Joseph Gyverson

This decision addresses costs following a successful motion by the defendants.

The defendants sought costs, but their Rule 49 offer was not strictly compliant with timing requirements.

The court found the time expended by the defendants' counsel to be excessive.

Ultimately, the court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs, fixed at $3,300.00 for fees plus HST and $507.66 for disbursements, emphasizing the importance of reasonable expectations and a fit and just award.

The defendants moved under Rule 21 to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim, arguing it failed to disclose a cause of action for ownership or vesting of cottage land.

The court found the statement of claim did not sufficiently plead the requirements for a gift, nor did it allege trust, proprietary estoppel, unjust enrichment, or detrimental reliance.

Given the pleadings, particularly the deceased's stated intention not to convey due to tax liability, the court concluded it was plain, obvious, and beyond doubt that the plaintiffs' claims could not succeed as pleaded.

The defendants' motion was granted.

Following dismissal of an estate-related claim by the applicant alleging undue influence over a will, the successful respondents sought approximately $92,000 in costs after a summary judgment motion.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including proportionality and the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party.

The court found the hours claimed by counsel were disproportionate to the relatively straightforward issues and modest value of the estate.

The court also considered the unsuccessful party’s limited financial circumstances as a relevant factor under rule 57.01.

Costs were reduced substantially and fixed at a modest amount inclusive of disbursements.

The respondents brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing an application challenging a will on the basis of undue influence and seeking dependant’s relief under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The applicant alleged that the deceased had been improperly influenced by the sole beneficiary when executing the will and alternatively claimed he was a dependant entitled to support from the estate.

The court found the allegations of undue influence were unsupported and lacked corroboration as required under s. 13 of the Evidence Act.

The court further concluded there was no evidence the applicant was financially dependent on the deceased at the time of death or otherwise qualified as a dependant under s. 57 of the SLRA.

Finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the claims.