COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Favreau, Rahman and Osborne JJ.A.
BETWEEN
His Majesty the King
Respondent
and
Euclide Ross
Appellant
Deniz Sarikaya, for the appellant
Nicholas Hay, for the respondent
Heard: June 22, 2026
On appeal from the convictions entered by Justice Susanne Boucher of the Superior Court of Justice, on March 7, 2025.
REASONS FOR DECISION
1The appellant, Euclide Ross, appeals from his conviction following a trial before a judge alone in respect of two offences under the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46:
a. dangerous operation of a conveyance causing death (s. 320.13); and
b. failure to stop and assist after an accident that caused death (s. 320.16).
2As found by the trial judge, at approximately 5:00 PM on January 4, 2023, the appellant left his home wearing a black baseball hat, black pants and a black jacket and walked to his black Ford F-150 pickup truck parked on the street in front of his home.
3Seven minutes later, a truck resembling the appellant’s vehicle was travelling on Lake Shore Boulevard West in Toronto. The truck turned left onto Second Street and struck Mr. Simmons, a pedestrian who was crossing the street. Mr. Simmons was stuck under the front driver’s side wheel of the truck and was dragged along the street and into the LCBO parking lot at the corner of the intersection.
4There, the driver of the truck got out, removed Mr. Simmons from under the front wheel, checked him for a pulse, then got back in the vehicle and drove away. Tragically, Mr. Simmons died from his injuries.
5The only contested issue at trial was the identity of the driver of the truck.
6The appellant appeals his conviction on three grounds, alleging that the trial judge:
a. erred in failing to instruct herself according to the principles in R. v. Nikolovski, 1996 CanLII 158 (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1197;
b. erred in failing to instruct herself pursuant to R. v. W.(D.), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742; and
c. materially misapprehended the evidence.
7In his original notice of appeal, the appellant also appealed his sentence, but subsequently filed a notice of abandonment for the sentence appeal.
8At the conclusion of oral argument, we dismissed the appeal with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.
9With respect to the first ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the trial judge failed to instruct herself about how to rely on video surveillance evidence in accordance with the guidance from the Supreme Court of Canada in Nikolovski.
10In Nikolovski, the accused was charged with robbing a convenience store. At trial, the Crown introduced a videotape of the robbery recorded by the store security camera as evidence. The store clerk testified that it showed the entire event.
11At trial, the store clerk testified, and could not identify the accused with certainty. The trial judge directed herself as to the frailties of eyewitness identification, but concluded that the videotape was very clear and that the accused was in view of the camera sufficiently long enough for her to make a careful observation. Accordingly, she convicted the accused.
12The Supreme Court considered the evolution of the use of audio and videotape evidence in Canada and stated that a tape, including a videotape, particularly if it is not challenged as to its accuracy or continuity, can provide the most cogent evidence of the relevant events: Nikolovski, at para. 16. The Supreme Court further stated at paras. 22, 23 and 30:
So long as the videotape is of good quality and gives a clear picture of events, and the perpetrator, it may provide the best evidence of the identity of the perpetrator. It is relevant and admissible evidence that can by itself be cogent and convincing evidence on the issue of identity. Indeed, it may be the only evidence available.
It is precisely because videotape evidence can present such very clear and convincing evidence of identification that triers of fact can use it as the sole basis for the identification of the accused before them as the perpetrator of the crime. … If an appellate court, upon a review of the tape, is satisfied that it is of sufficient clarity and quality that it would be reasonable for the trier of fact to identify the accused is the person in the tape beyond any reasonable doubt then that decision should not be disturbed.
Although triers of fact are entitled to reach a conclusion as to identification based solely on videotape evidence, they must exercise care in doing so.
13The appellant submits that the trial judge did not instruct herself to consider the clarity, quality, or length of the video evidence depicting the truck, and exercised no care when considering the video evidence to determine the issue of identity.
14There is no merit to this ground of appeal.
15In this case, surveillance video showed the appellant leaving his residence in his black F-150 truck just prior to the incident. The truck could then be traced, pursuant to successive surveillance videos from various addresses, travelling the relatively short distance from the appellant’s residence to the site of the collision, and thereafter to an Esso gas station and a different LCBO where the appellant got out of the vehicle at both locations and was clearly identifiable.
16Video evidence from six months prior to the collision showed certain distinctive features of the appellant’s truck, including three decals on the rear window, a red “X” on the truck bed, and chrome wheel covers and running boards. The trial judge found that the truck that struck Mr. Simmons had the same features, as reflected in the video evidence.
17The reasons of the trial judge reflect her careful analysis of the surveillance videos beginning at paragraph 36 of her reasons. The trial judge analysed the surveillance videos in stages, and in great detail, analyzed the comparator vehicle, the pre-collision videos and the post-collision videos.
18In so doing, the trial judge considered the video evidence according to the framework set out by the Supreme Court in Nikolovski, and made no error. We further note that, unlike the situation in Nikolovski, the video evidence in this case was not limited to a single video, but rather included numerous surveillance videos, taken close in time and geography, and which traced the appellant’s vehicle from his residence to the collision and on to the Esso station and LCBO where the appellant was clearly captured on camera.
19With respect to the second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the trial judge erred in failing to apply the W.(D.)1 framework to what he submits is exculpatory evidence – in particular, images of the suspect truck that had dissimilar features to the truck owned by the appellant, a report concluding that the paint chips found on the victim’s clothing were different from the paint found on the appellant’s vehicle, and the description of the driver of the suspect truck provided by an eyewitness to the collision which he submits did not match the appearance of the appellant.
20We see no merit in this ground of appeal. This was a judge alone trial. Judges are presumed to know the law, and they are not required to apply W.(D.) formulaically: R. v. Boucher, 2005 SCC 72, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 499, at para. 29; R. v. Wadforth, 2009 ONCA 716, 247 C.C.C. (3d) 466, at para. 51; R. v. Karnes, 2013 ONCA 605, at para. 10; R. v. E.D., 2020 ONCA 633, at para. 14, leave to appeal refused [2020] S.C.C.A. No. 474; see also R. v. T.D., 2024 ONCA 860, at para. 37.
21It is evident from the trial judge’s reasons that she considered the potentially exculpatory evidence and that it did not leave her with a reasonable doubt. She also considered the evidence as a whole and was not left with any reasonable doubt that the appellant was the driver.
22The trial judge carefully analyzed the evidence of the eyewitness and took into account all other evidence that might raise a reasonable doubt, including the absence of blood and fibres on the truck, the lack of matching paint chips and the fact that no airbags had deployed. The trial judge explicitly recognized the fact that all identifying features of the appellant’s truck were not observable on the suspect truck in each video, but found that the “whole of the evidentiary chain … makes up for the deficiencies in clarity with some of the videos intermittently in the chain”.
23In addition to the video evidence, other evidence in the record amply supported the conclusions reached by the trial judge. Among other things:
the appellant admitted having been in his truck at the relevant time to go shopping in the exact area of the collision and that he was the only driver of his truck; and
he was wearing all black clothing and a hat, as the eyewitness identified the driver of the truck as wearing.
24The trial judge carefully considered the potentially exculpatory evidence in the context of all of the evidence as a whole, as she was required to do. She concluded that those pieces of evidence in combination could potentially have raised a reasonable doubt if the overall circumstantial evidentiary picture was weaker, but they did not do so on this record. Her findings were open to her and are entitled to deference.
25With respect to the third ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence, and in particular failed to consider and give proper effect to significant differences in the vehicles seen travelling in the successive surveillance videos.
26To the extent that this ground of appeal is substantively different than the first ground, we reject it also. We have addressed the video surveillance evidence above.
27Moreover, the trial judge was clearly alive to the issue that the black F-150 trucks seen in the successive surveillance videos could be different vehicles. At paragraph 17 of the reasons, she observed that the truck model is a very popular truck, with many in Toronto, the fact that having decals or stickers in the rear windows is not itself rare, that there were some gaps between videos and that certain videos did not show the highly identifiable features of the appellant’s truck.
28There is no reviewable error in the conclusion she reached, having reviewed all of those facts and the submissions of defence counsel, that the appellant was driving the truck at the time of the collision.
29In sum, we see no error in the analysis by the trial judge, and her finding that the arguments raised by the defence did “not offer reasonable inference other than guilt, and do not raise a reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming countervailing evidence supporting the inference that Mr. Ross was the driver of the vehicle that struck Mr. Simmons”. These conclusions were clearly open to her.
30We see no basis for appellate intervention.
31Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the sentence appeal is dismissed as abandoned.
“L. Favreau J.A.” “M. Rahman J.A.” “Osborne J.A.”
Footnotes
- R. v. W.(D.), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742.