A. Zegouras

The appellant appealed his conviction for wilfully killing a dog without lawful excuse.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in law by placing the burden on the accused to prove lawful excuse on a balance of probabilities.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code applied.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the error engaged fundamental principles of criminal law and that the case against the accused was not so overwhelming that a properly instructed jury would have inevitably convicted.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving 'over 80', arguing his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached when police failed to facilitate contact with his lawyer of choice at the roadside.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the trial judge erred by focusing solely on the appellant's due diligence without first determining whether the police had fulfilled their initial implementation duties under s. 10(b).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

At a preliminary inquiry into the death of Shane Stone, the Crown sought committal of three accused on charges of second degree murder.

The victim was beaten to death in the accused's bedroom on January 2, 2013.

One accused conceded committal.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit the other two accused to trial on second degree murder, with one accused also facing charges of accessory after the fact and robbery.

The decision turned on circumstantial evidence including DNA findings, forensic evidence, witness testimony, and cell phone records establishing presence and participation in the assault.

The Crown applied to admit evidence of prior discreditable conduct by two of the accused relating to an assault on November 23, 2011, to support a committal on a charge of second degree murder.

One accused conceded committal, but the other objected.

The court found that while some similarities existed between the prior assault and the charged offence, most were generic in nature and present in countless assault cases.

The court held that the probative value of the similar fact evidence was limited and did not outweigh the risk of prejudice.

The Crown's reasoning essentially sought to establish that the accused was the "type of person" who commits serious assaults, which is prohibited reasoning.

The application was dismissed.