Monica Song

The moving party brought a motion under Rule 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to amend a previous order of the Court of Appeal.

The moving party sought to have an unpaid Superior Court costs order of $9,000 paid out of monies the responding party had previously paid into court as security for costs.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the moving party's original intent in seeking security for costs included the costs of the underlying application, and awarded $2,000 in costs for the motion.

The appellant, a dental school graduate, appealed the dismissal of his application for an injunction to compel the National Dental Examining Board of Canada to grant him a "Special Appeal" of his failed written exams.

The motion judge had struck the application, finding no reasonable cause of action as the Board's by-laws did not provide a substantive right to a "Special Appeal" for written exam failures.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, agreeing that the by-laws, when read as a whole, did not establish such a right, and therefore, the application for injunctive relief failed.

The applicants, representing taxi drivers and plate holders, sought to quash the City of Ottawa's 2016 Vehicle-for-Hire By-law, which created a separate regulatory regime for Private Transportation Companies (PTCs) like Uber.

The applicants argued the by-law was enacted in bad faith, granted an illegal bonus to PTCs, and was ultra vires.

The court dismissed the majority of the application, finding the City conducted extensive consultation, acted within its broad regulatory powers, and did not grant an undue advantage.

However, the court severed and quashed two specific provisions that were added to the by-law without notice to the stakeholders.

Kaymar Rehabilitation Inc. appealed the dismissal of its action against Champlain Community Care Access Centre regarding a 2003 request for proposals for therapy services.

Kaymar challenged the trial judge's interpretation of the RFP documents, arguing that Champlain improperly allowed bidders without therapy services experience to qualify by accepting "professional services" as equivalent experience.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation, finding that the RFP documents clearly permitted such equivalents and that Kaymar had accepted these terms by bidding.

The court also addressed the costs award, reducing it from $1,864,000 to $1,675,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

This costs endorsement followed a twelve-year litigation where the plaintiff's case, alleging an unfair bidding process, was dismissed in its entirety.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs of over $2.8 million, citing the plaintiff's unfounded allegations of dishonesty and collusion and persistence despite prior judicial warnings.

The plaintiff argued for partial indemnity costs, disputing the quantum and the basis for substantial indemnity.

The court awarded the defendant substantial indemnity costs from the date of its offer to settle in May 2014, finding the plaintiff's continued litigation of weak claims warranted such an award.

The final costs awarded to the defendant were $1,864,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST, after reductions for travel and excessive e-discovery costs.

The plaintiff, an incumbent service provider, sued the defendant community care access centre for damages arising from a 2003 Request for Proposals (RFP) process.

The plaintiff alleged the procurement process was unfair, claiming the defendant was motivated by a desire to avoid severance costs, used undisclosed criteria, permitted a conflict of interest, unfairly customized the RFP, accepted a non-compliant bid, and conducted a flawed evaluation.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that while there were minor procedural irregularities, the defendant did not breach its duty of fairness.

The court concluded the defendant had no financial motive to disfavour the plaintiff, the evaluation criteria were transparent, and the plaintiff was not prejudiced by the evaluation process.

The plaintiff brought a motion challenging the defendant’s claims of privilege over numerous emails listed in Schedule B of its affidavit of documents in a civil action alleging improper tendering practices in a public procurement process.

The court considered the scope and duration of solicitor‑client privilege and litigation privilege, particularly whether litigation privilege arising from earlier labour board proceedings and arbitration continued to apply in the current civil action.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada’s framework in Blank v. Canada, the court held that litigation privilege persists only where the subsequent litigation constitutes essentially the same legal combat and disclosure would intrude upon the advocate’s protected zone of privacy.

The court also examined issues arising from electronic discovery and discovery planning under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

After inspecting the contested documents, the court ordered production of some emails while upholding privilege over others depending on their purpose and whether disclosure would reveal legal advice or litigation strategy.