Korinda McLaine

The applicant brought a Charter challenge against s. 163(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, which gave the Parole Board 90 days to review a suspended statutory release.

For offenders with less than six months remaining on their sentence, this timeframe could result in incarceration beyond their newly calculated statutory release date.

The court granted the applicant public interest standing and found that the provision violated s. 7 of the Charter by arbitrarily and disproportionately depriving offenders of their liberty.

The infringement was not saved by s. 1.

The court remedied the violation by reading in language requiring the Parole Board to render its decision before the offender's new statutory release date.

An appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing a habeas corpus application challenging the appellant's reclassification from medium to maximum security and subsequent transfer to a penitentiary outside Ontario.

The appeal was rendered moot when the appellant was reclassified back to medium security and subsequently released on parole while the appeal was pending.

The Court of Appeal declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, noting that the issues sought to be raised were not properly raised before the application judge and that attempting to expand upon the legal principles established in Mission Institution v. Khela without a proper factual foundation would provide limited assistance.

An appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing a habeas corpus application challenging the appellant's reclassification from medium to maximum security and subsequent transfer to a penitentiary outside Ontario.

The appeal was rendered moot when the appellant was transferred back to medium security prior to the extension of time being granted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, finding that the current habeas corpus proceeding was the preferable forum to address the lawfulness of the appellant's present detention.

The Attorney General of Canada moved to strike portions of a self-represented plaintiff's pleading, including claims for misfeasance in public office, false imprisonment, arbitrary detention, cruel and unusual punishment, breach of fundamental justice, and aggravated and punitive damages.

The court applied the "plain and obvious" test under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Claims for misfeasance in public office, aggravated damages, and punitive damages were permitted to proceed, as sufficient material facts were pleaded.

However, claims for false imprisonment, arbitrary detention, cruel and unusual punishment, and breach of fundamental justice were struck without leave to amend due to a lack of reasonable prospect of success or insufficient factual basis.

The respondent brought an unopposed motion seeking to dismiss an application for delay in relation to a 2009 proceeding in which the applicant sought declaratory relief regarding an alleged interest in currency seized by the Canada Border Services Agency.

The court found procedural deficiencies in the moving materials under Rule 37.12.1(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the failure to file a draft order and properly serve required documents.

The court also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to dismiss an application for delay because the Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide such relief.

Instead, the Rules provide mechanisms for treating applications as abandoned under Rule 38.08.

The motion was therefore dismissed without prejudice to the respondent bringing a motion to have the application deemed abandoned or taking other procedural steps.

Following a pleadings motion in which the defendants were substantially successful in striking portions of a statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action or being improperly pleaded, the court addressed costs.

Although leave to amend certain paragraphs had been granted, the defendants remained the substantially successful parties.

The court held that the plaintiff’s self‑represented status and incarceration did not justify departing from ordinary costs principles.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a partial indemnity basis and fixed at $7,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.