R. Andrew Scott

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and failing to provide a breath sample, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge was unprepared and negligent.

The summary conviction appeal judge reviewed the evidence, including witness testimony of the appellant's intoxication and a video of his failure to provide a breath sample.

The court found the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and reasonable.

The appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml.

At trial, the accused argued that breath samples should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) arising from a police officer’s mistaken belief that a 15‑minute waiting period was required before administering a roadside screening test after the accused had been smoking.

The trial judge found Charter breaches but admitted the breath samples after applying the three-part test from R. v. Grant, concluding the officer acted in good faith and society’s interest in adjudicating impaired driving offences supported admission.

On appeal, the appellant argued the officer’s conduct constituted negligence rather than good faith and that the trial judge misapplied the Grant analysis.

The court held the trial judge considered the proper factors and was not clearly wrong in characterizing the conduct as a good faith mistake.

Deference was owed to the trial judge’s balancing under s. 24(2), and the conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous driving following a trial where he was acquitted of impaired driving but convicted of dangerous driving and sentenced to a one-year driving prohibition and a fine.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence concerning post‑accident alcohol consumption and improperly relied on Intoxilyzer readings to infer alcohol consumption before the accident.

The appellate court held that where there is intervening or "bolus" alcohol consumption, it is generally unsafe to infer pre‑incident drinking without expert evidence or other strong proof establishing the amount consumed.

The trial judge misapprehended the evidence relating to post‑accident alcohol consumption.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered because there remained evidence capable of supporting a dangerous driving conviction even without the alcohol inference.