for robbery of a gas station convenience store.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred in characterizing his prior sentences as lenient and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal found that while the characterization of prior sentences as lenient was inappropriate, it had no impact on the sentence imposed.

The court upheld the sentence as fit, noting the appellant's extensive criminal record, ineffective probation orders, 14 convictions for breaching court orders, and substance abuse issues.

The court emphasized the vulnerability of convenience store clerks working alone late at night.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking under s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The conviction followed police surveillance, an undercover purchase, and searches of the appellant's vehicle and apartment.

The appellant appealed, challenging the validity of the apartment search warrant and alleging various Charter violations during the police takedown and strip searches.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding sufficient grounds for the search warrant independent of evidence obtained from an allegedly unlawful strip search, and finding no Charter violations that would warrant a stay of proceedings.